Gulf Research Center Foundation

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The Global Think Tank Security Forum 2012

Università Ca'Foscari Venezia

The Global Think Tank
Security Forum 2012

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By publishing this volume, the Gulf Research Center (GRC) seeks to contribute to the enrichment of the reader's knowledge out of the Center's strong conviction that 'knowledge is for all.'

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Dr. Abdulaziz O. Sager
Chairman
Gulf Research Center

About the
Gulf Research Center

The Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute founded in July 2000 by Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, a Saudi businessman, who realized, in a world of rapid political, social and economic change, the importance of pursuing politically neutral and academically sound research about the Gulf region and disseminating the knowledge obtained as widely as possible. The Center is a non-partisan think-tank, education service provider and consultancy specializing in the Gulf region. The GRC seeks to provide a better understanding of the challenges and prospects of the Gulf region.

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The Global Think Tank Security Forum

The first annual meeting of the Global Think Tank Security Forum took place on May 28 and 29, 2012 at the Arsenale headquarters of the Italian Navy in Venice, Italy. The meeting brought together more than 40 participants representing think tanks from throughout the world in order to exchange views, ideas, and expertise with regard to the security challenges being faced in today's world. The event was organized by the Gulf Research Center Foundation with the support of the Ca Foscari University, Venice and the Italian Navy.

The objective of the meeting was to come up with an initial overview of current and impending security issues as they exist in the present ever-changing international landscape from both a regional as well as cross-regional perspective. This included identifying security issues that are common across states, highlighting security considerations that might be unique in a particular regional context, emphasizing new or emerging threats or challenges which so far appear on the margins of current debates, and suggesting policy recommendations or inputs that could in the end help to mitigate various dangers or threats.

Following its successful start, it is the aim of the Global Think Tank Security Forum to meet on an annual basis and to continue to build a platform for centers

and institutions working on security and strategic issues to exchange knowledge, perspectives and best practices with the purpose of producing high-quality research. For the first meeting, all speakers were asked to prepare short papers that provided an insight into their thinking on security issues either from a regional or transnational point of view. These papers have been compiled in a publication that each of the participating think tanks can utilize and distribute among their stakeholders and interested public.

The meeting highlighted the fact that under the process of globalization even security threats that develop within a limited domestic context can quickly escalate to have an impact beyond national borders. The gap between domestic and international security has almost disappeared and as such the actions of small groups of people can have widespread and devastating consequences. Similarly, the line between traditional and non-traditional threats to security has become increasingly blurred. The inter-relatedness of security challenges can thus not be denied or ignored. A key question that came up during the discussion but to which no satisfactory answer was initially found was whether globalization has made conflict more or less likely. Instead, there was agreement on the assessment that globalization has multiplied security challenges and therefore has made the search for policy responses more complex.

Such complexity presents a tremendous challenge not only for current political leadership but it also places the rising generation of future leaders in increasingly difficult positions. Governance in this context has emerged as a key concept which incorporates aspects such as leadership, the sense of political will, the problem of potential institutional weakness – as is currently visible in the Arab world, for example – the need for security sector reform, and the uncertainty of political transition and its impact on how to deal with a variety of security threats. The (in)capacity to deal with the current profound period of transformation where security documents are being constantly rewritten poses its own distinct challenges.

Misperception, in the meantime, continues to play a central role as far as both state-to-state but also personal relations are concerned. Here, there is the ever-present danger of sliding into conflict situations even if this was not the original intent by the involved parties as could potentially happen as far as the current situation with Iran is concerned. Perceptions are one side of the coin and there is equally the dichotomy between growing misperceptions and the need for greater information-sharing to avoid potential areas of disagreement that could – unless dealt with – escalate into larger conflict situations.

Furthermore, there are strong discrepancies when it comes to threat assessments with some actors considering certain challenges as being more prevalent whereas others do not assign those challenges the same kind of urgency. The discussion underlined this point when it comes to the issue of terrorism where it was argued on the one hand that the era of 9/11 was coming to a close with other priorities emerging while, on the other hand, it was also argued that the distinct possibility of another large-scale attack is ever-present which would in turn bring the terrorist phenomenon once again to the forefront. The point here might be that security challenges never completely disappear but that they simply lie dormant for a while.

So-called traditional security issues remain prevalent, as the discussion revealed, over issues such as China and Iran, non-proliferation, terrorism, maritime security, or aspects such as the small arms trade and the commercialization of the military sector which has led to a significant increase in the use of private military companies. The already mentioned dichotomy between misperception and the need for information-sharing is also evident here when one considers the issue of maritime security in terms of the need for the freedom of the seas (an issue of central importance within the field of energy security, for example) vs. the fight against piracy, illicit trade, proliferation concerns etc. that in turn require greater intervention and restrictions. While the seas represent the links between continents as can be seen with the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, a great discrepancy exists in the ability of states to control maritime waters. This is highlighted by the fact that the US Navy is today one-third the size it was during World War II while the resources available to a country like South Africa, which occupies a key geographical position in terms of maritime traffic at the southern tip of the continent, has shown to be inadequate to the required need. The same argument can be put forth for the Indian and Chinese navies as they are confronted with a variety of sea-based threats.

At the same time, numerous other issues were mentioned that have increased in importance even though a direct security link might not be immediately evident. This includes items such as pandemics, corruption, migration, the ability to provide humanitarian assistance, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RfP), climate change, water and food security, environmental degradation, energy security (both supply and demand security), energy scarcity as well as demographics. The medium- to long-term dangers associated with such broad issues are clearly evident but the ability to divert sufficient resources to adequately deal with them has at the same time not been matched. Short-term thinking and responses to immediate issues

prevails. Exactly how one should deal with the overarching concept of human security remains unclear.

How to deal with these challenges or the more traditional notions of either a rising or a changing China is complicated by the lack of global governance structures that could in theory deal with the litany of transnational and cross-border security threats. Here, it was mentioned that more inclusive arrangements would need to be considered including a variety of conflict management mechanisms able to adapt to the ever-changing security environment. A related question that however remains is whether international treaty arrangements actually work, and in case they are seen as insufficient, whether they can be reformed or replaced with new approaches. Even on the regional front, the track record of regional security architectures is mixed at best with Europe being put forth as a successful example while attempts at establishing such mechanisms in the Middle East or South Asia have not resulted in anything concrete or hopeful. Given the divergent nature and shifting composition of where and how security challenges emerge, it appears clear a multi-functional response mechanism is needed but how it can be constituted especially at the multilateral level remains unclear.

As far as most militaries are concerned, there exists a high degree of reluctance to use military power or force to resolve issues given the full understanding about the destruction that is caused by the use of such power. The underlying realization is that development can only take place in peaceful conditions and therefore all efforts must be undertaken in order to avoid war situations. As was mentioned on several occasions, there can be no security without development and no development without security. But while such a slogan appears self-evident, it is also clear that issues such as economic scarcity, uneven growth, shifting migration patterns, and demographic developments have still not been elevated as key security considerations when it comes to medium- to long-term policies. In the meantime, the redeployment of military sources to areas such as humanitarian assistance or fighting piracy has again underlined the need to possibly re-shape the institutions that have defined the post-World War II environment and to engage more substantially in the search for alternatives.

But even such search is complicated by the significant shift in recent decades in the absence of large-scale direct conflict and the rising prevalence of indirect conflicts. Certainly, there has been a shift in terms of how violence is applied with the state confronting the loss of monopoly over the use of force. And while state-to-state war is seen as increasingly becoming obsolete, the definition of what constitutes an invasion in the classical sense is equally subject to debate as recent

instances with cyber warfare have underlined. Moreover, most other conditions can be defined as either low-key or low-intensity with the issues involved remaining unresolved, i.e., a situation of no peace and no war. All of this points towards the urgent need to come up with and develop a more comprehensive concept of global security for the global citizen. This could be considered an objective as the Global Think Tank Security Forum continues its work.

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Security Trends: Shifting Priorities and Growing Complexity

Daniel Möckli

In the past decade, international security was heavily shaped by the 9/11 attacks and the US 'War on Terror.' This 9/11 era is gradually coming to a close. With Osama bin Laden dead and the US withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, jihadist terrorism is no longer a strategic preoccupation. While it remains a permanent operational challenge, it has not become an existential threat to states.

At least from a Western perspective, terrorism today is a manageable risk. The core organization of al-Qaeda is severely weakened. Most of its affiliates in the Middle East and Africa as well as the large majority of other Islamist extremist organizations pursue predominantly local agendas. Al-Qaeda's ideology of global jihad is being marginalized in Islamist discourse. While fighting terrorism will continue to be a cost-intensive struggle, counter terrorism works today to the extent that the probability of mass casualty attacks on Western homelands has significantly decreased.

Although non-state violence remains a major security issue, it is increasingly great power relations and inter-state rivalries that governments are preoccupied with again. In the context of the economic and financial crisis, the global shift of economic power from West to East and from North to South has accelerated. The

new world emerging is characterized by a growing number of non-Western states demanding a seat at the global table. Their heightened economic weight is gradually being translated into political clout and ambition.

Against this background, it is easy to depict the international system in largely negative terms today. Related to the proliferation of power centers, there is much political fragmentation on the global level, which derives from a conspicuous divergence of interests and values. Global governance deficits are widening as broadly accepted solutions to common problems are ever more difficult to establish. Leadership is in short supply, with the US no longer able and willing to act as global policeman and emerging powers reluctant to step in. Geoeconomics and geopolitics have taken centrestage again, prompting states to shift from rule-based to power-based behavior once more.

It is important to note, however, that structural interdependencies continue to frame state behavior and inter-state relations too today. These interdependencies, be they economic, societal, or technological, suggest that there will be limits to how far divergence will translate into non-governance and large-scale confrontation in a globalized world. They render some degree of cooperation indispensable for any state. They also account for the fact that rising powers in many cases still choose to work within the Western-shaped international order. Moreover, these interdependencies are the main reason why geopolitics is a much more complex phenomenon today than at any time before.

With these last observations in mind, one may question whether it is adequate to describe the emerging international system as 'multipolar,' as many analysts have done in recent years. The advantage of the term is that it accounts for the ongoing diffusion of power that extends beyond uni-, bi-, or- tripolarity. But the problem with 'multipolarity' is that it suggests a degree of autonomy and separateness of each 'pole' that fails to do justice to the interconnections of today's world. This is why the current state of play may be better described as 'polycentric.' Unlike 'multipolarity,' the notion of 'polycentricism' says nothing about how the different centers of power relate to each other. Just as importantly, it does not elicit connotations with the famous but ill-fated multipolar system in Europe prior to 1914 that initially provided for regular great power consultation, but eventually ended in all-out war.

No matter how you label the emerging order, there is no doubt that security policy is an ever more complex endeavor in today's world. Governments have to prepare for state and non-state challenges alike. They have to find ways of dealing with both powerful and weak states. In view of the diffuse threat environment, their security instruments are required to be multifunctional. Yet budget pressures often

make difficult policy choices and capability reductions inevitable. And although their security depends on effective cooperation with other states, both international and domestic factors render such cooperation often very difficult.

In these circumstances, threat perceptions and policy preferences on how to tackle the security challenges vary widely around the globe. There is no unifying theme or a universally acknowledged single most important security issue to be discerned these days. Accordingly, rather than defining a hierarchy of threats, the following seeks to shed light on a series of major international security developments, as identified by the Center for Security Studies in its annual publication *Strategic Trends*.[1]

China's Uncertain Peaceful Rise: Sino-American Polarization in East Asia

After years of impressive economic growth, China's share of global GDP has grown so fast and extensively that many commentators in both the West and in China itself see it as a coming superpower. However, there are two major uncertainties concerning China's further rise. First, although its relative economic power will continue to increase to some extent, China's growth rates may well shrink significantly. The global economic downturn and especially the crisis in Europe have resulted in decreasing demand for Chinese exports. Changes in China's growth and development model may become inevitable in this context, but any such move implies serious political risks for the leaders in Beijing. Like the Western economies, China faces its own major structural problems these days.

Second, not least as a result of the unfolding growth challenge, China's political elites are increasingly nourishing nationalist sentiments as a means of cementing domestic cohesion. Together with other factors such as the growing role of the Chinese military in shaping foreign policy, this has resulted in Beijing gradually taking a more assertive line internationally, particularly as far as the Asia-Pacific neighborhood is concerned. On the global level, China's economic interdependence with the US and Europe may still provide enough incentive for Beijing to work within the Western-shaped economic system. By contrast, on the regional level, growing Sino-American polarization seems a distinct possibility.

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1. *Strategic Trends – Key Developments in Global Affairs*, edited by Daniel Möckli (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2010ff.), www.sta.ethz.ch

Economically, most states in the Asia-Pacific are drawn ever more closely into China's orbit. When it comes to their security, however, they look more and more to the US, being especially concerned about China's uncompromising statements concerning its extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Washington, in turn, announced a strategic refocus on East Asia in early 2012. Whether the remarkable recent surge in mutual economic ties and multilateral schemes in the Asia Pacific will be able to mitigate regional tensions remains to be seen. There are reasons to doubt it.[2]

The Strategic Weakening of Debt-ridden Europe

The question of where China is heading has not received nearly as much attention in Europe as in the US. This is not just because of differences in geography, power, and strategic culture, but also because the Europeans are preoccupied with themselves these days. The EU is in a bad state, having suffered much fragmentation as the debt crisis has shaken both the Eurozone and the European project proper. Intra-European power shifts that have catapulted Germany into a new leadership role, political and economic divisions between Europe's North and South, re-nationalization tendencies in the EU, and the rise of Euroscepticism across the continent are profoundly changing the nature of European unification. Britain's self-marginalization in Brussels and the growing split between the 17 Eurozone members and the 10 other EU member states raise further questions as to Europe's future cohesion. All this amounts to a significant weakening of the EU's capacity to serve as an anchor of stability in Europe.

With distrust and divergence on the rise and national treasuries empty, European foreign policy is losing clout too. Projecting stability beyond its periphery is an ever bigger challenge for the EU as enlargement fatigue grows, soft power wanes, and EU incentives for neighbors to reform remain modest. The EU's relations with global powers have become cacophonous as individual member states focus on their own strategic partnership with China and the like and tend to stress commercial diplomacy rather than EU normative vocabulary.

Interdependence in the case of the EU has had negative contagion effects as far as the spreading of the debt crisis is concerned. But it has also been a major source of cooperation, as it compels member states to show enough solidarity to keep the Eurozone and the European project afloat. Close economic, cultural, and historical ties in Europe lend the EU a degree of resilience that makes the scenario

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2. For more details, see the chapter by Prem Mahadevan in *Strategic Trends 2012.*

of disintegration look improbable – even if domestic politics are bound to render the search for effective solutions to the debt and euro crisis ever more difficult. Interdependence may also mitigate fragmentation as far as European defense is concerned, as national defense cuts and Washington's turn towards the Pacific strengthen the case for more 'pooling and sharing' in the EU and NATO if Europe's security and credibility are to be preserved.[3]

Transformation and Polarization in the Middle East

The fundamental transformation that is currently sweeping the Arab world has had a major impact on how the region is being perceived. The spread of domestically-driven secular revolts against authoritarian regimes has shifted the focus of international debates towards the question of how the Arab states are constituted internally. The demands for civil rights, economic opportunities, and better governance by a new Arab generation are profoundly changing the Middle East, though the extent and endurance of reforms will vary between states and are still unpredictable. So far, the old Arab nationalist republics have proven to be the most vulnerable authoritarian regimes, while the Gulf monarchies may be able to weather the storm.[4]

Domestic changes in the context of the Arab upheavals can have profound effects on political allegiances and geopolitics in the region at large. This holds particularly true for developments in Egypt and Syria. Linked to the Cold War-like relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Riyadh and other Sunni Gulf monarchies such as Qatar seek to take advantage of the 'Arab Spring' by shifting the regional balance of power in their favor. The result is sectarian polarization across the region on a scale hitherto rarely witnessed in the inter-state relations of the Middle East.[5]

In Egypt and Tunisia, conservative Sunni actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups have gained influence. In Bahrain, on the other hand, Riyadh has used military means to suppress protests of the Shiite majority population against political discrimination. The most important power struggle, however, is taking place in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are advocating arming the Syrian opposition in order to both eliminate Bashir al-Assad as Iran's most

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3. For more details, see the chapter by Daniel Möckli in *Strategic Trends 2012*.

4. See the chapter by Roland Popp in *Strategic Trends 2011*.

5. The following is based on Daniel Möckli, "Iraq after the US Withdrawal: Staring into the Abyss." CSS Analysis in Security Policy no. 113 (May 2012).

important regional ally and boost the influence of conservative Sunni forces in a successor regime in Damascus.

The outcome of the struggle in Syria will have major repercussions on Iran's standing in the region. Developments in Syria and Egypt may also change the parameters of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, of the three traditional security hot spots of the Middle East, it is Iraq that is most immediately affected by the revolts in its neighborhood and the related sectarian polarization across the region. Since the withdrawal of US troops, sectarian and ethnic antagonisms have resurfaced in Iraq, with both Sunnis and Kurds increasingly alienated by Nouri Al-Maliki's authoritarian style of government. Iraq's domestic crisis is now gradually overlapping with the crisis in Syria, where Al-Maliki has spoken out against toppling Al-Assad. As Iraq's relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are deteriorating, Al-Maliki increasingly leans towards Iran, causing further anger among Iraq's Sunnis. New waves of violence or even civil war in Iraq have become plausible scenarios once more.

The Crisis of Crisis Management

A final major security trend worth mentioning here concerns the decreasing support for international crisis management efforts as they have evolved over the past 10 to 15 years. In line with the changing nature of conflict, there has been a shift towards more intrusive and robust crisis management since the mid-1990s. Yet, concepts such as peacebuilding and the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) are in crisis today. This has much to do with some of the developments outlined earlier. Western-inspired approaches to transform the political and socio-economic structures of conflict-ridden states and build new institutions have met resistance not just from local actors, but also from some rising powers like China that have little interest in fostering democracy and the rule of law. As for R2P (equally a Western concept), BRIC scepticism has grown since NATO interpreted the UN mandate for protecting civilians in Libya as green light for regime change.

Today's crisis of crisis management is also due to Western intervention fatigue. The negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the debt crisis, and a lack of strategic consensus among Western allies have all raised questions as to the future willingness and ability of Western states to send troops abroad. Current missions increasingly suffer from capability shortages due to national austerity measures. Further gaps are likely as defense spending continues to decrease.

Although the demand for stabilization missions is as large as ever, the crisis of crisis management may yet accentuate. This may mean fewer operations. It may also mean a return to less ambitious models such as peacekeeping, with a view to freezing rather than resolving conflicts. What seems clear is that international security is bound to suffer if the international community becomes more reluctant to tackle violent conflicts at their geographic and substantive roots.[6]

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6.   See also the chapter by Aleksandra Dier in *Strategic Trends 2010.*

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Security Threats: North America Looks at the World

Janice Gross Stein

Security threats are often very much in the eye of the beholder. Leaders bring their experience, their historical memories, and their political perspective to bear when they interpret the evidence that shapes their perception of threat. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, facts rarely speak for themselves. North American leaders are no exception.

Historically separated from other continents by large expanses of oceans and enriched by abundant natural resources and open frontiers, leaders in the United States and Canada stood removed from traditional European wars. All this changed a hundred years ago, as the United States became a superpower and Canada shifted its focus of attention from its "mother" countries of Britain and France to its powerful neighbor to the south. It is as a partner in North America — along with the United States and Mexico — that Canada monitors threats today. Three stand out as overwhelmingly important.

The first and most immediate is the recurrent fear of a second major attack against North America by al-Qaeda or its affiliates. Canada has paid an enormous price for the first attack a decade ago: its border with the United States, its most important trading partner, has thickened and the growth of integrated markets with

the free flow of goods, services, and people, slowed dramatically. Onerous security procedures remain in place and Canada still struggles to reassure its neighbor to the south that their shared border is adequately policed and monitored. The nightmare for Canadian policymakers is that an attack will be launched by someone who crosses into the United States from Canada. Across the political spectrum, Canada's leaders understand that they cannot afford even one attack and that such an attack remains an ongoing and live possibility.

That no attack in the last decade has succeeded offers very limited reassurance to political leaders and security officials. Several attacks against the United States have been aborted, one as recently as the second week of May 2012. The United States has made significant changes to airport security since the attempt by the "underwear bomber" two years ago. The "multilayered" approach to security includes increased sharing of intelligence and boarding pass information, widespread use of body scanners, the monitoring of human behavior in airports, and closely integrated networks among airport officials around the world. Had any of these attacks succeeded, the psychological and political damage would have been severe. The ongoing perception of threat ensures hyper vigilance and a climate of insecurity that spreads beyond political leaders to the public.

The second major security threat is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Early on, Canada renounced nuclear weapons and remains deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, Canada has paid special attention to the worrying behavior of the government of North Korea and remains preoccupied that North Korea, in the midst of a leadership transition, can deeply destabilize East Asia. Canada is a Pacific power and is actively interested, as is the United States, in the promotion of a secure East Asia. The United States and Canada agree on the importance of working closely with the governments of Japan, China, and South Korea to avoid a dangerous escalation.

Canada and the United States are also deeply worried that Iran may choose to develop a nuclear weapons program. Both governments agree that Iran's leadership has not yet made such a decision but are troubled by Iran's refusal to provide satisfactory answers to the questions asked repeatedly by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both are worried by Iran's current enrichment to a level of 20 percent, far beyond what is needed for research purposes or the production of medical isotopes. Both are especially concerned by Iran's current program of burying its enrichment program at Fardo where it is invisible and difficult to monitor. Both are troubled by Iran's unwillingness to accept challenge inspections, especially at Parchin, a site that IAEA inspectors have repeatedly asked to see. Although one

inspection did take place, it did not include the chamber that is of special interest to the IAEA.

There is consensus between the two governments in North America on the threat that a decision by Iran would pose to global security. Both governments have said explicitly that an Iranian nuclear weapons program would be "unacceptable." It would dramatically increase the likelihood of a pre-emptive attack against its nuclear installations by Israel, with all the attendant risks of a wider regional war. An Iranian nuclear weapons program would alarm many of its neighbors in the Middle East, particularly Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and could well lead to region-wide proliferation. It is also possible that an Iranian nuclear weapons program could leak nuclear know-how to non-state actors. This is not inconceivable, given the example of a nuclear network that was privately led in Pakistan and sold detailed plans. Should nuclear knowledge leak to non-state actors, especially those with no known address, they could threaten or actually detonate a small nuclear device to terrorize a civilian population and delegitimize a government. These are all deeply alarming scenarios, with potentially destabilizing consequences in a Middle East that is currently undergoing rapid transformation.

Both governments currently believe that there is still time for a major diplomatic effort and serious negotiation with Iran. I suspect that both would agree to an Iranian enrichment program at levels far below 20 percent as long as inspections remain ongoing and Iran allows challenge inspections to take place. The issue is not that Iran has a right to a nuclear program; it most certainly does. Iran also has an unambiguous right to enrich for peaceful purposes. Negotiations must produce dramatically increased confidence, however, of Iran's peaceful intentions, through a rigorous inspection program and an end to the burying of centrifuges deep below ground. Finally, both governments agree that the time for such an agreement to emerge is limited; there is a relatively narrow window of opportunity to make progress. This issue is an ongoing and serious preoccupation of both governments.

A third issue of concern for both governments is the threat of a cyber attack that could disable military and/or civilian infrastructures. Both societies now depend heavily on interconnected digital networks to run the basic infrastructure of their militaries, transportation systems, financial systems, electricity grids and power generation systems, communication systems, and health systems. These systems are all more or less vulnerable to denial of services and other forms of cyber attack that can disrupt their capacity to function or compromise their security. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine the precise identity of a cyber-attacker, even when the server that serves as the launching pad for the attack is identified.

Governments around the world are investing heavily in the capacity to provide timely warning of the intent to launch a cyber attack, in building resilience and redundance into critical systems, into enhanced security for essential systems, and into the capacity to identify the cyber-attacker. However, the advantage lies with the cyber-attacker, given the relative ease with which systems are compromised and the degrees of difficulty and expense of walling off cyber systems. In the language of traditional security, the advantage currently rests with the offense. It is only a matter of time until a government is disabled for a time by a serious cyber attack.

Governments are investing significant resources to attempt to secure their cyber systems and are working actively with private sector partners to encourage them to do the same. They are developing cyber security strategies that reach across governments and are also at the beginnings of discussions of the principle of a global cyber security regime that would provide the same kinds of benefits as other arms control regimes. Very little progress has been made in developing these principles, however, as some governments are not yet willing to engage in the discussion seriously.

Two other non-traditional security threats that particularly preoccupy governments in North America are the transmission of a deadly virus that grows to pandemic proportions and the likelihood of a major ecological disaster as world energy markets tighten and the transportation of energy across longer and longer distances becomes more likely.

Pandemics and emergency preparedness are a major security preoccupation. The city of Toronto had an extraordinarily difficult experience with SARS that was brought to Canada by a citizen who had travelled from southern China through Hong Kong directly to Canada. The city was unprepared to deal with an epidemic that could spread beyond those in direct contact to the wider community. Since the outbreak of SARS, Canada has invested significant resources in preparing for a coordinated response across governments within the country and in coordinating responses with other North American governments. The threat of a pandemic is a preoccupation not only of leaders of public health agencies but of the wider security establishment that would have to manage community safety, control access to Canada, manage its borders, and control the movement of people in and out of the country.

Governments in North America are also thinking hard about the security requirements for the safe movement of energy across long distances. Canada is currently a major exporter of energy and has the world's second largest proven oil reserves. The northern face of Canada, the Arctic, is now warming at an

unprecedented rate, and access to the vast mineral and energy resources of the Arctic is only a matter of time. The prospect of a major oil spill through pipelines or tankers, accidentally or as the result of attack, is a growing preoccupation. Governments are investing in surveillance systems, underwater detection systems, and enhanced search and rescue as rapidly changing global energy markets create new opportunities and new threats.

Finally, governments are seeking to match resources to threats. In an era of constrained government spending and new security threats, they are looking for innovative partnerships with the private sector to mobilize and augment the capabilities that they will need to address these threats. The twenty-first century, in other words, will not look much like the twentieth.

3

Prevailing Security Threats from a United States Point of View

James Larocco*

The United States has viewed its national security from a global perspective for more than two generations. Since the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the US has positioned itself to project power anywhere in the world at a time of its choosing (or in response to provocations by others). This ability to project lethal force at will is an awesome responsibility, and I am more often surprised when the US chooses not to project its power than when it does.

A United States unchallenged in its projection of power by any outside force or combination of forces pertains to this day. What has changed, however, is a major shift of focus by the American people and their elected leaders toward what has become the consensus top priority issue of the past few years: guaranteeing the economic security of our country and its citizens, which all consider as the foundation of national security itself.

While it is misleading to say that "resources are now driving policy," there is no doubt that resources are always taken into account when assessing threats and

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* The opinions expressed in this paper are those solely of the author and do not necessarily represent the positions of the US Government, Department of Defense, or the National Defense University.

determining how best to counter them. The US can project power anywhere and at any time of its choosing, but the decision to do so will be very carefully weighed in this era, as resource implications will continue to play an important role in any decision.

The Obama administration has released a variety of documents that detail our national security threats, goals and objectives. For those of you who wish to see the evolution of this administration's national security strategy, I draw your attention to: The Quadrennial Defense Review[1], the 2010 National Security Strategy[2], the 2010 National Military Strategy[3], the Ballistic Missile Defense Review[4], the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review[5], and the updated National Defense Strategy, entitled "Sustaining U.S Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,[6]" issued January 2012. These documents provide detailed insights into American priorities in terms of values and interests, and threats and countering those threats, while noting the variety of tools at our disposal to carry out policies, strategies and programs. I will draw from these various policy documents as I address the topic of this paper.

Please allow me to engage in some intellectual shorthand in covering a topic that could be the subject of a thousand-page book. In this regard, I will categorize threats as follows: traditional and non-traditional. I believe this makes it easier to understand, internalize, and critique not only my presentation but also the US view on threats, which may seem less rational to many who come from countries with far different perspectives.

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6. United States, Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20120106-PENTAGON.PDF

Traditional Threats

Energy Security: Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the highest national security threat facing the US, its allies, partners, and friends, as well as the entire global economy, is the availability and uninterrupted flow of energy resources. In this case, the focus is clearly on the Gulf. Any protracted cut-off of energy resources passing through the Straits of Hormuz would have catastrophic effects on the US and global economy, which is already under high stress from the global financial crisis that began in 2008 and as yet remains far from resolved.

The US has positioned a carrier battle group in the Gulf on a constant basis for almost every day for more than 20 years, with two carrier battle groups currently in that area. At the same time, US deployments of air, sea and land forces in the Gulf States, as well as command and control and advisory elements, have adopted an increasingly prominent posture over these two decades.

The threat to energy security has taken on an additional element of urgency as a result of the assessment by some that Iran has moved to the threshold of the technical ability and final decision to produce nuclear weapons. A possible military confrontation with Iran has drawn more attention to the threat that the Iranian Navy, either in anticipation of a possible military confrontation or as a result of a confrontation, might move to mine and close the strait, thereby triggering a global energy crisis and resultant economic catastrophe.

Economic Security: If one takes the time to read the US national security strategies published over the last three decades, one will understand that the US has always placed its economic security as the foundation of all other elements of national security. In this regard, threats to that security are always given priority attention.

The global financial and economic crisis is now in its fourth year, with anxieties over a slide into an economic depression only partially assuaged. Concerns remain, with a special focus on southern Europe. To be sure, the US has welcomed steps by the European Union to address concerns over debt, finances and recovery. The US sees this primarily as an issue to be resolved by the Europeans, but stands prepared to assist as policies and prescriptions agree.

Economic security has always been a foundation of our security, thus qualifying it as a "traditional threat"; however, it is the unique challenges of the global economic situation today that place this as a top priority for the rest of this decade if not beyond. The success or failure of any American president during this period will be measured on his or her ability to place our economic security back in a safety zone.

Maritime Security/Freedom of Navigation: Related directly to economic security, the US sees the Asia-Pacific region as vital to our economic and overall national security health, both in the short-term and particularly in the decades ahead. The US views this region not only as an area of opportunity, but also as one with an increased probability for conflict, especially over economic issues.

Statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton[7] and former Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy[8] have described this shift in US policy focus.

The US perception of this increased probability of conflict is clearly focused on China and its moves in the past few years, viewed as hostile by US friends and allies in the region. The recent standoff between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal is a case in point.

The overlapping claims in the South China Sea have made the confrontation over resource development in this area increasingly worrying. The US believes that conflicts arising over offshore resource development should be resolved peacefully by all concerned parties.

At the same time, there is growing concern that conflict in the area known historically as the "Greater Indian Ocean" (from the Gulf of Aden to the South China Sea), an area that contains most of the world's security chokepoints (from the Bab Al-Mandeb to the Straits of Malacca), could threaten global commerce if the freedom of navigation is denied.

The US for decades has provided much of the world with security on the high seas permitting an expansion of waterborne trade unprecedented in the history of mankind. That primacy on the high seas is now eroding, and the US recognizes that maintaining this primacy may simply not be possible in the decades ahead, no matter how much emphasis is put on expanding US naval assets. Our fleet is only a quarter of the size it was in World War II, and budget constraints preclude the kind of expansion by the US to match what China, India and others are doing and will continue to do.

While the US has taken some steps to assure our friends and allies that it stands with them, including the establishment of a facility for Marines in Western Australia, there is considerable debate in Washington now over how to weigh this potential threat and, accordingly, how best to counter it.

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7. Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=full

8. Lisa Daniel, "Flournoy: Asia Will be the Heart of U.S. Security Policy," American Forces Press Service, April 29, 2011, available at http://www.militaryconnection.com/news%5Capril-2011%5Casia-heart-security.html

Non-Proliferation: This has been a top national security priority for the US since the beginning of the nuclear era and is no less so today. As noted within the May 2010 National Security Strategy:

> "The American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. And international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased. Excessive Cold War stockpiles remain. More nations have acquired nuclear weapons. Testing has continued. Black markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials. Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global nonproliferation regime that has frayed as more people and nations break the rules."[9]

In alignment with reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, "The United States will pursue the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and work to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon."[10] If Iran possesses the nuclear bomb, other countries in the region may follow suit.

Unfortunately, the United States faces no good options when it comes to Iran. Iran's strategic position alongside oil shipping routes and its extensive asymmetric and proxy capabilities make a nuclear-armed Iran unacceptable for the United States and for many other countries in the Gulf region. A nuclear Iran would destabilize the Middle East, reducing other states' capacity to guarantee freedom of navigation for oil supplies and to deter Iranian regional ambitions.

The threat of proliferation of nuclear material to Iranian proxies, and the almost certain desire by Iran's rivals to develop their own deterrent, would make the Middle East a more volatile and dangerous place for years to come. The March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster further highlights the dangers of a nuclear Iran and the threat that a similar nuclear disaster could pose to its Gulf neighbors.

There are those in the US who also view a nuclear Iran as prompting other powers in the region, notably Saudi Arabia and perhaps Turkey, to follow suit. There is a strong belief that if Iran is not stopped, the entire doctrine of non-proliferation and disarmament is at risk.

The US recognizes that exercising the military option may bear grave consequences, including a spike in oil prices, the spread of terrorism and the failure

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9. United States, The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 23.

10. Ibid.

to permanently stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In my view, of all the threats that face the US in the year ahead, the threat of Iranian proliferation stands above all others as possibly causing a crisis of global proportions.

There is great controversy within the US over the utility or futility of the P5+1 talks. As of now, the Obama administration remains committed to the diplomatic track.

The threat of confrontation with North Korea over proliferation and missile development has been more high profile in recent months than even the threat of confrontation with Iran. The US and our friends and allies in the region view the North Korean steps as unwarranted and needlessly provocative. Once again there is concern that talks will be futile, as they have been repeatedly in the past. No one, however, has been calling for military confrontation with North Korea over their nuclear program development, and the expectation at least for now is that conflict is containable, however destabilizing it may be to the region.

Countering terrorism and violent extremism: Terrorism remains high on the list of US national security priorities more than 10 years after the attack on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. While I do not find that surprising, I never would have predicted that the emotionalism among Americans attached to the issue of terrorism would be so high a decade after 9/11. Even with the death of Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda (AQ) leaders and the incarceration of others, significant threats remain and Americans are fixated on these threats. An outside observer should not underestimate the importance Americans attach to countering terrorism and violent extremism.

While AQ "central" appears to be seriously degraded in its command and control capabilities, terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other regional and local groups have expanded their reach and capabilities. No longer does the US think solely of AQ and Hizbollah; these days Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is seen as the most likely source of attacks against US interests. US efforts in Yemen have been constant over the past 10 years, and President Obama recently approved (according to press reports) a wider definition of targets in Yemen for drone attacks, a key weapon of choice in the war on terrorists.

State Department Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, has repeatedly spoken publicly[11] about the threat from AQAP, at one

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11. Daniel Benjamin, Senate Hearing, "U.S. Policy in Yemen," POMED Notes, July 19, 2011, available at http://pomed.org/blog/2011/07/pomed-notes-senate-hearing-u-s-policy-in-yemen.html/

point speculating that a next attack on American soil has an 85 percent probability of emanating from AQAP in Yemen. His assessment has been reinforced by statements of the President's senior advisor for Counter Terrorism, John Brennan. Mr. Brennan has made frequent visits to Sanaa and Riyadh pursuing discussions on degrading and dismantling AQAP.

As was recently revealed, Saudi-born AQAP bomb maker, Ibrahim Hasan Al-Asiri, is still alive. This raises further concerns that AQAP may target the US at this time. Al-Asiri has been credited with being a mastermind of the failed suicide attack on Saudi Interior Ministry Deputy Prince Mohamed bin Nayef.

While Yemen is discussed as the key source of a possible if not likely terrorist attack against US soil, it is also recognized that the epicenter of global terrorism is within Pakistan's border provinces with Afghanistan. Groups specifically targeting US interests, which include Al-Qaeda, now led by Egyptian-born Ayman Al-Zawahiri, are high priority targets for US counter terrorism efforts. In addition to AQ, the degrading, defeat and dismantling of the Haqqani Network and other groups affiliated with the Afghan opposition and Afghan Taliban are considered essential to the success of our long-term efforts toward a stable, secure and prosperous Afghanistan.

It is worth noting that Pakistan, as host to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), popularly known as the Pakistani Taliban, presents a unique challenge in the global landscape of terrorist threats. LeT's terrorist strike on Mumbai was the highest profile attack in recent years. The US recently raised the bounty on LeT leader Hafiz Mohamed Sayeed, who openly moves about Pakistan, speaks at public forums, and challenges both the US and India with his harsh rhetoric. LeT remains a target of concern not for the rhetoric; rather, it is their ability to plan and carry out terrorist strikes beyond traditional regions of their operations. At the same time, Sayeed has a well-disciplined team of followers with an infrastructure inside and outside Pakistan growing in capabilities.

Africa has been a growing killing field for terrorists, with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the north and Sahel regions, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and eastern Africa. While Boko Haram appears confined to certain parts of Nigeria and has shown by recent actions that its capabilities are limited, AQIM has continued to advance its capabilities, infrastructure and, most recently, its armaments. The conflict in Libya presented a golden opportunity for AQIM to expand its arms cache, establish new operating routes and bases, and recruit new allies. The Trans-Sahelian region is now drawing increasing focus of the US and its allies in North Africa. The instability in Somalia, on the other hand,

appears to be increasingly contained, although Al-Shabaab remains a formidable threat offshore as well as onshore.

The US National Security Strategy argues that of particular concern is combining nuclear proliferation with terrorism. The nightmare of terrorists in possession of tactical nuclear weapons haunts every counter-terrorism and non-proliferation expert.

Middle East Peace Process: The lack of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East is seen as a major threat to US security. The Arab-Israeli conflict has long been a source of tension that has fueled violent extremism and is a major threat to global, US, and Middle Eastern regional security.[12] "The United States, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States have an interest in a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict – one in which the legitimate aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians for security and dignity are realized, and Israel achieves a secure and lasting peace with all of its neighbors…The United States seeks two states living side by side in peace and security – a Jewish state of Israel, with true security, acceptance, and rights for all Israelis; and a viable, independent Palestine with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and realizes the potential of the Palestinian people."[13]

While the US goals are clear, and the elements of peace deals, including a Palestinian-Israeli peace, are well known, the failure of the peace process to develop over the past four years, despite the prominence President Obama placed on moving swiftly early in his presidency to resolve this longstanding conflict, has left considerable disappointment and anger throughout the region. While there is recognition that any work on a peace process is inconceivable until 2013, there equally is frustration over the inability of any of the actors to get any serious dialogue, bilateral or multilateral, in motion.

There is strong expectation from all parties that a peace process, whether built on old mechanisms or starting afresh, will be at the top of the agenda next year. The motivation is not hope for success, but fear of failure and descent towards regional conflict.

There is recognition that a new government in Egypt will see forward movement on a resolution of the Palestinian issue as a key component of their

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12. United States, The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 24-25.

13. Ibid, 26.

foreign and national security policy, with not only their relationship with Israel and commitment to the Camp David Treaty contingent on forward movement on the peace tracks, but also a willingness to play a strong role with the Hamas leadership in Gaza to secure a moderation in their positions that are anathema to the Israelis as well as the US and the Quartet.

Non-Traditional Threats

Advancements in technology and shifts in the global order have seen a number of non-traditional security threats emerge in recent times. Some of the challenges listed below are summed up in the White House's new defense plan issued in January 2012, entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities of 21st Century Defense." Such threats include:

Cyberspace: FBI Director Robert Mueller warned in public testimony in March 2012 that "in the not too distant future, we anticipate that the cyber threat will pose the number one threat to our national security."[14] In an article written for the Washington Post in April 2012, the President's adviser for counter terrorism, John Brennan, noted that in 2011, there were approximately 200 attacks on America's critical infrastructure, 85 percent of which is privately owned and operated. He spoke of an attack on the nation's electrical grid that could shut down whole areas of United States, leading to billions of dollars of economic loss.[15]

In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the following was written: "Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation. The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. They enable our military superiority, but our unclassified government networks are constantly probed by intruders. Our daily lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale. The Internet and e-commerce are keys to our economic competitiveness, but cyber criminals have cost companies and consumers hundreds of millions of dollars and valuable intellectual property. The threats we

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14. Robert Mueller, Public Speech, RSA Cyber Security Conference, San Francisco, CA, March 1, 2012, available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and- spies

15. John O. Brennan, "Time to Protect against Dangers of Cyberattack," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 2012, available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies

face range from individual criminal hackers to organized criminal groups, from terrorist networks to advanced nation states."[16]

Joel Brenner, author of the 2011 benchmark book on the cyber threat, entitled America the Vulnerable, notes that in the modern era "the objective in warfare would not be killing or occupying territory but rather paralyzing the enemy's military and financial computer networks and its telecommunications…by taking out the enemy's power system. Control, not bloodshed, would be the goal."[17] This definition of warfare was outlined by a Beijing National Defense University lecturer nearly 25 years ago. It has proven truly prophetic.

Cyberspace will be the fifth and likely the preeminent battle space of the 21st century. Traditional views of power will shift disproportionately to otherwise relatively insignificant actors. Long-understood military and civilian boundaries will become less distinct. Decisive outcomes will be achieved by state or non-state actors in the virtual world at the same scale as an air-strike or naval bombardment.[18]

There exist a plethora of examples that demonstrate that cyber warfare will continue to present a real threat to the national security of any state. The 2007 experiment, Project Aurora, demonstrated that electrical power grids could be compromised at any time. The 2010 Stuxnet virus, that caused the shutdown of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, proved that even the most secure installations could be victimized. The real danger is that once these cyber attacks are launched, their source code is available to anyone in the global commons. A new generation of cyber warriors are being trained and developed by our adversaries to build upon these existing codes in order to conduct similar operations on any military and civilian systems or installations.

The growth of the threat is exponential and increasingly complex, pervasive and persistent. An international framework is desperately required to govern actions by state and non-state actors alike in this new battlespace. Within this framework there should exist a code of conduct complemented by an authoritative body with license to prosecute international cybercriminals or levy recommendations for harsh sanctions on offending states. Unfortunately, it will likely take a major international incident for states to find the will to move beyond politics and promote a solution for the betterment of our future generations.

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16. United States, The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 27.

17. Joel Brenner, *America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 115.

18. Paul Cornish, David Livingstone, Dave Clemente, and Claire Yorke, *On Cyber Warfare*, Chatham House Report, November 2010, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/r1110_cyberwarfare.pdf

"Arab Spring"/Middle East Transition: The transition that began in the Middle East in Tunisia in December 2010 has already resulted in regime change in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, with unrest continuing elsewhere from Morocco to Bahrain. This historic transition has rocked traditional US foreign policy in the Middle East, forcing careful assessments of policies and programs. The new challenges for US policies are viewed as presenting both threats and opportunities.

The threats from the transition are not uniform from country to country, although any threats to stability in one country can easily spill over to adjacent states, as the armed conflicts in Libya and Syria illustrate.

The most critical countries from the US national security point of view are Egypt, Syria and Yemen, although the threats to stability, mass migration, economic meltdown, and the spread of weapons and terrorism could turn any Arab Spring country into a focus of concern.

Egypt is not only a leader in the region, but is the most populous Arab country, controls the Suez Canal, and holds the key to regional stability as Israel's peace partner in the Camp David Accords.

There is an age-old adage regarding the Middle East: 'there is no war without Egypt, no peace without Syria.' During the 33 years since the Camp David Accords were signed, this adage accurately describes the prevailing situation: no war, but no peace. Sustaining at least the status quo may present challenges in the period ahead.

There is a recognition that the new Egyptian government may call for the reopening of the Security Annex of the Treaty, which covers the permitted and non-permitted deployment of Egyptian forces in delineated zones within the Sinai Peninsula. In the past, Israel has strongly rejected reopening terms of the treaty, even for minor changes, but this may not be possible with an Egypt that believes that the time has come for Egyptian forces to reoccupy the Sinai not only as a sovereign right, but also to provide the ability to secure this troubled region, plagued by unrest, terrorism, and the smuggling of people and goods.

Should Egypt decide to abrogate the treaty, the consequences for the region and US interests could be catastrophic. While few believe this will happen, the unpredictability of the course of transition in Egypt keeps this concern alive.

Of most pressing concern at this time is the looming Egyptian financial and economic meltdown. Egypt's foreign exchange reserves stood at $70 billion in January 2011. As of the end of May 2012, reserves are projected to be less than a quarter of that amount. Tourism earnings have plummeted, import demands remain high (Egypt is the largest importer of wheat in the world), and exports remain flat. With the Egyptian people's high expectations in the aftermath of

the revolution, it is difficult to foresee how Egypt can address this looming crisis without instability and perhaps serious unrest. Foreign banks do not see Egypt as a good prospect for lending, the Gulf States have been reluctant to provide assistance or new investment, and the Western World is simply not in a position to provide a Marshall Plan for Egypt, which some estimates note will require a minimum of $20 billion per year just to stay afloat.

The challenges facing Egypt and its new leaders are clearly enormous, as are the challenges facing the region and global community in assisting Egypt to successfully navigate through its transition. The rewards of success for all involved are profound, but the threats are real and just as profound.

Yemen joined the Arab Spring as a failing state from a variety of economic, social and political measures. More than a year later, transition from decades of rule by Ali Abdullah Saleh to a new regime of indeterminate makeup remains problematic as all the factors noted above have only gotten worse.

The US views the threat from Yemen in the short-term as related to the continued active presence of AQAP and in the longer run to instability, state-breakup or even state failure that could make Yemen a bookend for Somalia on the Gulf of Aden.

Few predict at this time that Yemen's situation will deteriorate to the dire situations noted above, but similarly few predict a major, positive turnaround in the country's economic, social and political situation. As such, the threat posed by Yemen is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Syria poses arguably the most vexing challenge of all the countries in transition in the Middle East to the US, its allies and its friends. Whether from the perspective of values or interests, peace or war, problems or opportunities, Syria stands unique.

Values loom large in assessing the threat of Syria. To permit the Syrian regime to oppress its own citizens in such brutal fashion as other countries in the region embrace new freedoms is a glaring anomaly. A regime victory against its citizens and those who believe the regime must go would represent a huge defeat for the Arab Spring, the US and its allies, and the United Nations as an institution that has been looked to in an effort to resolve the situation peacefully.

A Syrian regime victory would similarly be a defeat for the US and others who see a new regime as offering an opportunity to break Iranian influence and activities against peace, supporting terrorism, and fomenting instability in the region. This is the crux of the strategic threat to the US from the Syrian situation.

While the Syrian people drew inspiration from what happened in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, so did Bashar Al-Assad. He understood clearly the stakes and has acted accordingly. Few believe he will step down as part of a negotiated settlement. Whether the US, Turkey or other countries will form a coalition of the willing, adopting kinetic measures to deal with Assad remains only a point of debate at the time of writing. Looking at the trends of argumentation here in Washington, I cannot at this time forecast anything beyond continued and tightened sanctions and reliance on UN efforts.

Conclusion

It is fair to say, in my view, that it is not simply the Middle East that is in transition; few countries anywhere in the world are not undergoing significant if not profound transition, a situation that may well persist for many years to come. The addition of more "non-traditional" threats should be anticipated.

4

Russia's Stance on Current International Security Issues: A View from Moscow

Vladimir A. Orlov

Russia has strengthened its international positions over the past decade (2001-2011), in contrast to the weakness and decline of the Russian state in all traditional aspects of power throughout the 1990s. After a period of hectic, unsystematic reforms, Russia has returned to the international scene as an exporter of global and regional security, not as its importer.

Russian national interests may be defined as follows:

- A strong, influential (geopolitically, geoeconomically and geostrategically) and democratic state.
- The sovereignty and independence of Russia
- National unity and harmonious relations between Russia's peoples
- A developed, democratic civil society that participates in the defense of the citizenry's rights and freedoms
- A high living standard for Russia's citizens
- Safeguarding the historic, moral and cultural values of Russia's peoples

In international affairs Russia's national interests are:

- A world order that takes into account the variety of interests of nations and states, including those of Russia.

- Equal and mutually beneficial relations with all states and international integrationist groupings, structures and organizations.
- Strategic stability and international security, strict international arms and non-proliferation control regimes
- Integration with CIS states in all spheres of activity
- Respect for Russia and respect for the rights and freedoms of its citizens and compatriots abroad

In its defense and security policy, Russia's interests are the following:

- A rational and modern structure of the state's military
- Sufficient deterrence potential and level of military preparedness
- Integration with allies and cooperation with partners in the sphere of security and defense
- Russia's armed forces must be one of the principal instruments for securing, upholding and defending national interests and state security

Russia's global strengths, sources of power, and stable development are based on three pillars:

- Nuclear weapons – being among the largest nuclear-weapon states
- Energy resources, and
- High technologies, particularly in space, defense, and nuclear industries, combined with traditionally high educational level.

The key global security threats to Russia's interests include:

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
- New, increased role of violent non-state actors, primarily international terrorist organizations
- Violation of global stability by building a global strategic missile defense system which would lead to a renewed arms race and a new arms race in outer space
- Illicit drug trafficking, particularly around Russian borders and penetrating into Russia
- Cyber wars and cyber crime, including DDDOS attacks on information software of strategic installations; and
- Demographic trends

The key global security challenges to Russia – which may turn either into threats or into opportunities for development, if addressed, include:

- Migration patterns

- Climate change; and Financial crimes, including money laundering, corruption, and organized crime

How will Russia build its security and foreign policy to respond to these threats and challenges during the next 5-7 years? On May 7, 2012, in his first foreign policy move, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on foreign policy priorities. The ranking of international diplomatic priorities stated in the decree is rather interesting. Following the UN, which plays the central role in world affairs, is the economic bloc known as the BRICS, then the G-20, and lastly, the G-8. As it stands, the future unified economic stance of the BRICS members – Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, which are also members of the G-20 – will be one of the most important elements of Russia's foreign policy.

Russia as a Participant of Key International Forums

A key pillar of Russian foreign policy is economic integration with CIS countries. In this regard, one can highlight the ratification of the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement and the framework for the Union State, a coalition between Belarus and Russia, the development of the Customs Union and the Uniform Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan with the goal of creating the Eurasian Economic Union by January 1, 2015. These new multilateral economic structures are to gradually replace the CIS structures. Moreover, the first country Vladimir Putin visited in his third presidential term was Kazakhstan on May 25, 2012.

As far as relations with non-CIS countries are concerned, the President's decree primarily touches upon economic cooperation with the EU. Relevant topics include, "the creation of a single economic and human space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean", a visa-free zone, and realization of the "Partnership for Modernization" program, including an energy partnership aimed at creating an integrated European energy model.

In Russia's view, the existing system of international relations in Europe still contains a number of rudimentary elements inherited from the Cold War period. This system cannot satisfy Russia. Attempts to transform some of the elements did not bring any tangible results. Despite numerous efforts to adjust NATO to the existing realities, its security policy still remains the source of serious problems in the Russia-West relationship.

On November 30, 2009 the Russian leadership sent a draft treaty on European security to the leaders of countries in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok and to selected international organizations. President Medvedev said the treaty will "finally do away with the legacy of the Cold War." The treaty called for mutual cooperation between signatory countries "on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security."

Touching upon Russia's policy in the Asia-Pacific region, Putin's 2012 decree emphasizes the need to promote "accelerated socio-economic development of the Eastern Siberia and the Far East regions." He also highlighted strategic cooperation with China, India, Vietnam, Japan, and other key countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, Moscow has strengthened its relations with the individual countries of Southeast Asia. This trend is abundantly clear in four major spheres – arms deals, energy sector, innovative technologies, and people-to-people contacts. Another important development has been the continuing growth of Russia's importance to Southeast Asian energy security. In fact, Russian companies which are planning to carry out projects in Southeast Asia are represented by the leaders of Russia's energy sector. The projects under negotiation are no less impressive – Russian business is looking forward to cooperating in the construction of the TransASEAN pipeline and nuclear power plants, development of electric power stations networks in a number of countries, and assisting the Southeast Asians in using energy-saving technologies.

At APEC 2006 held in Hanoi, Vietnam, Russia put forward a proposal to host the 2012 summit. As a Euro-Pacific nation, Russia is pursuing an important strategy of restoring the balance between the European and Pacific strands of its foreign policy.

Regarding relations with the United States, which are not considered a priority in the 2012 presidential decree, political problems prevail. There is an emphasis on equal rights and non-interference in internal affairs as well as on missile defense, an issue that is an irritant in bilateral relations.

The strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States remains focused on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons just as it was 30 years ago. In 2002, the United States denounced the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), undermining in fact the whole regime of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In his decree, Putin emphasized that Russia would need to defend its interests as the United States plans to create a global AMD system. The issue of strategic cooperation on security is viewed from a new angle by the decree. It clearly states that negotiations on further strategic offensive weapons reductions are possible only after taking into consideration all factors affecting global strategic stability.

As for resolving global crisis situations, the decree approves the practice which is already being used by Russian diplomacy – "politically diplomatic settlement of regional conflicts" on the basis of collective action. This course was implemented to its fullest during the Syrian crisis. Its main instruments are blocking attempts of external interference in the UN Security Council and establishing a negotiation process between conflicting parties under international mediation on the basis of a UN mandate. On the other hand, the decree aims to prevent situations that allow a repeat of the Libyan tragedy, when the UN Security Council's mandate was in fact used for a quasi-intervention and regime change.

This foreign policy stresses on dialogue and multilateral negotiations as the basis of solving the problems regarding the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.

Under the NPT (1970) and Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (1974), Iran assumed legal obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place its nuclear activities under international control. In 2002, an undeclared and extensive nuclear program in Iran going back to nearly two decades was revealed. The IAEA inspection team determined that Iran had been conducting clandestine nuclear activities for a period of 18 years, including various sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle in violation of its obligations under the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Thus, Iran had failed to comply with a number of provisions of its Safeguards agreement with the IAEA; in particular, it failed to meet its reporting requirements. These violations undermined international confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

North Korean nuclear tests and attempts at developing long range missiles constitute a grave challenge to the global nonproliferation regime and a threat to peace and stability in North and East Asia and beyond. In addition, Pyongyang may be willing to proliferate anticipating an international market for its bomb technology, fissile materials and hardware. The strict observance by all members of the world community of tougher sanctions provided by UNSCR 1874 would substantially hold back North Korean attempts at developing its nuclear-missile capability.

To evaluate these and other international issues, the PIR Center developed the International Security Index (iSi), a comprehensive index of the level of international security.

Every day dozens of events from different regions of the world come to the notice of the media, but only the most significant ones are mentioned. Even if they are not mentioned in the media, information about these events can influence the international security climate. For navigating the overload of information, decision-makers need a compass. For example, we monitor the movement of the economy on the stock market and use such indices as Dow Jones, Nikkei, or MICEX.

The aim of iSi is to provide quantitative indicators that reflect the dynamics of trends in international security. The iSi index is meant to demonstrate the extent to which the international security situation differs from the "ideal" (assumed as 4210 points, according to our methodology) at each point in time. It also indicates how various specific military and nonmilitary factors are affecting international security.

Each event is assessed both according to its positive or negative influence on international security and according to its degree of influence (weak, moderate, or strong), on the point scale we have developed. The degree of influence of each such factor is corrected depending on the country or region in which the event took place. In order to do this, we have developed a coefficient for the significance of particular regions (from 1 to 9). The number of positive points for each individual factor indicates the event's contribution to international security; negative marks indicate the negative influence of a particular factor.

Thanks to the iSi Index, there now exists an opportunity to monitor changes of global security. The iSi rate is calculated weekly and monthly. The weekly iSi rate is published on Tuesdays in the leading Russian daily Kommersant with a brief commentary explaining the fluctuations of the Index. The results of the iSi monthly measurements are published on the first working day of every month on the PIR Center website, www.pircenter.org . The results of the Index calculations are also published in the Security Index journal, published by PIR Center.

The PIR Center's monthly calculation of iSi is accompanied by interviews with our International Expert Group, which includes representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan, Brazil, India, China, the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, South Africa among others. The evaluations of these experts make it possible for us to see how our calculations are viewed in a given month and, in particular, the dynamics of iSi over the course of several months at a time, in various regions of the world. Today the International Expert Group represents all continents and the composition of INTEG now includes representatives of all of the BRICS states.

5

Security Threats from a Middle Eastern/ African Perspective

Marina Ottaway

These remarks will focus on countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as those in the Horn. It will not consider the security problems of Sub-Saharan Africa, aside from those of the Sahel countries that experience security problems closely connected to those taking place in North Africa.

In a discussion of security threats, the countries under consideration can be divided into three groups:

- Countries whose security problems are predominantly external, that is countries that are threatened by another country or group of countries. While countries in this category may also face some internal security threats, the external and internal threats are not clearly linked
- Countries whose security threats are mostly internal, as a result of the weakness of the government and state institutions, coupled with a high level of dissatisfaction among the population
- Countries where lack of internal security translates into external insecurity, as domestic problems allow external actors to fish in troubled waters making the situation worse

While the distinction among the three categories is not always clear cut and some countries are certainly borderline between categories, these classifications help us to focus on the different kinds of security threats.

External Threats

There are two major sources of external threats to Arab countries at this point, Iran and Israel, with Iran being the most important. Iran is a threat to the Gulf countries and those of the Levant, but this threat diminishes greatly as one moves further to the west. For Egypt, for example, Iran is a marginal security threat at best. For Morocco, it is not a security threat at all.

Israel is a direct security threat to the Palestinian territories and to Lebanon, and less so to Syria and Jordan, at least under the present circumstances. However, Israel could indirectly become a security threat to all Gulf countries if it attacks Iran, causing reprisals across the region.

Under all circumstances, Iran is a potential threat to all of its neighbors and the countries across the Gulf because of its size and its historical aspiration to be the dominant power in the region. The potential threat is increased by the somewhat unpredictable nature of the Iranian regime, its growing nuclear capability, and its potential nuclear weapons program.

There has been much discussion on whether Iran acts in a rational-enough fashion that would allow deterrence to work. More important than the issue of rationality (about which we can only speculate), is the fact that the government is divided; thus the level of threat could vary depending on which faction is riding high at one particular moment. Certainly, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to delight in making extremely provocative statements, although thus far, it is not clear that he has enough power domestically to be able to follow up on these statements.

Adding to the Gulf countries' perception of a mounting threat coming from Iran is the changing nature of its relation with Iraq. The antagonistic, indeed belligerent relationship that pitted Iran and Iraq against each other in the days of Saddam Hussein has been replaced by a much more complex relation with the Maliki government. For Maliki, Iran is both an ally and a threat. It is an ally because it helps bolster Maliki's position, but a threat because it has the potential to cross the line from support to domination. Maliki has so far played Iran and the United States, winning the support of both. In the case of the United States, Maliki has won the game, with the United States still supporting him for a lack of options, but not in a position to dictate his actions. With Iran, however, he is riding a tiger, since it is far from clear whether he can use Iranian support without losing his autonomy. The extent of Iranian control over Iraq remains a question mark at this point.

In the days of the Cold War, the Soviet Union also loomed large in the security of Arab states, as an enemy for some or as an ally for others. Russia is not an important enough player in the region to be a threat to any MENA country,

but by the same token, it is not a factor in guaranteeing the security of any Arab government. It remains relatively close to the Assad regime in Syria, at least close enough in light of its willingness to veto Security Council resolutions against the country and not to participate in the imposing of sanctions. However, Russia is not an ally on which the Syrian regime can count in its struggle to remain in power. It will not send troops to keep Assad in power, as the Soviet Union previously did in many countries.

Internal Threats

For most Arab regimes, the major threats at this point are domestic, not external ones. Since the beginning of 2011, four Arab rulers — those of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, were deposed as a result of domestic uprisings. Syria is embattled. Most importantly, there is no Arab regime today that can assert with confidence that it is immune to a domestic uprising.

In Tunisia and Egypt, the ouster of the incumbent leaders was an internal process from start to finish; the leaders were caught by surprise, put up surprisingly short resistance, and were deposed before outsiders had time to even start discussing seriously a course of action. In the case of Egypt, the United States changed its position quickly from defending Mubarak as a good ally and a leader in firm control of a stable country, to arguing that Mubarak had to leave power. The change in US position came only in the wake of a massive domestic uprising and only days before Mubarak resigned though; there is no evidence that the hasty change in Washington's position affected either the crowds' determination to get rid of a president who had long overstayed his welcome or Mubarak's decision to step down.

The situation is more complex in Yemen and in Libya. In Yemen, the combined pressure by Saudi Arabia, the rest of the GCC countries and the United States certainly contributed to easing President Ali Abdullah Saleh out of office by providing him with a safe way out and a degree of face saving. The intervention also made Saleh's departure less of a complete break than it might have been otherwise, allowing members of his family to retain important positions. Yet, neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia would have put pressure on Saleh to resign unless the domestic situation had shaken his hold on power sufficiently to convince them that he had become a factor of instability rather than a bulwark against the possibility of radical change.

In Libya, the intervention by NATO and some Arab countries, made possible by a UN Security Council Resolution that called on the international community

to protect Libyan civilians, was crucial to the downfall of Muammar Qaddafi. We can only speculate whether Libyan rebels would have eventually prevailed even without outside intervention, but in practice, international intervention played a major role. As in the case of Yemen, though, there would have never been an outside intervention without a domestic uprising. While Gaddafi had an uncanny ability to provoke Arab leaders and no supporters among NATO countries, he had also won a degree of tolerance after he gave up the nuclear program, such as it was, in December 2003. With Gaddafi no longer representing a real international threat, his domestic policies would have continued to be ignored had Libyan citizens not taken things in their own hands.

Many other Arab countries are experiencing domestic threats with the potential to overthrow the regime and in some cases to undermine the state itself. Syria is the most obvious case of a seriously embattled country, where the struggle against an unpopular regime can plunge the country into sectarian conflict as well as destabilize the region by allowing or inviting outside intervention — we will return to Syria in the next section.

Despite its enormous problems, Syria remains a strong state, with military and civilian institutions that have a lot of resilience and can keep the country together even in the face of mounting opposition — that is why the conflict in Syria is likely to be both protracted and bloody, because the regime can draw on the resources of a real state. The countries most susceptible to internal threats are those where the state itself is weak, without significant military and administrative resources with which to react to even a weak opposition.

A significant swath of countries extending across the Sahel to the two Sudans, particularly South Sudan, as well as Somalia fall in this category of extremely weak, indeed failing states. Mauritania, Mali, and Niger are loosely administered, resource-poor countries. Following a military coup d'état on March 21, 2012, in less than two weeks, Mali lost control of most northern towns to a yet unclear mixture of Tuareg insurgents and terrorist/criminal networks. Other countries, such as Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco, are relatively strong states with adequate revenue and administration, but still have trouble controlling their entire territories. South Sudan, independent only since July 2011, is a state-in-the-making that already displays some of the characteristics of failed states. Somalia has been a failed state for over twenty years. In such countries, internal threats can quickly become significant even if rebel groups are weak, because the state has few resources to mobilize.

Internal Insecurity Leading to External Intervention

Internal instability can open the way to external intervention, particularly in small countries where state institutions were weak in the first place. Large or at least strong states are less susceptible. Egypt, at present, is experiencing considerable internal threats, as domestic political forces with different goals and agendas battle each other in a political arena that appears to be devoid of rules. External intervention appears extremely unlikely, however. Egypt is a large country, with military, security and administrative institutions that function — apparently no more inefficiently than they have in the past despite the political turmoil. There is definitely a battle for power going on in the country, but no power vacuum. The same is true in Iraq, also a country that is threatened internally, but where external intervention seems to require either the overwhelming military superiority enjoyed by the United States or the invitation of one political faction seeking advantage over internal rivals.

By contrast, a country like Bahrain is an easy target for outside intervention, both against the regime or in its support. Protest in Bahrain started as an internal affair, a new installment in the battle between the Sunni monarchy and the majority Shia population that has been fought in the country over decades — this was the conclusion of both US intelligence and the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Bassiouni Commission). But the situation quickly became internationalized. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries intervened on behalf of the monarchy, deploying troops from the Peninsula Shield Force. The United States, embarrassed by the blatant violations of human rights by Bahraini security forces, took a somewhat critical stance and suspended delivery of military aid for a few months, but restarted it in May 2012, despite an admission that the problems that led to the suspension of aid had not been corrected in the first place. Furthermore, it remains a hotly debated issue whether Iran is actively supporting some of the protests, or simply encouraging them from a distance.

In some countries it is even difficult at times to draw the line between internal and external actors. This is particularly true where outside actors are not states, as they are in the case of Bahrain, but also include terrorist networks. The conflict in Syria, which certainly started as a domestic one, is becoming internationalized at two levels. First, other countries and the United Nations have become openly involved in trying to find a solution to the mounting violence; so far no country has been willing to intervene with force on behalf of the insurgents as NATO did in Libya, although weapons are finding their way into the country. Second, there are growing indications that the fight against the Assad regime is attracting participants from outside Syria itself, with a growing number of attacks bearing similarity to

those perpetrated by groups in Iraq. Whether those involved are Syrians returning to their country from Iraq — or are citizens of other countries is probably less important than the presence of actors linked to international networks.

In the weak states of the Sahel, the lines between internal and external can be particularly blurred, in part because some of these countries' borders have never really been closed, with people moving though poorly controlled territories. Is the Tuareg insurrection in Mali a domestic phenomenon or does it involve external intervention? Do the terrorist/criminal networks operating across the Sahel belong to particular countries? Not only are the answers to these questions elusive, but perhaps they are not very important, either, in that they seek to impose definitions that do not correspond to the reality of the countries involved. The greatest threat to such states is probably neither domestic insurgents nor outside interveners, but rather, the weaknesses of the states themselves.

6
Africa's Key Security Threats

Cheryl Hendricks

Africa is a rapidly changing continent. Many future scenario exercises predict a more prosperous future for its people.[1] This optimism is generated by forecasts of population growth, urbanization, falling poverty rates, and by improved governance on the continent. However, many of Africa's traditional and non-traditional security challenges remain, and new environmental challenges loom large. It seems prudent to note at the outset that Africa is diverse and therefore the regions and countries experience the security challenges identified below variedly. There is also a long list of human security challenges that have, and can, be identified. For this brief overview of Africa's key security threats, however, we concentrate on the following: Conflict Management and Peacebuilding; Terrorism, Piracy, and Organized Crime; Human Development and Environmental Challenges.

Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Challenges

In the post-Cold war era, Africa emerged as the continent with the majority of civil wars. Paul Williams noted that "between 1999 and 2008, Africa experienced

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1. See J. Cilliers, B. Hughes and J. Moyer, *African Futures 2050,* Institute for Security Studies Monograph 175, 2011.

13 major armed conflicts, the highest total of any region in the world."[2] There are currently UN missions in Somalia, South Sudan, Abyei, Darfur, Libya, Western Sahara, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Central African Republic, and the DRC giving credence to the pervasiveness of conflicts in Africa. The African Union sought to actively find solutions to the conflicts, building the African Peace and Security Architecture (with its concomitant frameworks and structures), and it has been able to deploy troops in Somalia and the Sudan.

These interventions have had their dividends for an overall decline in the number of large-scale armed conflicts has been registered. However, though large-scale conflicts may have declined, human insecurity remains. We have seen a change (though contested) in the nature of the conflicts in Africa, i.e., more low-intensity conflicts.[3]

Scott Strauss noted that "today's wars are typically fought on the peripheries of states, and insurgents tend to be militarily weak and factionalized."[4] He cites low-level insurgencies in Casamance (Senegal), Ogaden (Ethiopia), Caprivi strip (Namibia), Northern Uganda, Cabinda (Angola), Nigeria, Chad and the Central Africa Republic (various armed factions in the East), Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan and Eastern Congo, as examples. We also continue to see the fragility of post-conflict states, election-related violence remains high, North African countries have, through widespread protests, demanded democratization and we have seen the return of the military juntas – these conflicts account for many of the fatalities of African conflicts.

The low-intensity conflicts raise questions about the adaptive nature of current conflict management and peacebuilding structures and processes. It is encouraging that the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution (2033) to cooperate more closely with the AU Peace and Security Council. However, it seems that the problem remains that the mechanisms and structures that both the UNSC and the AU have put in place are designed for yesteryear's wars with clearly defined actors who can be brought to negotiating tables to sign ceasefire agreements and where peacekeeping forces can be sent in to ensure that the actors adhere to the agreement. But most of the low-intensity conflicts do not conform to these scripts

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2. Paul Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (USA: Polity Press, 2011), 4.

3. Stephen Ellis in "The Old Roots of Africa's New Wars," *International Politics and Society* 2 (2003), essentially contests the view that these are new wars, contending that they have been with us for a long time – some since independence.

4. Scott Strauss, "Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in sub-Saharan Africa," *African Affairs* 111/443, 2012.

of war. In addition, many of the challenges that lead to the violence – whether criminal, political or electoral, are governance related, i.e., the causes of the conflicts are social, political, economic and "increasing institutional inefficiency, uncertainty and weakness" (SIPRI Yearbook, 2011), so that we cannot simply apply band aid (stop conflicts through the deployment of peacemakers), but have to align conflict management with a focus on dealing with governance challenges for sustainable conflict resolution. Though this is recognized in theory, in practice it has proved more challenging to implement, hence the cycles of violence. The World Development Report (2011:7) notes that "Countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses." This explains why so many "post-conflict countries" slip back into conflict.

Terrorism, Piracy, and Organized Crime

The inherent governance challenges of some African states increases their vulnerability to terrorist activities, piracy, and organized crime. Boko Haram, al Shabab, and Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continue to pose security risks in Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sahel region. The long absence of a functioning government in Somalia has provided the opportunity for pirates to use this space to operate from. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were 219 piracy attacks in 2010.[5] The Congressional Research Service notes that the attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia's eastern coastline and outward into the Indian Ocean (as far east as the Maldives and as far south as Mozambique). As with terrorism, combating piracy has to include resolving the conditions that enable these types of activities to flourish, i.e., the lack of security, lack of rule of law, and pervasive poverty.

Similarly, these conditions provide fertile ground for organized crime, e.g., drug smuggling in West Africa. Even the more stable countries like South Africa fall prey to these types of criminal activities – which range from money laundering, wildlife poaching, and drug smuggling to human trafficking. Cyber crime is now joining the list of criminal activities. Africa appears not to have fully engaged the issue of cyber warfare and consequently has not formulated appropriate responses. In many African states, the response to cyber threats has often been to shut down access to information. African states must view cyber security as a national security priority and craft proper frameworks to guide responses to cyber attacks and ensure appropriate oversight.

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5. Congressional Research Service, "Piracy off the Horn of Africa," 2011.

Terrorism, piracy, and organized crime pose serious security challenges to weak states with weak security institutions and weak regulatory frameworks, and African governments must therefore begin to deal with closing these institutional and policy gaps.

The prevalence of small arms and light weapons also fuels criminal activities in most states across Africa. People feel insecure as states are increasingly unable to perform their most basic functions. Under such conditions, informal security arrangements emerge further weakening state capacity to control the monopoly on violence. States themselves are involved in rogue behavior, supplying weapons to rebel groups – these conditions heighten the sense of insecurity of Africa's citizens.

Human Development Challenges

The Human Security Paradigm, which emerged in the early 1990s, shifted our gaze from state security to individual security and the everyday security challenges brought about by the lack of political and economic development. The Millennium Development Goals were meant to address some of these challenges (such as poverty, education, gender equality, and maternal mortality). But, as we move closer to 2015, it seems clear that though progress has been made, many states, particularly post-conflict African states, will not have met these goals and the goalposts would therefore need to be shifted.

Two trends in Africa's development are, however, attracting mixed reaction – i.e., population growth and urbanization. Africa is the only continent that will double its population (to 2 billion) by 2045.[6] This represents an opportunity for a "demographic dividend" in the form of bigger markets and a bigger working age population. Africa's cities are also growing by an estimated 15-18 million each year.[7] But the fear is that Africa's cities will become "densely concentrated centers of unemployed young men …a combustible mix that can intensify violent crime, gang activity, illicit trafficking, links to transnational organized criminal syndicates and political instability."[8] Large slum areas become no-go zones for security, and as Commins argues, "urban fragility becomes a form of state fragility." People within these unserviced zones (no water or sanitation) are vulnerable to any external shocks (food and fuel hikes) and take to the streets to vent their frustration – urban riots in Mozambique, Senegal, and Burkino Faso were manifestations of this.

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6. *The Economist*, "Africa's Population: Miracle or Malthus?" December 17, 2011.

7. Stephen Commins, "Urban Fragility and Security in Africa," in Africa Security Brief no. 12, 2011.

8. Ibid., 1.

We have already noted that violent crime is rampant in these urban spaces. High incidences of sexual and gender based violence are part of the urban crime statistics. Bruce Baker notes the limitations of the police in these high density urban settings, viz., few, untrained, lack literacy skills, resources, and institutional capacity. The resources, he highlights, have often been "tilted heavily toward the military over the police…Compounding these challenges is a long history of police neglect, corruption and impunity…"[9] Security sector reform is a key part of the transformation that African security institutions (and not limited to post-conflict states) should undertake. These institutions must become effective, efficient, legitimate, and accountable – but this remains a challenge, for these institutions have essentially been geared to protect state incumbents rather than citizens.

Africa's security challenges can only be addressed through the adoption and implementation of a human security approach that seeks to both strengthen state institutions and their capacity to deliver services and protect and enhance the rights of citizens and create sustainable livelihoods.

Environmental Challenges

Climate change, water scarcity, and food insecurity are all seen as stresses that have the potential to generate renewed conflict in Africa, which seems least able to deal with the impact of these environmental challenges because its investment in disaster management and adaptive strategies has been low. These environmental challenges can reverse the gains made in human development to date.

Conclusion

It is important to note that though we have placed emphasis on the security challenges that impact Africa, this is also a continent that has shown tremendous growth – averaging at 5 percent – over the last decade. There is a vibrancy and dynamism exuded by its people which belies the doom and gloom that comes from a focus on states and their perceived insecurity. Africa is characterized by uncertainty, but this is also an opportunity to reinvent and re-imagine the continent. It is in the informal sector and in the cultural spheres that we see these trends – not necessarily in the political and security arenas that often resist transformation.

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9. Bruce Baker, "Nonstate Policing: Expanding the Scope for Tackling Africa's Urban Violence," in Africa Security Brief no.7 (2010): 3.

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7

India and the New Emerging Security Environment

V.R. Raghavan

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Major geopolitical and geoeconomic developments are currently transforming the international security scenario. The global balance of power is shifting from the West to East, and an article in The Economist frames this shift as the "emergence of Asia" and "the sun rises again."[1] The emergence of new economic powerhouses in Asia coupled with the global slowdown and the Eurozone crisis has initiated a new game of power politics in Asia. The shift in the global balance of power will bring new opportunities as well as new challenges. In addition to the ongoing power shift, energy is getting increasingly interlinked with geopolitics as global competition for resources sharpens. Indian security perceptions are guided as much by these developments as by its own fundamental strategic priorities.

Indian Strategic Priorities

The first strategic priority for India is and will continue to be sustained economic development, in order to lift 40 percent of one billion Indian people out of poverty. India cannot claim to be a successful state with this major strategic necessity remaining unfulfilled. This requires a stable domestic political environment and a peaceful international environment.

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1. "The Balance of Economic Power: Feast or Famine," *The Economist*, February 27, 2010, 71-72.

In order to pursue its developmental and economic goals, a peaceful periphery in the Indian region is a strategic necessity. Equally, a stable international security and economic environment is a strategic imperative for India.

Indian Security Concerns

Two major security concerns of India relate to the Arab world and the changing geopolitical developments in East Asia. Today geoeconomics dominates world affairs as there are growing demands for energy and other natural resources leading to competition which has both economic and security implications. Massive competition prevails in Africa, Latin America, Middle East and Central Asia in the quest for energy and other mineral resources to keep up with the growing consumption patterns of these emerging countries.

These consumption patterns have also led to an unprecedented surge in the prices of oil, gas and raw materials and fast depleting resources are likely to be a major source of geopolitical strife in the coming years. Countries around the world are reinforcing their protectionist policies to safeguard the national economy. This will have long-term consequences as protection of national interests will become a dominant feature of international relations.

Arab Spring

The current unrest in the Middle East will have wider implications for global stability. The democratic upsurge in Arab countries stems from socio-economic problems and demands for political freedom.

A new regional reality has formed in the Arab region. Until recently, Shia-Sunni friction and pro and anti-West stance were the causes for uneasy relations between the countries in the region. Internal changes are now reshaping bilateral relations and affecting the regional balance of power.

The Arab region accounts for 40 percent of oil and natural gas supplies to the world, and the Strait of Hormuz is a crucial chokepoint for energy supply to the rapidly growing markets of Asia. Energy and maritime security is intricately linked to the ongoing transition in the region.

Middle East and the Gulf

The uprisings in the Middle East bring their own set of challenges and opportunities. Peace and stability in the region are important for India as its strategic interests in

the Arab region are linked to energy, trade, a large Indian work force, and religious ties. India imports 75 percent of its oil and natural gas from the Middle East and the Gulf. The Middle East has nearly five million Indian migrant workers who account for 32 percent of the total migrants in the region. India receives $24 billion worth of remittances from the workforce which accounts for 45 percent of total foreign remittances to India. India is thus vulnerable to the evolving geopolitical situation in the area.

Besides, India has huge interest in Iran. Iran's geopolitical and strategic location, long coastline along the Gulf, and its influence over the Strait of Hormuz makes it an important country in the region. Iran has the third largest proven oil reserves and second largest gas reserves in the world. India eyes Iranian gas for its long-term energy security. The Chabahar Port in Iran along with a very strategic railway link offers India direct access to Afghanistan and energy-rich Central Asia.

The crisis over Iran's nuclear program spells uncertainty for the region. If Iran is attacked, it might target energy infrastructure and US bases in the region. Likewise Iran may strike Israel in an attempt to draw it into the conflict and that would put pressure on Arab governments to curtail support to the US. Any attack would have serious implications for the global economy. According to the IMF, it would be tantamount to an oil blockade and may cause a 30 percent oil price hike if Iranian oil exports are disrupted. This would also affect the efforts that have been invested in rescuing the Euro.

India's Middle East Policy is also influenced by the Islam factor. This factor came into prominence during the run-up to the Iran vote at the IAEA. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh candidly explained that India has a large Shia population which plays a crucial role in India's policies towards Iran. Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed India's stance on India-Iran trade relations: "It is not possible for India to take any decision to reduce the imports from Iran drastically, because among the countries which can provide the requirement of the emerging economies, Iran is an important country despite U.S. and European sanctions on Iran."[2] Buying oil from Iran does not mean that India condones Tehran's nuclear ambitions other than for peaceful purposes. Maintaining stability in the Arab Peninsula to enable an uninterrupted flow of energy is a global challenge and India needs to carefully nurture its policies in the region.

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2. "India Won't Scale Down Petroleum Imports from Iran: Pranab," *The Hindu*, January 30, 2012.

Rise of China

The rise of China in the 21st century is a historic event that is reshaping world order. Measured by its comprehensive national capabilities, military power, and growing influence on a global scale, China is increasingly becoming a global power whose influence is felt in all corners of the world.

Recognizing the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the emerging new order, the US has decided to focus on the region as part of what they call the pivot towards Asia. The US plans to enhance military-to-military cooperation with China at the same time boosting the capabilities of its allies in the region. Leon Panetta, US Defense Secretary said, "America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing the new defence strategy. In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Asia."[3] The new strategic posture has been welcomed by the countries in the region which have been at the receiving end of the muscle flexing by China that claims the entire South China Sea as its exclusive domain.[4] The South China Sea is one of the busiest sea lanes in the world, and disputes in this region could have a major impact on the world economy. The US decision to play a larger role in Asia comes against the backdrop of rising military expenditure in the region. China's arms budget has grown at a rate of 12 percent a year and is now second only to the US. According to SIPRI, Asia has become the biggest regional importer of weapons. The growing military spending in Asia is the natural result of the sustained and rapid economic development of the countries of the region and seeks to safeguard their growing economic and development interests, including overseas interests and the safety of shipping routes, and also to address the challenges posed by terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism. A lack of trust and misunderstandings concerning China's rise have also to some extent resulted in a "security dilemma."[5]

India and China have a very complex and complicated bilateral relation interspersed with elements of cooperation and competition with potential to influence events in the 21st century. China has augmented military and administrative capabilities across the Tibetan Plateau by improving the infrastructure and communication arteries, air bases, and logistics capacity. China's capacity to control

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3. *The Economic Times*, June 7 2012.

4. *Times of India*, June 7, 2012.

5. "New Arms Race? US Fuels Massive Arms Spending in Asia," *China Daily*, April 8, 2012.

and crush any dissent in Tibet and capability to project sizeable military forces into India has enhanced. On the maritime front, China's expansion of its blue water navy is a matter of growing concern for India. In conventional military capabilities and nuclear weapons, China is far superior to India. According to SIPRI, India has increased its military spending by 66 percent since 2002, while China, working from a more primitive level of military technology, has increased its spending by 170 per cent in the same period. China, with a military budget which SIPRI estimated at $143 billion last year, is second only to the United States in military spending. India, with a 2011 budget of $49 billion, is seventh globally, but third in Asia after China and Japan. India is now the world's biggest importer of weapons, mostly from Europe and Russia, and possesses a large domestic arms industry. The growth in defense production capability in China calls for more concerted efforts to improve India's defense preparedness, much larger capacity for indigenous defense production and upgradation of armed forces. China's assertive actions in the South China Sea and the consequent return of the US pivot in Asia have created a potentially conflictual environment in East Asia. It has also led to increased arms and naval build-up in the region. China and the East Asian states are large importers of oil and gas which must of necessity move by sea. The Indian Ocean and the choke points of Malacca Straits thus become critical strategic assets where a conflict can be a serious destabilizing element. India has consequently enhanced its naval footprint in East Asia, and this trend is likely to continue.

Afghanistan and International Terrorism

Terrorism is one of greatest scourges of the 21st century and a source of instability in many regions across the world. Afghanistan is currently in a state of transition and is also an epicentre of international terrorism. With US and its allies withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2014, a scramble for influence will take place which will a strategic concern for India. US withdrawal could result in the spiralling of violence and Islamic extremism in the Af-Pak region, the impact of which would be mostly felt in India. India is interested in developing Afghanistan as an economic hub, linking Central and South Asia through pipelines, trade and transit routes. India has built a strong multi-faceted strategic relationship with Afghanistan based on historical and cultural linkages and cemented by a significant role in the reconstruction, development, and capacity-building in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

India is steadily building its economic capabilities to take care of its primary strategic need of removing poverty among its large population. Two major strategic concerns will drive Indian policies in this decade. One relates to the consequences on its economy of the democratic and social upsurge in the energy-rich Arab region. Secondly, the rapidly changing security scene in East Asia with the rise of an assertive China and its likely confrontation with the US is a potentially high risk scenario which can have a major impact on Indian strategic interests. India will do everything to add security value to regional and global stability. It would make every effort to be a source of strategic stability.

8

Some Thoughts on the Security Challenges Confronting Southeast Asia

Joseph Chinyong Liow

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has emerged as one of the most economically and politically dynamic regions in the world. Having recovered from the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s, most Southeast Asian economies restructured themselves with sufficient verve such that they managed for the most part to insulate themselves from the subprime and Eurozone crises. On the political front, populations across the region have asserted their aspirations leading to political transformations and changes towards the widening and deepening of democracy. Perhaps most astounding has been the change in Myanmar, where the hitherto iron grip of the military junta has gradually loosened over the past two years, culminating in the release of political prisoners, conduct of free by-elections, and implementation of more investor-friendly economic policies.

Notwithstanding these changes, the region continues to face a number of security challenges ranging from climate change and the persistent scourge of terrorism, to rising tensions in the South China Sea. This paper seeks to outline some of the key fundamental security themes that are likely to preoccupy the region's policy-makers in the coming decade.

ASEAN's Centrality and Integration

ASEAN's centrality can be defined as its ability to play a central role in defining some of the norms of East Asian international relations. A concrete expression of this centrality may be seen in ASEAN's role in providing a neutral platform in maintaining the sensitive relations between East Asian countries and between them and the US. Such efforts have found institutional expression in ASEAN-led initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.

The challenge for ASEAN is to remain at the heart of the evolving East Asian architecture. Whether ASEAN can continue this role depends on three factors: the state of ASEAN's own integration; the state of evolution among the major East Asian powers; and the balance between the three major powers China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

As a successful Cold War organization, the post-Cold War years presented ASEAN with the difficult process of economic integration that required considerable sacrifices and strong external imperatives. With the rise of China and India, ASEAN has found itself geopolitically and economically "trapped" between two emerging powers. This state of affairs presents threats (i.e., ASEAN being rent apart either by the centrifugal forces from the two powers, or becoming a victim of major power rivalry) and opportunities (i.e., an integrated ASEAN which successfully synergizes policies with both powers).

It was with the imperative of integration in mind that ASEAN embarked on the ambitious crafting of the ASEAN Charter. Yet, while the Charter – ratified and implemented – bestows upon ASEAN a legal identity, institutional cohesion relies equally heavily on the domestic politics in individual ASEAN countries. Indeed, as numerous incidents in the recent past have shown (e.g., Thailand's chairing of ASEAN in 2009), ASEAN the organization is all too vulnerable to the exigencies of domestic politics.

The East Asian Regional Architecture

East Asia is an extremely diverse region; perhaps more so than any other. Moreover, the social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics at work in this region have long transcended geopolitical boundaries. This is even more so today, such that the modified idea of a broader East Asia region, which in the past referred to Northeast Asia, now includes Southeast Asia as well as some parts of South Asia, i.e., India.

The geographical mapping of East Asia is primarily determined by political and economic factors. As challenges evolve and the search for more effective modes of interaction continues, there has been an amplification of voices that call for the building of a regional architecture that can facilitate the emergence of the region. This is the result of a prolonged period of sustained growth in East Asia that has created an environment of far greater strategic complexity. Although East Asia is not a naturally coherent region, one of its significant characteristics is its commitment to growth and its sustainability that has remained firm over the decades despite mistakes and setbacks.

Regional institutions play an important role in cementing the architecture within East Asia. There is now the ASEAN+3, with the 10 ASEAN member states as well as the three regional powers, namely China, South Korea and Japan. There is also the East Asia Summit, which adds Australia, New Zealand, the US, India, and Russia to the above list.

At the heart of debates over the emerging East Asian architecture is the perception held in many East and Southeast Asian states that the US presence – which has for long provided the security umbrella for the region – was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regional stability. Given the strategic complexities of today and the urgent need to sustain growth, a revamp of the institutions and architecture inherited from the Cold War is undoubtedly required to manage the complex relationships that have emerged between powers such as China and India, China and Japan, and the US and China.

Framework of the Regional Architecture

The architecture building effort is not a community building project as some have described, but an attempt to create a framework to manage relationships and create stability so that conditions for growth can continue.

Being a region of diversity, it is better for East Asia to maintain a multi-polar overlapping framework rather than a single dominant regional architecture such as the one in Europe. While there is a broad consensus currently on the direction of the architecture-building exercise, there are nevertheless accompanying risks that have to be taken into account. Foremost is the risk of domestic politics. This is likely to be the most volatile given how many of the countries in the region are either currently undergoing or have recently undergone political transitions the outcomes of which are not yet clear. There is little that states can do to influence these outcomes. Second, there are regional geopolitical risks that could pose a threat to the stability

and growth of the region. These include the India-Pakistan conflict, tensions across the Taiwan Straits, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula aggravated by the possible crisis of legitimacy confronting the new North Korean regime. Third, there are global geopolitical factors that will weigh heavily on developments in the region. These include the situation with regard to Iran, which is itself gradually increasing its influence in East and Southeast Asia through oil and energy, and the place of the US in the international system.

East Asia and the Global Context

For the last two hundred years, the basic concepts and structures of the international system had been determined by what was broadly called the West. Now, the world is in a state of transition and the main challenge it faces is how to adapt to Western-defined modernity. In this regard, it may be noted that the most successful countries in the world in meeting this challenge are all in East Asia, primarily but not exclusively China. Notably, this process has been defined by the imposition of changes upon the Western-defined international system.

East Asia and the Role of US

Two different models of regional experiments are the ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. There are three different schools of thought as regards the US role in these two platforms. Since the Cold War, the hub-and-spokes model of regional alliances – with the US as the hub and its allies as the spokes – had been the main means of America's regional security engagement in East Asia and this model was long deemed in Washington circles to be a sufficient vehicle to secure US interests. This may no longer be the case. A second school of thought subscribes to the need for a new architecture and sees APEC as the primary vehicle for American interests in that regard. Finally, a third school of thought – one that is represented by the current Obama administration – views the hub and spokes as well as APEC models to be important but no longer sufficient to secure American interests. Even though the third school of thought appears to have prevailed, the debate is far from over and the US role remains unclear given its resource constraints due to its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic downturn from which it has yet to fully recover.

The Rise of China and India

The Cold War united the original five ASEAN members. The post-Cold War years witnessed the ASEAN struggle to stay relevant by focusing on economic integration. In hindsight, the 1990s was a wasted decade as the record on economic integration proved dismal despite ASEAN expansion. A key reason for ASEAN's mediocre performance during this period was the lack of a strategic imperative that could foster coherence and deeper cooperation. As mentioned earlier, the rise of China and India has provided this critical strategic imperative. In response to the "threat" posed by China and India, ASEAN (in particular, the original five members) has forged ahead with deeper integration.

Conclusion

While it is true that the world is experiencing a shift in the distribution of power (and wealth), it is premature to conclude that this portends the decline of the West or the rise of the East in any sort of relative manner. Consider, for instance, the fact that as a rising power, China remains greatly influenced by many Western models (and this has been so since 1911).

The point is that the new world order is an uncertain one, and it is likely to be defined by contestations for leadership in global affairs as the world moves into a period of "non" polarity and lack of international leadership.

Nonetheless, what seems to be clear is that East Asia is definitely an important region, and the regional architecture here will have more influence in the international arena. In turn, the new global architecture will also influence whatever happens in East Asia.

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Asia-Pacific Security and the Japan-US Alliance*

Yukio Satoh

Although the center of gravity of the global economy is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region and economic and financial cooperation among East Asian countries is increasing, security conditions in the region remain fluid.

The situations in Northeast Asia are more unstable and unpredictable than those in Southeast Asia. The legacy of the Cold War still remains on the Korean Peninsula in the form of military confrontation between South and North Korea, involving the United States and China separately allied with the opposing sides. In the south, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is making slow but steady progress in deepening cooperation among the 10 member countries.

At the same time, the balance of power among major powers is changing, with the emerging US-China rivalry at the center. Japan is struggling to revitalize its economy and how Russia will engage in the region remains to be seen.

Against this backdrop, US President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda recognized anew the Japan-US alliance as "the cornerstone of peace, security, and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" at their

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* This chapter was written before the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the election in December 2012 and the government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office. Prime Minister Abe's government is far more enthusiastically committed than the preceding DPJ government to strengthening alliance cooperation with the US.

meeting in Washington on April 30, 2012. How fast Japan will recover its political and economic dynamism necessary for the alliance to respond to the changing security circumstances is yet another important question that would have significant implications for the future of the region.

North Korean Threat

From the Japanese perspective, North Korea and China are the major causes of security concern, although the nature of the threats and challenges they pose are different. North Korea poses a direct threat — although potentially — to Japan's security, while China is presenting challenges to the geopolitics of the region that includes Japan.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile development endanger the security of not only Northeast Asia but also other parts of the world, particularly a wider Middle East extending from Pakistan to Syria. The regime's reclusiveness, defiant attitude toward the outside world, and 'military-first' policy as well as the recent succession to power of the little experienced Kim Jong-un, all add to the unpredictability of the already reckless country.

North Korea's missiles are already reckoned with in Japan's defense planning. Japan's four main islands and Okinawa, the island in southwest Japan where US bases are concentrated, are all within the range of the North Korean missile Nodong-2010, which is estimated to be already operational. Pyongyang tested its longer-range missile, Taepodong, over Japan in 1998 and is further developing missiles capable of reaching US territories. These developments have prompted Japan to engage in cooperation with the US on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

Politically, the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s has made the Japanese indignant at the North Korean regime. The issue became widely known to the Japanese public in 2002, when the then Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, visited Pyongyang. Although the then North Korean leader, the late Kim Jong-il, admitted and apologized for the abduction of 13 citizens, the Japanese suspect that North Korea has not fully accounted for what it had done, including the number and fate of abductees.

Diplomatically, the Six Party Talks have been a platform to engage North Korea for the past decade. The Talks, initiated by China and participated in by Japan, South and North Korea, Russia and the US, is primarily aimed at attaining a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. But for Japan the multilateral negotiations provide an avenue to explore a solution of the abduction question as well. The Talks have stalled, however, since North Korea walked away in December 2008.

The other five countries are also not acting coherently in pursuit of their allegedly joint goal of denuclearizing North Korea. China seems to give priority to ensuring stability in its ally and neighbor over pressing Pyongyang hard enough to denuclearize itself. The US appears to be more concerned about Iran's nuclear programs and the proliferation of North Korea's weapons and technologies. Seoul's attitude toward Pyongyang fluctuates, often with the change of President, between confrontation and conciliation. Japan, particularly the Japanese public, is apparently more concerned about the fate of the abductees than denuclearization questions, and Russia keeps a low profile at the Six Party Talks.

The possibility of the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime has long been speculated about. Nevertheless, contingency planning for such eventualities remains to be made by the surrounding countries that are likely to be affected. Cooperation to this end is long overdue for the countries concerned, particularly South Korea, the US and Japan.

Challenges of China

It is vitally important for Japan to maintain politically stable and economically productive relations with China, and vice versa. Chinese cooperation is crucial for regional stability and security, let alone for global economic growth. It is in the interests of Japan to ensure that China plays the role of a 'responsible stakeholder,' as rightly advocated by Robert Zoellick.

Indeed, Japan and China are pursuing the goal of attaining a 'mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,' as announced in 2008 by the then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Chinese President Hu Jintao. Trilateral summit meetings among Japan, China, and South Korea have taken place regularly since 2009.

However, the bilateral relationship is precarious. The Chinese claim on Japan's Senkaku Islands ('Diao Yu Dai' in Chinese), is an issue of contention. Chinese vessels attempt to violently challenge the Japanese control of the islands, as vividly demonstrated in 2010 in the incident between a Chinese trawler and a Japanese coastguard vessel. China's attempts to enforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea is an alarming reminder of Beijing's aggressiveness in claiming maritime territories and exclusive economic zones rich in natural resources.

Nationalism is a flammable agent in both countries. A view widely held in Japan is that the Chinese Communist Party uses the memories of the Japanese military invasion in the 1930s and 40s to incite anti-Japanese sentiments ingrained

in Chinese nationalism to the party's political advantage. Conversely, Chinese claims on the Senkaku Islands spark nationalistic feelings in Japan.

Strategically, it is worrisome that China is expanding its military power in a form asymmetrical to US force posture with the aim of attaining what is known as 'anti-access and area denial' capability against US forces. For, such Chinese military power would eventually undercut the predominance of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region, upon which Japan and many other countries have been counting for regional stability. It is for this reason that Japan wants European countries to refrain from exporting advanced military technologies to China.

US-China Relations

US-China relations have complex bearings upon the Japan-US alliance. While Japan wants a cooperative and predictable US-China relationship, the strategic interests Japan and the US pursue in their respective relations with China are not always the same.

Economically, the two countries are competitors in Chinese markets. Politically, pressing China to improve the protection of human rights or to promote freedom and democracy is less a priority for Japan than it is for the US. Diplomatically, Japan is anxious, if subconsciously, about a possibility that it might be left out of direct dealings between the two permanent members of the UN Security Council that are outside the reach of Japanese diplomacy.

To compound the tripartite relations further, US-China relations are rife with uncertainties. Although the US and China need each other's cooperation economically and financially as well as for foreign and security policy, the two countries' interests often contradict each other. For example, the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy are an important part of the US foreign policy agenda, while China regards US advocacy on these issues as interference in domestic affairs. Non-interference in domestic affairs is one of the basic principles of Chinese foreign policy. The US legislative responsibility to defend Taiwan is regarded similarly by China.

Moreover, distrust toward each other persists, if more deeply in the Chinese mindset than in the American. Given also American self-righteousness and Chinese self-centeredness as well as the equally proud and assertive characteristics of the two nations, diplomacy between the two countries could easily become confrontational, with destabilizing impact on regional geopolitics.

It is therefore important for Japan to make every effort to help promote mutual

understanding between Washington and Beijing. To hold a trilateral dialogue could be meaningful in this context.

Strengthening the alliance with the US is essential for Japan to play such a role. The US-extended deterrence is indispensable for Japan to neutralize the potential threats China's military power, including nuclear weapons, might pose, and Washington's confidence in Tokyo as a trustworthy ally is necessary for Japan to make herself persuasive in relations with the US. Chinese skepticism toward Japan which is allied with the US will not go away. However, for China, Japan allied with the US is more acceptable than a militarily independent Japan, and a Japan equipped with powers of persuasion in its relations with the US could be beneficial.

Some in Japan advocate that Tokyo's political relations with Washington and Beijing should be of equal distance. But this is not a realistic policy option for Japan so long as it needs the alliance with the US for its security. Moreover, it is not feasible for Japan, politically and financially as well as diplomatically, to independently acquire a deterrent against every potential threat conceivable.

Japan-US Alliance

The Japan-US Security Treaty will continue to be the mainstay of Japanese security. The force posture and capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) is limited by the official interpretation of the Japanese constitution to serving the narrowly defined purposes of self-defense. The interpretation also prohibits the SDF from exercising the right of 'collective self-defense', to limit further the way the SDF can engage in military operations with US forces.

Japan's dependence upon US military support ranges broadly from deterring the threats of nuclear weapons and reinforcing the SDF for the defense of Japan to ensuring force presence and power projection for regional stability.

In return, Japan provides US forces with bases and the financial 'host nation support', which is the most generous among the US allies. Japan would be an indispensable staging area for US forces' operations to defend South Korea. US forces based in Japan also contribute to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. They include an aircraft carrier and other naval vessels operating from their homeports of Yokosuka and Sasebo and the Marine Corps' expeditionary forces forward-deployed in Okinawa.

This lopsided structure of alliance cooperation has long been beneficial to both sides. In the wake of World War II, the US wanted to prevent the revival of a militarily strong Japan, and Japan wanted to save defense efforts for the sake of

economic development. During the Cold War, the US needed bases and the host nation support provided by Japan, counting little on the SDF except for the limited role of surveillance of Soviet submarines. Japan, with a strong sentiment against nuclear weapons prevailing among the public opinion, tried to avoid involvement in US nuclear strategy. In contrast to NATO's policy of nuclear sharing, Japan publicly refused the introduction into the country of US nuclear weapons despite its reliance on US nuclear deterrence for addressing Soviet nuclear threats.

The situation has changed since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to the Soviet Union whose military threats were felt more acutely on the Euro-Atlantic side rather than in Asia (Sino-Soviet confrontation had made the Soviet threat less tangible in Asia), North Korea and China are close enough to directly affect Japanese security perceptions, making public opinion more supportive of stronger defense and a closer alliance with the US.

Significant developments during the past decade reflect the changed Japanese security perception: The procurement of the US-designed BMD systems and the co-development with the US of a next-generation interceptor (SM-3 Block II A); the first-ever recognition in 2010 in Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of the need of Japan's own efforts to enhance the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence (the NDPG have been revised three times at various intervals since 1976); and, the added focus on the defense of south-western islands facing China reflected in the NDPG's plan to increase SDF's mobility.

Conspicuously, Japanese security policy progressed in the same direction despite the change of the ruling party in 2009 from the conservative-leaning Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the liberal-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The alliance cooperation once derailed by the first DPJ Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, is now back on the right track. But the long controversial issue of relocating a Marine air station within Okinawa was made more difficult to resolve by policy aberrations made by Prime Minister Hatoyama, who, during his short tenure, raised Okinawa's expectations for the removal of the air station out of the island without any prospect for their realization.

Japanese Defense Efforts Required

The recent progress of Japanese defense efforts notwithstanding, it is likely that the shift of US strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region, in the name of 'rebalancing', and the prospective pressure of budget cuts on US foreign and defense policy would together add to US pressure for increased Japanese efforts for common security

purposes. The Japanese knowledgeable about defense and security recognize that Japan needs to increase its defense efforts in order to adapt the SDF's force posture and capability to changing defense and alliance requirements.

Four requirements stand out in this context. First of all, it is important for the SDF to further strengthen operational cooperation with US forces. To this end, the two governments have already agreed to promote joint training, joint surveillance and reconnaissance activities and joined or shared use of facilities between the two forces. The joint rescue operations ('Operation Tomodachi') the two forces conducted in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, has given them the broad experiences upon which they would be able to build effective cooperation in the future.

Secondly, politico-military cooperation in a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral format with such countries as South Korea, Australia, ASEAN countries and India as well as Gulf States and NATO members is becoming important.

While such cooperation has been in progress in the Asia-Pacific region, albeit in varying degrees, Japanese security cooperation will have to have a global perspective. SDF vessels have been participating in joint exercises with US and Indian naval vessels in the Indian Ocean; SDF vessels are deployed in the Indian Ocean and reconnaissance aircraft are stationed in Djibouti to participate in anti-piracy international cooperation; SDF minesweepers joined US and British counterparts in an exercise in the Gulf for the first time in 2011; and SDF troops are participating in UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. These activities signify a new development in this direction. Furthermore, the next-generation BMD interceptor that is being co-developed by the US and Japan would be used with some necessary modifications for European defense should the European Phased Adaptive Approach toward BMD be adopted by NATO.

Thirdly, it is important for Japan to increase defense spending. Despite growing concerns about North Korea and China, Japanese defense budgets have been decreasing almost continuously since FY 1998. Reversing this trend is critically important to attain the SDF's desired capability, including the advanced BMD systems and F-35As.

It must be admitted though, that, given a combination of extremely heavy public debt, low tax revenues, and increasing future budgetary requirements to sustain the aging society, it will be hard to increase defense budgets before Japan's fiscal conditions improve by raising consumption tax, as planned by Prime Minister Noda. More fundamentally, to revitalize Japan's economy is essential to the end.

Fourthly, the constitutional interpretation prohibiting the SDF from exercising the right of collective self-defense must be changed to allow it, for example, to use its future BMD interceptors to target the adversary's high-flying missiles heading toward US territories. Should Japan decline to do so because of the said constitutional prohibition, it would deal a fatal blow to the alliance itself. More broadly, it is important to make it possible for the SDF to act in support of US and/or other nations' forces while engaging together in UN peacekeeping or other UN-sanctioned operations.

Changing the established constitutional interpretation would be very difficult politically, and a strong political leadership will be required to make it possible.

It must be stressed here that defense and foreign policy efforts alone are not enough to manage alliance politics with Washington. For, it is primarily through the prism of trade and economic relations that the US Congress evaluates the state of its relations with Japan. On the other hand, Tokyo tends to address trade and other economic relations with the US separately from defense issues, except for the procurement of weapon systems. Tokyo will have to take a more comprehensive approach toward the alliance, particularly as the US Congress is likely to pay more attention than ever to Asia.

The Importance of Public Relations

In the final analysis, domestic politics on both sides of the Pacific would have defining impact on the Japan-US alliance. The confrontational partisan politics in Washington is worrying in this context.

But it is more worrying that Japanese politics has been adrift (propping up seven prime ministers during the past decade) without any prospects for attaining orderly governance. It is unlikely that the political leadership necessary for the increased defense and security efforts required will be forthcoming in such a political situation.

Current Japanese politics reflects the people's 'post-modern' way of thinking, which is similar to that of the Europeans. The Japanese are more concerned about their individual well-being and economic conditions, civil society activities as well as ecology and environmental issues than about national security. Even on security issues, the mass media, which has great influence on shaping public opinion, tends to focus more on tangible but parochial issues, such as local complaints about US force presence and political pressure from Washington, than on analytical issues like the potential threats posed by North Korea or China that need to be discussed more widely and in-depth.

To cultivate public understanding, let alone positive support, for increased defense and security efforts is, therefore, difficult. But public support is crucial for increased defense efforts in order to ensure that the Japan-US alliance can effectively contribute to the future security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Public relations must come high on the agenda of Japan-US cooperation.

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Security Challenges in Asia (and the Pacific): An Australian Perspective

Leanne Piggott

Since Federation in 1901, Australia's security outlook has been shaped by a sense of vulnerability to foreign invasion arising from its geographical proximity to heavily populated Asian countries to its north, large land area, extended coastline and relatively small population. From that perspective, national security planning has been based on the imperative of maintaining a strategic alliance with a 'great and powerful friend' capable of providing direct military assistance, if ever needed, to defend Australia's large continent and territorial waters. Since WWII, and more especially since the Suez Crisis in 1956, this role has been fulfilled by the United States, with whom Australia signed the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, a military alliance that binds the two countries to cooperate on defense matters. Over the decades, Australia has committed troops to US military engagements and conducted joint exercises with US forces. Australia and the US have assigned officers to each other's armed services, shared intelligence and developed force interoperability.[1] In September 2011, Australian and US officials announced that the ANZUS alliance now extends into cyberspace.

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1. The use of standardized equipment and operational doctrine.

Australia's national security interests have in turn been served by the rise of US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region since WWII. Paradoxically, perhaps, this has facilitated Australia's economic engagement with Asia and access to its markets. It has also provided the opportunity for Australia to contribute to operations aimed at regional order, including in the area of most strategic importance to Australia, namely, Southeast Asia. This is the area that sits at the northern approaches to Australia and through which any hostile forces would have to operate in order to project military force in any sustained way against Australia. Critically, these approaches could also be used to threaten or constrain Australia's land and sea trade routes with East and Southeast Asia and choke off the supply of critical resources to Australia, the most crucial being oil. Accordingly, any external aggression or threat of aggression in this region and its critical sea lanes by potentially hostile powers has been viewed in Canberra as a potential threat to the mainland of Australia itself.

It is for these reasons that the shift in traditional power relations currently underway in the Asia-Pacific region has created great uncertainty for Australia, in both conventional and non-conventional terms. In terms of conventional security threats, the region is undergoing a re-balancing of power relationships as states look to maintain or assert their strategic influence through a combination of political, economic and military measures. Growing tensions between the major powers of the region, namely, the United States, China, Japan, India and Russia, has led the Australian government to warn of "a small but still concerning possibility" of military confrontation between "some of these powers."[2]

For the present, this is of concern to Australia principally for economic reasons. Asia is home to Australia's major trading partners, including China, Japan, and South Korea. Specifically, China has become Australia's single most important trading partner with Chinese imports from, and investment in, Australia at record levels. As one analyst has argued, "China is now as critical for Australia's economic security and prosperity as the United States is, in terms of Australia's military security."[3]

Conflict in the region generally, and along its sea lanes in particular, would thus constitute a major threat to Australia's economic security. Further, if conventional warfare was to erupt between China and the US, Australia would be faced with a tough decision as to whether to hedge in favor of its long-term economic interests or its traditional security alliance. A key strategy for Australia has been to avoid being

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2. Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, 2009), 74.

3. Mohan Malik, "Australia, America and Asia," *Pacific Affairs* 79, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 589.

placed in a situation where it would be forced to make such a choice, a situation it has not been faced within its previous history.[4]

The fact that the two principal powers in the region, the US and China, are nuclear weapons states, and that China's ally, North Korea, has developed nuclear weapons while adopting an aggressive posture towards the US and its ally, Japan, add further complexities to the potential for military confrontation. Asia is projected to account for the majority of global nuclear energy expansion over the coming century, which opens the possibility of an increased number of states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, adding fuel to the instability already caused by North Korea.

Australia's non-conventional security concerns include the threat of terrorist attacks at home and against the country's interests abroad. While Australia has been fortunate not to have experienced a terrorist attack on its home soil, its embassy in Jakarta was the target of a car bomb attack in 2004 and more than 80 Australians were killed in the first terrorist bombing attack in Bali in 2002. The Australian government continues to see Southeast Asia as the main source of threats of terrorism to Australia. More specifically the threat is perceived to emanate from a particularly virulent form of jihadism from groups and individuals based in the region who view terrorism as a legitimate modus operandi in their struggle against state governments.

Conventional and non-conventional security issues converge in relation to energy and resource security or, more specifically, oil supply security. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Australia is in the enviable position of being a net energy exporter, although it is a net importer of crude oil and refined petroleum. Currently, most of the oil that Australia imports comes from Southeast Asia. The largest source is Vietnam.

However, like all oil-importing countries in the region, Australia is on a trajectory towards importing an increasing quantity of the oil that it needs, some of which will need to be sourced from the Middle East in the coming decades. So in addition to Australia's export dependence upon the economic development and prosperity of its Asian trading partners, which themselves rely on Gulf oil, Australia too will become increasingly vulnerable to the short, medium and long-term risks to energy supplies that derive from the geopolitics of the Middle East, the volatility of which has in the past added a premium to energy prices.

Further, in the light of ever-increasing oil demand from Asian economies, in particular China and India, the ability of the global markets to provide reliable

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4. Recent policy decisions, including the agreement to host in Darwin US marines on rotation of duty, would suggest that Canberra has already decided to remain loyal to its treaty partner.

and affordable oil and gas is viewed as critical to ensure that Asian consumers do not reach the decision to abandon the market in favor of unilateral deals, coercive diplomacy or some form of 'resource conflict'. It is therefore important to Australia that major Asian consumers leave it to the market, rather than politics, to govern the price of oil and other resources.

The actions of China are therefore also of particular interest to Australia because if demand pressures were to convince China or any other major oil consumer to seek oil supplies beyond the relative safety of a 'market-allocation' mechanism, this could threaten to 'securitize' energy issues, that is, to convert conflicts over resources (in this case oil) into armed confrontations, as has frequently occurred throughout history. Equally important is the way in which the US would interpret China's actions and how it would respond. The implications for Australia of possible tension between China and the US over energy resources have not been lost on Canberra. As noted in the 2009 Defence White Paper, growing economic interdependence between countries resulting from globalization is not a guarantee against the outbreak of inter-state conflict over resources.[5]

Against this backdrop, China's response to territorial disputes, such as those that have arisen in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, have been keenly watched by Australian analysts, some of whom have determined that its actions reflect an 'increasingly assertive position' and therefore give rise to concerns about "China's behaviour and future possibilities."[6]

At an official level, the Australian government has continued publicly to advocate that the US continue all facets of its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, arguing "that strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the continued presence of the United States through its network of alliances and security partnerships, including with Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and Australia, and by significant levels of US military capability continuing to be located in the Western Pacific."[7]

The likelihood of a militarization of energy security in the region resulting in an actual conflict between China and the US is low, assuming that both states continue to behave as rational actors. Not only would such a conflict result in potentially crippling energy prices, thereby undermining global security, it would also involve a retreat from globalization upon which the economic development,

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5. Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century.*

6. P. Abigail, "Australia's Next Defence White Paper: an ASPI Update," *Proceedings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ASPI Global Forces International Conference* (August 11, 2011), Canberra, 2012, 74.

7. Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century,* 43.

and in turn the internal stability, of both states has been, and continues to be, dependent. Therefore, to ensure the integrity of the current global system, on which Australia's future prosperity and stability also depends, it is important for Australia to support measured, market-based solutions to the problems of energy security, ones that facilitate trust and promote multilateral, regional, and bilateral cooperation on energy issues.

Energy security relates in turn to the security of the sea lines of communication upon which oil tanker transportation is dependent. For the Asia-Pacific region those lines include sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The increasing importance of the Indian Ocean region to Australia's strategic calculus was identified in the 2009 Defence White Paper, which recognized the importance to Australia of "the growing power of India, the critical trade routes flowing through it, the increasing fragility of some littoral states, including Pakistan, and the prospect of the region becoming a venue for strategic competition between great powers."

The view in Canberra is that "as Chinese and Indian naval forces grow and project further west and east respectively, as energy security continues to rise, and as transnational challenges such as terrorism, piracy and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction endure", the central position of Australia "between the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific theatres will only become more important as waters close to China become less safe."[8] In response, the Defence Force Posture Review currently underway is examining options for an increased Australian military presence in the region, "looking both on-shore and at our off-shore territories", as well as for "increased use by US forces of Australian facilities in Northern and Western Australia."[9] Developing a closer strategic relationship with India is also high on Australia's diplomatic and defense agenda.

Thus from the Australian perspective, security challenges in Asia and the Pacific will continue, at least in the foreseeable future, to remain principally state-based in origin. Due to its perception that its key strategic partner – the US – will remain the dominant power in the region for some years to come, it is likely that Australia will continue to commit forces and diplomacy to supporting this status quo. However, this will not be at the expense of Australia's continued engagement with its key trading partner, China, as well as its other regional partners, including Japan, India, and Indonesia, in an effort to expand collaborative dialogue and cooperation in pursuit of regional and economic stability and security.

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8.   A. Shearer, "Uncharted Waters: The US Alliance and Australia's New Era of Strategic Uncertainty," Lowy Institute Perspectives, Sydney, 2011, 14.

9.   Abigail, "Australia's next Defence White Paper," 76.

11
Facilitating Security in the 21st Century: The Contribution of BICC

Peter J. Croll

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) addresses a broad range of global issues, all of which are highly relevant to the general field of security studies. People differ in terms of what they consider to be threatening and worth securing. Questions of how security ought to be achieved – and by whom – are also frequently contested. Over the past years, BICC has engaged in and shaped many such debates. In particular, it emphasized that security can only be achieved by way of facilitating peace and development. This normative orientation is nicely captured in the general idea of 'conversion' as the cutback and transformation of military assets and capacities.

Already in 2004, on the occasion of the 10-year anniversary of BICC, I argued that the concept of conversion embraces an understanding of security, which goes beyond a limited focus on the military security of states. As I wrote, conversion is "part of a broadening of our understanding of security, including issues of democracy, development, and the primacy of the security of human beings." It is not merely a

technical component, but "must have a final goal of changing attitudes and minds and hearts, in order to embark on a peace process."[1]

Eight years later, in 2012, this observation remains as relevant as ever. In fact, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with a number of global dynamics – migration, climate change, resource extraction, proliferation, the privatization of violence – have arguably become all the more pronounced, urging us to come up with creative solutions to complex problems. In response to some of the security challenges of the 21st century, BICC has organized its work into five thematic programs:

- Security – Stakeholders, systems, threats
- Arms – Global trends, exports, control
- Migration, Conflicts, and Security
- Natural Resources and Conflicts
- Base Conversion

I will give a brief overview of the main questions and issues relating to security, which we are currently addressing in each of these areas.

Security – Stakeholders, Systems, Threats: This program area aims to understand and assess the security practices of various actors in different local spaces. A security practice can be broadly defined as any social activity, which articulates and engages perceived threats in a coordinated manner and over a prolonged period of time. The program rests upon the assumption that efforts to 'govern' security can take many different forms and are usually exercised within and through complex networks composed of multiple agents. Moreover, it takes these networks to embody, reflect and constitute particular principles of socio-political order – the modern idea of the 'state' being just one among many potential possibilities. Given this underlying perspective, all projects within the framework of the program address, in one way or another, one or more of the following questions:

- How can contemporary networks for governing security be described or 'mapped'? What types of actors are involved? What do they do and how do they relate to each other? What concepts and strategies of security do they propose and pursue?
- What kinds of social and political order do security practices construct? How

1. Peter J. Croll, "The Future of BICC," in *Promoting Security. But How and For Whom*? eds. Peter J. Croll & Michael Brzoska , BICC brief no. 35 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 2004), 20-23.

do these differ from one another? In which ways do they become constituted?

- How do we normatively assess security practices and their concordant principles of formation? What distinguishes a 'good' from a 'bad' security practice?
- Which concrete recommendations for policymakers can be gained from a comprehensive analysis of security networks?

The program area relates to and integrates a great many of our projects – past, present and planned – searching for and generating policy recommendations. It includes issues as diverse as private security companies, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), human security, traditional conflict resolution, terrorism and piracy.

Arms – Global Trends, Exports, Control: The objective of this program is to provide empirically based theoretical insight and consequent policy recommendations on arms control. Two principal questions are addressed:

- What are the wider ramifications of the global arms trade and increasing investments of states in military capacities?
- How can weapons exports, alongside national and civilian stockpiles, be subjected to effective regimes of regulation?

BICC participates in the writing of the annual GKKE Rüstungsexportbericht, a critical review of German arms exports, which is published by the Joint Conference Church and Development (GKKE). In addition, it maintains a comprehensive database assessing the correspondence of individual states to the various criteria of the European Union's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. BICC has also developed the Global Militarization Index (GMI), which documents militarization trends in many countries of the world and thereby seeks to facilitate public debates on the issue.

As regards the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), we have recently put a particular focus on questions relating to national stockpile management. Our interest is in how national SALW stockpiles are maintained, and what mechanisms exist to limit leakages from legal to illegal stockpiles. How can states be encouraged to put in place mechanisms (including legislation, technical safeguards, and social structures) to safeguard their national stockpiles? A concrete project to this end is currently being conducted in South Sudan, where we also advise the government in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.

Migration, Conflicts, and Security: We investigate linkages between migration and security and intend to generate empirical data on (in)security as a driver and consequence of voluntary and involuntary migration. In recent political and academic debate, discussions focusing on the so-called "Security-Migration-Nexus" have usually established more or less substantive threat scenarios regarding domestic and social security issues of Western recipient countries, e.g., problems arising from irregular migration, failed integration efforts, or the assumed link between international terrorism and migration.

Nonetheless, widespread social implications of different forms of forced or involuntary migration are especially prevalent in cases of South-South migration as opposed to South-North migration. For instance, only a small fraction of Africa's 16.3 million migrants plan or undertake to migrate to Northern countries. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), i.e., migrants that have not crossed an international border, has risen significantly over the past 30 years.

The program area integrates many projects and publications at BICC. Following a more balanced approach to analyzing the interplay of security, conflict, development, and migration, BICC's research takes into account three dimensions:

1) countries and regions of origin;

2) countries of settlement and recipient societies;

3) transnational communities and diasporas.

Against this background, we pose the following research questions:

- How is the nexus between migration and security? How do conflicts, inequality, environmental stress and other threats to human development work as a push-factor for migration?

- What are the repercussions of large-scale migration on recipient societies, particularly in the case of neighboring countries affected by so-called "complex migration emergencies"?

- What are the security needs of migrants, especially when taking into account their usually precarious living conditions?

Natural Resources and Conflicts: We have been studying the linkage between natural resources and conflicts – conducting research, lobbying, and educational work on this issue – since 2000. Two questions are particularly relevant to our work in this area:

- What factors lead to the fatal link between natural resources and violent conflict?
- What type of natural resource governance can contribute toward peace and development?

Our research on natural resources and conflicts has thus far revolved around two issues. On the one hand, we worked on crisis prevention in the context of trans-boundary water management. On the other hand, we look into the role of extractive industries in the 'war economies' that feed many violent conflicts around the world. An important focus here is on promoting 'good resource governance' – that is to say: governing resource extraction in such a manner that it does not serve a war economy.

While the primary responsibility for governing natural resources lies with national governments, 'governance' as understood by us, does not include state agents alone, but also non-state actors such as private companies, civil society organizations and informal traditional authorities. Of particular relevance is the increasingly international scope of governing activities in the field of natural resources.

We are engaged in several research and policy networks concerned with the consequences of natural resource extraction for developing countries. One of these is Fatal Transactions, a network of European research institutes and advocacy organizations working to prevent natural resources from fuelling conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Through Fatal Transactions, BICC has actively participated in the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, which seeks to break the linkage between diamonds and violent conflicts. Since January 2010, BICC is the International Coordinator of Fatal Transactions.

Base Conversion: Despite our broad thematic scope, issues related to the conversion of military bases also remain an important aspect of BICC's work. So far, our research in this area has been predominantly shaped by the concrete requirements of affected communities and the federal states of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Brandenburg. Given this background, BICC addresses four blocks of research questions:

- How and by which means can the state government of NRW support communities affected by military base conversion in the future? Which tools are needed for this purpose?
- What should a "NRW conversion strategy" look like? Such strategy would need to take into account that not each and every affected community can be supported and not each and every site can be redeveloped.

- What are the effects and consequences of the ongoing restructuring processes of military forces in the United States or the United Kingdom, which still have large parts of their armies stationed abroad? How can – and should – countries such as Germany, South Korea, or Japan react when coping with the planned withdrawal of foreign troops?
- What role should base conversion play in the actual planning of military transformation processes? How can it be linked with the overall discourse on disarmament?

In brief, facilitating security must include, or even have as a key concept, conversion, conversion of mind-sets. The path to more security in a comprehensive and inclusive manner will always require taking a step back and taking a look at ourselves.

We have to remain grounded in the real world.

12

A Silent Revolution: Changing Threat Patterns and the Growing Importance of Security Sector Governance

Theodor Winkler

We are witnessing a genuine revolution in international security which, surprisingly enough, is only slowly being recognized. It is driven by three major trends:

- The shifting face of violence[1] that replaces the traditional enemy from without increasingly by new threats from within;
- a threat pattern that is not only interlinked but dynamic;
- the emergence, as a result of globalization and particularly the revolution in information technologies, of new realities that create fundamental threats beyond the limits of the nation state as well as of the traditional international order.

To address this set of swiftly evolving trends, a *Gesamtschau* (comprehensive point of view) is needed. Partial measures, still instinctively favored by the international community, will not suffice in the end. Hard security answers to the new threat realities, long favored, have proven (at least if seen as the only, or preponderant, recipe) inadequate, if not counterproductive. Both Iraq and Afghanistan bear

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1. Cf. Alyson K. Bailes, Keith Krause, Theodor H.Winkler, "The Shifting Face of Violence," DCAF Policy Paper no 18, DCAF, Geneva, 2007.

witness to that. The importance of soft security approaches is quickly on the rise in the world of today. In that context, there is a growing recognition that the issues of governance and reform of the security sector are of particular relevance.

The face of violence is clearly shifting. The enemy from without is being increasingly replaced by new threats from within. Traditional interstate war remains, unfortunately, a possibility. It may suffice to cite the example of unpredictable North Korea. Yet classic military interstate war has long since become the exception rather than the rule. New forms of conflict dominate the international security agenda. Today, most conflicts are no longer fought between states, but between a government and forces such as political, religious or ethnic groups, militias and armed bands, guerrilla and terrorist organizations, clans, warlords, organized communal groups, or simply criminal gangs. An increasing number of conflicts are even taking place between such groups themselves – with little or only indirect government involvement. The phenomenon of gradually disintegrating or failed states – particularly, but not only, in Africa – has led since the 1990s in many conflicts to massive violence.

These "new" wars are, moreover, cheap. For the most part, they need only small arms and light weapons, which are ever more abundantly available in many parts of the world. Conservative estimates place the number of guns in the world at a staggering 500 million and of automatic rifles at 55-72 million.[2] Add to those numbers countless grenades and rocket launchers of all descriptions, mortars and other light weapons, as well as shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. In fact, the weaponry to trigger conflict or to make a conflict situation flare up again is clearly available in most fragile states and post-conflict situations. The collapse of state authority – such as in Albania and Libya – can swamp entire regions with dangerous arsenals that have a most destabilizing effect. The abundance of weaponry is, however, but one factor that renders "new wars" cheap to run. The use of child soldiers, the ability of the soldiery to live off the land and/or to finance itself through illicit trade (in diamonds and other precious raw materials or drugs and trafficking in human beings) are other major contributing factors. Links between armed gangs and organized international crime are frequent. Global terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, moreover, often both profit from the resulting chaos and contribute to it.

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2. *Small Arms Survey 2001* (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Oxford University Press, 2001), 62.

Such non-traditional conflicts prove difficult to extinguish. Most smoldering wars tend to flare up again, inspite of the sustained efforts of the international community to resolve them. The reasons are multiple and specific to each case. However, there is a common denominator: the ability to conclude lasting peace is seriously handicapped, if not compromised for good, if the state monopoly of legitimate force is lost.

The state monopoly of legitimate force is, however, jeopardized not only by internal war and conflict. International organized crime has long become a threat of strategic magnitude. Never before have such huge quantities of drugs been produced. The trafficking in human beings is on the rise – and so are many other forms of criminal activity. The world's financial system is increasingly affected by the rise in money laundering and other criminal financial activities. Criminal gains are gigantic and permit organized crime to simply financially outclass many police organizations in intelligence gathering, weapons and other equipment. Corruption remains in many parts of the world an issue of great concern.

This phenomenon is amplified by a rapid urbanization of our planet. The world's urban population grew from 2 percent in 1800 to 30 percent in 1950 and to 49 percent in 2003; it is expected to reach 60 percent by 2030[3]. If in 1950, there existed only one city with more than 10 million inhabitants, there are more than 20 of them today. This trend favors urban violence of a new kind and on a different scale. The cities hold meager prospects for many of those who flock to them. The slum population around the world is growing more rapidly than the overall urban population. Large cities increasingly risk turning into breeding grounds for poverty, despair, and violence. In some cities the police are no longer able (or willing) to venture into some quarters except in what effectively amounts to military style-operations, involving heavy weapons, armor, and helicopters. At a more modest level, the size of police patrols even in parts of Europe's cities needs to be enlarged from the classical two to a larger number of officers. Again, the state monoply of legitimate force is undermined.

On a broader scale, we are indeed confronted by a multiplicity of actors, issues and means, leading to new conflict patterns and threat realities. New approaches are needed for conflict prevention, management, and resolution as well as for post conflict reconstruction.

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3.   United Nations Human Settlement Report (UNHSP), *Compendium of Human Settlement Statistics; Statistical Annex* and *2005 World Development Report.*

These new threats are, moreover, interlinked and dynamic in their nature. An example may illustrate the point: Climate change will deeply affect rural populations that are just barely hanging on – such as in the Sahel zone – obliging them to migrate to urban slums or towards the hoped-for paradise in the North. In the process, they will become the prey of human traffickers and organized crime. Such migrant groups will also tend to destabilize the states on their migratory route – from Morocco to Turkey – only to find at their final destination an increasingly hostile host population. Instead of the hoped-for paradise they will find, more often than not, a world without prospects, marked by a dependence on social security, youth gangs, drugs, and prostitution. Consequently, religious fundamentalism is often the only refuge for them, further increasing tensions with the home community.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated in his report In *Larger Freedom*[4] of March 21, 2005 that security, development, and human rights are intrinsically linked. There cannot be any development without security. Nobody invests in a war zone. And inversely, without development there cannot be, in the longer term, any security either. People with empty stomachs and deprived of meaningful prospects will take to their Kalashnikovs. Building security and thus laying the groundwork for development will, at the same time, require crucial steps towards establishing a system of rule of law – for in order to be functional, the security sector must be transparent, accountable, democratically controlled, and impartial. It cannot be a state within the state or represent only one fraction of society. What is required is good governance of the security sector. It must be achieved through the comprehensive reform of existing security structures.

Security sector governance and reform are, consequently, considered by the international community at large as key notions to cope with both the development and security challenges of today. The United Nations, the European Union, and the OECD have developed corresponding strategies; others, like the African Union and ECOWAS, are in the process of doing so.

This new interest in governance, particularly of the security sector, is likely to persist. For the security sector is currently undergoing yet another revolution that is driven by the growing role of private sector involvement. An ever growing number of traditional state functions have been taken over wholly or in part by the private sector. The most striking example is the growing role played by private military and security companies (PMSCs). Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg. Private-public partnerships – and the resulting governance issues – are mushrooming. The industry

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4. UN Document A/59/2005

is aware of it and has started to react. Examples include the extracting industries – with a growing network of regulatory mechanisms (from the agreement on Voluntary Principles to the Kimberley Process and the emerging understanding of individual companies of the significance and relevance of security sector governance and reform for their work). One of the most critical – and urgent – areas in this respect, however, is that of cyber security.

In the cyber world, we are confronted with threats that are neither from without nor from within the boundaries of the traditional nation state, but with challenges that originate from beyond them. Nation states are clearly unable to address them in splendid isolation. Indeed global approaches are needed. However, it is not within the ability of the traditional international system to cope with the challenges posed by the cyber world. A simple example of this reality: The technical development of the cyber world far outstrips the ability to shape and adopt legislation at the national level, let alone the ability of the international community to develop consensus and universally binding norms. Meaningfully addressing the challenges posed by the cyber world would require international cooperation based on soft law, on alliances of the able and willing around which consensus may coalesce – just as in the area of PMSCs, the most successful approach, promising an actual breakthrough, was based on the combination of the soft international law "Montreux Document" and an "International Code of Conduct" established in close cooperation with, and signed by, the industry itself.

In order to cope with these new supra-national challenges, new thinking is required – thinking that is not only out of the box, but one that uses a completely different box. A transition is needed towards much broader understanding of the international system and its dynamics. Key to this new development is a better understanding of the role to be played by more broadly defined approaches to security sector governance and reform.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was created on the initiative of the Swiss government in October 2000 to address precisely this complex set of issues. Legally at the crossroads between an international organization and an NGO, DCAF today counts some 65 states as members. It has a staff of around 140 and a budget of more than $35 million. Its mission is to assist the international community to define and implement its strategies in the area of good governance and reform of the security sector, to develop analytical and conceptual thinking in this area, and – above all – to assist its members and partners operationally on the ground. The Centre conducts more than 400 operational projects per year. It is a close partner of the United Nations, the

European Union, the OSCE, the OECD, NATO and many regional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS.

DCAF also wants to play a role in the context of the new dimension of security issues. It has been acting as facilitator on the road that led to both the "Montreux Document" and the PMSC International Code of Conduct. The Centre is deeply involved in the negotiations aiming to set up an implementation mechanism for the latter (which will be located in Geneva). It has observer status with the Voluntary Principles agreement of the extracting industry and has widely published on ways and means to approach the governance issues posed by the cyber revolution.[5] DCAF is, today, in the process of creating within the Centre a specially dedicated division dealing with all aspects of private-public partnerships in the security sector.

There is every promise that DCAF will not run out of work soon.

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5. Cf. DCAF's "Horizon 2015" publication series on www.dcaf.ch

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