Mustafa
Alani
Senior Adviser and Director of
Security Department, Gulf Research
Center
In GCC-Iran
relations, there are a numerous critical issues, all of which are critical
for both sides. These issues are the products of geography and history, as well
as the result of the divergent national and strategic interests of the two
sides. However, unlike other examples of conflicts in the international
political arena, the GCC-Iran conflict has one vital element missing, that of an
effective balance of power,
In recent history,
the Iran of the Shah and then its successor, the Iran of Ayatollahs, has
invested considerable effort and money in building power and influence centers
inside some of the Gulf Arab states, and certainly inside other Arab states. In
that context, Iran has sought to harness the support of the Shia community, or a
part of it, in certain Gulf Arab states, as a means to back Iranian political
and strategic objectives.
Looking at this
approach in general terms, Iran has scored considerable success in its attempt
to utilize the card of sectarian identity and make out of this an issue of
loyalty superior to other loyalties. Let it be clear, the great majority among
the members of the Shia communities in the Gulf States have never deviated from
loyalty to their own country and to their Arab identity. Indeed, they have never
suffered from a conflict of loyalties because, in short, they have no other
loyalty superseding that to their country and to their Arab national belonging.
For this clear
majority, Iran has been, and still is, a Persian state which competes and is in
conflict with its Arab neighbors. It is a state that has its own national
interests which, in many areas, contradict and conflict with Arab national
interests. They see no political dimension in their sectarian identity. In fact,
they have never considered the need to develop any form of a sectarian loyalty
or, by extension, loyalty to Iran or its political
objectives.
Still, since the
success of the Iranian revolution, the Ayatollah regime has persistently tried
to project Iran as the mentor, promoter and protector of Shia interests and,
indeed, of the Shia population around the world. Over time and particularly
today, this self- proclaimed status of Iran as the leader and protector of the
Arab Shia has turned into the main instrument of Iranian interventionist policy
in internal Arab affairs. By applying such mechanism, it has been said that
Iranian intelligence with the help and support of the state's religious
institutions has succeeded in mobilizing a 'fifth column' in some Gulf Arab
states. In turn, a very tiny minority of citizens has allegedly accepted to
serve the interests of a foreign state. And with such a 'fifth column', Iran
possesses a strategic advantage over most of the Arab states.
Going back to the
opening argument that the GCC-Iran conflict has some vital elements missing, it
is in fact the balance in this conflict that is missing. While Iran is able to
effectively act from within Gulf Arab societies, the GCC states do not have the
ability to act in such a manner or to redress the balance. As a result, this
one-way interventionist policy has made these societies vulnerable vis-à-vis
Iranian objectives.
The equation in
this issue is clear. The more Iran weakens, the more it is going to utilize the
sectarian card to gain influence and achieve its objective of destabilizing Gulf
Arab societies. No doubt, for reasons relating to the nature of Bahraini
society, Bahrain represents the 'fault line' in this confrontation. In addition,
other Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with small Shia minorities could
be equally targeted.
Meanwhile, the
people of Iran have been protesting against a regime which has shown no respect
for human rights, a regime which has dealt harshly with any demand for reform
and has never recognized the right of any opposition to exist.
In the end, no one
should, or could, deny the right of the people –irrespective of their ethnic,
religious, or sectarian origins - to demand respect for their human rights and
to ask for political and economic reforms. Yet, it should be equally the case
that such justified and fair demands should not be hijacked by a tiny minority
which is wearing the cloak of 'Gulf citizenship'.