Introduction and Theoretical Framing
The notion of soft power took time to enter the conceptual, methodological, and practical vocabulary of Russian foreign policy. The term soft power was theorized by Joseph Nye in his foundational 1990 work Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power and further developed in subsequent writings, notably in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. The book, among other important points, offers an overview of the relationship between soft power and public diplomacy,1 a topic that is further clarified in the 2008 article “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The article explains that soft power, defined as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment,” requires intentional efforts to be effective. In this regard, public diplomacy stands as the main instrument that mobilizes soft power resources, namely culture, values, and policies, to convey them to a global audience. Acting as the main instrument of soft power projection, public diplomacy remains, however, a broad and evolving concept that encompasses a set of different practices aimed at communication with foreign publics.2 These may include, but are not limited to, cultural diplomacy (which may incorporate artistic and sports diplomacy), education diplomacy, media outreach, and other tools helping to promote narratives, ideas, and images about an actor.
As can be seen, the development of Nye’s soft power concept was unfolding during a period when the newly independent Russian state was experiencing profound political challenges and undergoing the process of redefining its identity and its role on the global stage. Moreover, Nye’s theorization of soft power was grounded in the case of the United States (US) and the established dominance of its political, cultural, and ideological paradigms, the global diffusion of which contributed to the narrative of a US victory in the Cold War. In addition, some experts4 have pointed out that the ideological underpinnings of Nye’s concept influenced how it was initially received in post-Soviet Russia, a society emerging from the influence of a specific ideological model that had shaped both its internal and external political behavior.
Russia’s approach to soft power began to take shape in the early 2000s, shaped by a combination of internal developments and external dynamics. In particular, shifts in the international political context prompted Russia to adapt its soft power to changing circumstances. The outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022 also brought about the need for adjustment to the new political landscape. At the same time, alongside these adaptation efforts, a certain continuity can be observed with earlier phases of postSoviet development and broader historical legacies. Situating them within this wider context enables a more comprehensive understanding of Russia’s evolving approach to soft power.
This article aims, first and foremost, to demonstrate how Russia has adapted its soft power in response to the current international context. It will begin by outlining Russia’s use of soft power tools from a historical perspective. Second, it will analyze the conceptual approach to soft power in contemporary Russia’s foreign policy and examine the key soft power instruments the country employs on the global stage.
Building on this, the article will explore the adaptation of both the approach and the tools of Russian soft power in light of the political changes that have followed the outbreak of the 2022 conflict. Subsequently, the article will consider the Gulf region, specifically the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a case study to reflect on the new opportunities for cooperation emerging from both the evolving nature of Russia’s soft power strategy and the regional political dynamics in the Gulf. The paper concludes by outlining both the opportunities that may enhance the global reach of Russian soft power and the structural, conceptual, and contextual challenges that may constrain its long-term effectiveness.
The focus of this article is specifically on the tools and approaches used by Russia in the realm of soft power, aiming to assess their potential without attaching analytical or ideological labels. Thus, terms such as soft power, cultural diplomacy, and humanitarian policy are adopted here as analytical categories to study the instruments and strategies Russia frames as referring to soft power. This approach contributes to the academic analysis of Russian soft power, a topic still relatively underexplored, and offers an assessment of the scope and potential of Russia’s soft power repository within the broader landscape of its foreign policy.
I. Russia’s Soft Power from a Historical Perspective
1) Early Image Projection Efforts in Pre-Revolutionary Russia
Culture, in all its diverse expressions, stands at the heart of soft power and its promotional instrument, public diplomacy. It exerts a broad and lasting influence in shaping international perceptions and preferences. As can be seen in Nye’s works, culture can influence others subtly, voluntarily, and thus effectively, which enhances its potential as a soft power resource.
In this regard, although the term “soft power” only gained widespread use in the 1990s, Russia has historically exhibited forms of symbolic and cultural appeal consistent with the concept. In the imperial era, Russia’s image abroad benefited from what was often regarded as the distinctive Russian cultural tradition, expressed through literature, music, and thought. Figures such as Aleksandr Pushkin, Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Ivan Turgenev, or Anton Chekhov contributed to the image of Russia as a creative, culturally rich, and profound nation among European cultural elites, even as the country could be seen as less advanced in economic and social development compared to Western Europe.
Furthermore, at the turn of the 20th century, the activities of Sergei Diaghilev, a Russian impresario, cultural entrepreneur, and artistic organizer best known for founding and leading the Ballets Russes (Russian Ballet) company, further demonstrated the potential of Russia’s cultural appeal. At the beginning, Diaghilev led the art association Mir Iskusstva (World of Art) and edited a monthly journal with the same name (publications between 1899 and 1904). The movement embodied the ideals of symbolism and modernist arts, and contributed to creating the intellectual and cultural environment in which emerged what would later be known as the Russian avant-garde, a cultural phenomenon covering diverse movements (Cubism, Futurism, Suprematism, Constructivism, Rayonism, etc.) now represented in leading museums and galleries around the world, with artists such as Kazimir Malevich, Vasily Kandinsky, Marc Chagall, Mikhail Larionov, and Natalia Goncharova among its key figures.
Initially focused on organizing exhibitions of European artists in Russia, Diaghilev soon shifted his attention to presenting Russian art in Western European capitals. To market the presentation of Russian culture, first through visual arts, then opera, and especially from 1909, ballet, Diaghilev launched the term Russian Seasons. His innovative approach to ballet through integrating music, choreography, costume, and scenographic design, combined with a modern artistic vision, revolutionized ballet performance and continues to shape its development today. Diaghilev’s productions introduced new talents such as Vaslav Nijinsky or Anna Pavlova, who became world-renowned “ambassadors” of Russian culture, and involved close collaboration with Russian avant-garde artists (such as Igor Stravinsky for music, Natalia Goncharova for costume and scenographic design), as well as fostered intercultural exchange through cooperation with figures like Gabrielle (Coco) Chanel or Pablo Picasso.
The term Russian Seasons thus became closely associated with Diaghilev’s legacy, whose activities abroad extended after the 1917 Revolution, until the late 1920s, projecting cultural narratives and patterns outside the official Soviet framework. In the 21st century, Russia revived the Russian Seasons brand as part of its cultural diplomacy initiatives. Meanwhile, the foundational marketing and vision of its creator, Sergei Diaghilev, remain one of the key elements contributing to the success of the Russian Seasons as a symbol of Russian cultural outreach.
Together with Diaghilev’s cultural initiatives, several aspects of the Russian Empire’s early 20th-century foreign policy also contributed to enhancing, or at times restoring, its international image, particularly in the aftermath of diplomatic setbacks such as the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Among these efforts were Russia’s initiatives in convening the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, which sought agreements to limit armaments, the development of humane norms for warfare, and the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. Personally promoted by Tsar Nicholas II, these efforts helped portray Russia as a peace-seeking international actor. To illustrate, Nicholas II was referred to as the “Peacemaker” and received a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901.5 Besides, Russia’s role in initiating, organizing, and advancing the work of these conferences continues to stand as one of the bases for highlighting Russia’s historical contribution to the development of international humanitarian law.
2) The USSR Period and the Development of Image Projection Instruments
The subsequent political transformation of the Russian state also brought about a change in the mechanisms of influence directed at international audiences. Communist ideology and the international communist movement, first through the Communist International (Comintern, until 1943), and later via the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform, established in 1947), became central to shaping the image of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) abroad. However, the Soviet discourse promoting peace, peaceful coexistence of nations, and global social justice could also be interpreted as echoing, to a certain extent, the initiatives of pre-revolutionary Russia to present itself as a peace-promoting international actor.
International organizations aligned with Soviet foreign policy objectives, such as the World Peace Council (WPC), established in 1949 to promote peace and nuclear disarmament, as well as the Soviet Friendship Societies (including the Soviet-American Friendship Society), which aimed at fostering intercultural exchange, or the Communist Youth Leagues (CYL), engaged in youth exchanges through educational and cultural initiatives, all formed part of the Soviet Union’s soft power instrument repository. These platforms sought to portray the USSR as a cooperative, peace-oriented, and globally relevant actor.
With its discursive emphasis on equality and social justice, socialist ideology resonated with segments of the intellectual and academic elites in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, while also gaining traction among national liberation movements in Africa and the Arab world. This ideological appeal translated into political alliances and fostered regimes sympathetic to, or directly inspired by, the Soviet model. Besides, since the 1960s, Moscow further sought to highlight the achievements of the USSR’s Central Asian republics, with their Muslim majorities, as a means of strengthening its image across Islamic countries. Political and religious elites from Arab and Muslim states were invited to visit cities such as Tashkent, Samarkand (Uzbekistan), and Baku (Azerbaijan), where developments in education, healthcare, and the expanding social role of women were presented as examples of progress. However, these initiatives often faced challenges of continuity and credibility, and in many cases met with religious or intellectual resistance to the Soviet model.
Besides, these Soviet soft power instruments were predominantly state-led, government-sponsored, and officially supervised, marking the absence of non-governmental, private, or civil society participation in the projection of soft power. In addition, while the messages of peace and international cooperation could be perceived as of a universal nature, their practical geographical and political orientation and resonance were constrained by the realities of the Cold War. Moreover, the state-centric nature of such initiatives could also affect the scope of their reception by foreign publics.
At the same time, “high culture” remained a prominent element of Soviet cultural diplomacy. For instance, beginning in the mid-1950s, the Bolshoi Theatre became one of the Soviet Union’s most prominent cultural ambassadors. Its state-organized international tours, especially in Western countries such as France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, were aimed not only at showcasing the artistic excellence of the USSR but also at counterbalancing negative narratives about the USSR abroad and demonstrating the sophistication of Soviet culture and society.
In the meantime, international broadcasting and cinema emerged as additional key platforms through which the Soviet Union sought to project cultural achievements, shape international perceptions, and address competing narratives. For example, launched in 1929 and progressively enlarging the scope of languages of broadcasting, Radio Moscow became one of the major symbols of the USSR’s public diplomacy. In cinema, the release in 1925 of Battleship Potemkin, directed by Sergei Eisenstein, gained international acclaim for its revolutionary filming techniques and narratives, positioning the USSR as a reference point in the global film industry. Later, War and Peace, directed by Sergei Bondarchuk and based on Leo Tolstoy’s novel, became a key point of Soviet cinematic diplomacy when it was awarded the Academy Award (Oscar) for Best Foreign Language Film in 1969 during the détente period, which highlighted the intertwining of cultural, strategic, and political considerations.
Another prominent tool enhancing the USSR’s international standing was space diplomacy. The successful launch of Sputnik in 1957, followed by Yuri Gagarin’s triumph as the first human in space in 1961, served to promote the USSR’s scientific and technological advancements on a global scale in the framework of whole-scale competition with the US. In parallel, the strength of “communist ideals” that were shaping the “communist citizen” was also projected through sports diplomacy, culminating in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Despite being partially boycotted, the event was intended as a major global statement by the USSR. Supported by carefully curated symbolism of the Games, including the warmly smiling, welcoming “Misha” the Bear mascot, the Games aimed to contribute to reshaping international associations linked to Soviet/Russian identity and imagery.
Overall, the historical outlook demonstrates that both pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR employed various instruments of what can retrospectively be described as soft power to shape their image on the international stage. The USSR possessed a broader and more structured range of such tools, fueled by the global ideological and political competition of the Cold War, which necessitated and encouraged their further development. However, as demonstrated, certain instruments (high culture) and foundational messaging (peace promotion) can be traced back to the pre-revolutionary period. This continuity in substance and evolution in means may suggest a degree of historical consistency in Russia’s approach to international image projection, while also highlighting its capacity to adapt to changing political circumstances.
II. Formalization of Russia’s Soft Power Approach on the International Stage
1) Institutionalization of Soft Power Policies
The formalization of soft power and its components within the framework of Russian foreign policy started gaining ground in the early 2000s. This process departed from a growing awareness of the “underutilized” potential represented by Russian and Russian-speaking communities abroad. Particular attention has been directed toward those designated as “compatriots” (“sootechestvenniki”). This term, however, remains broad and somewhat ambiguous, encompassing Russians who, after the dissolution of the USSR, found themselves outside the borders of the newly established Russian Federation (general numbers usually provide an estimation of around 25 million individuals),7 as well as earlier and later waves of Russian migrants. At the same time, in political discourse, the term may take a more elastic and instrumental meaning, extending to Russian-speakers, cultural affiliates, and individuals identifying with Russian heritage, regardless of ethnicity. Thus, in 2001, the inaugural World Congress of Compatriots was convened, where, during its opening, Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time publicly articulated the concept of the “Russian World” (Russkiy mir),8 stressing that being a compatriot is a matter of personal spiritual self-determination, and that the notion of the Russkiy mir “had historically extended well beyond the geographical borders of the Russian state or even well beyond the Russian ethnicity.
In parallel, the integration processes were intensifying within the post-Soviet space, a region that Russia refers to as “near abroad,” a term that carries both strategic and cultural implications. In 2000, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The further development of the idea of the “common space” resulted in the creation of a Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2010, which subsequently, in 2015, transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), aimed to establish a single market, with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan also joining the Union in the same year. Regarding the post-Soviet space, Russia’s soft power continues to draw upon shared historical experience, institutional continuity, and a cultural and linguistic legacy. Following the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the Russian language maintained its position as the regional lingua franca, dominating in the fields of commerce, employment, and education.10 The economic interdependence forged during the Soviet period, including trade structures within the “single economic complex” oriented toward Moscow, continued Russian subsidies to some post-Soviet states (especially in terms of energy), and Russia’s stronger economic capacity in the region’s comparative perspective, further contributed to maintaining the important status of the Russian language and the overall Russian influence in the post-Soviet space.11 As Nye has pointed out, economic resources, when demonstrating economic success and thus a successful economic model, can also become elements of soft power.
At the same time, a growing recognition emerged regarding the necessity of engaging with foreign publics in order to shape Russia’s international image. In July 2001, President Putin tasked the Russian diplomatic corps with strengthening efforts to cultivate a positive image of the country abroad.13 Meanwhile, the global financial crisis of 2008 also underscored the need to adjust the existing political approach. The crises revealed the vulnerabilities of the Russian economic model, particularly its dependence on energy exports. However, a prevailing negative image of Russia in international media, often portraying it as a non-modernized and economically uncertain partner, was seen as detrimental to its ability to attract foreign investment, critical in the context of economic difficulties.
Media
As a result, since the beginning of the 2000s, soft power has started to acquire a more institutionalized approach within the Russian political framework. Among the most visible instruments of this effort was the launch, in 2005, of Russia Today (RT), a 24/7 English-language news channel sponsored by the Russian government. Initially broadcasting in English, the channel subsequently launched Arabic programming in 2007, Spanish in 2009, and Russian in 2014. In 2015, it further expanded to include German and French services, while also localizing its Anglophone content for UK and US audiences.15 According to its official website, the channel “is now available to more than 900 million TV viewers in more than 100 countries around the globe,” and as of 2024, had accumulated over 23 billion online views.
As is usually pointed out, the development of the RT network has seen two principal phases. From 2005 to 2008, the channel sought to improve Russia’s global image by emphasizing modernization narratives and promoting Russian culture. This first phase remained largely Russia-centric, and its success was limited.17 Following the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, the channel was rebranded in 2009 as RT, adopting a more “neutral” logo intended to broaden international appeal and downplay the reference to Russia in its title. With this new phase, RT repositioned itself as a platform for “alternative perspectives,” frequently going against mainstream “Western” media narratives, with a more critical tone with regard to “Western” policies. The content was not turning around Russia or its politics but encouraged “Western” audiences to engage with topics relevant to their own countries, often through “Western” presenters and journalists. By making the promotion of alternative points of view one of its brand’s features, encapsulated in its slogan “Question More,” RT has managed to expand its global audience and establish itself as one of the largest international news outlets originating outside the Anglophone world.
As this trajectory illustrates, the conflict in Georgia and the ensuing negative media coverage of Russia in the “West” prompted a recalibration of communication strategies to promote a Russian understanding of world politics and present alternative discursive frameworks to global audiences. Overall, government funding for Russia’s media-oriented public diplomacy instruments increased significantly following the 2008 conflict, driven by the perception within Russian official circles that the international media coverage of the conflict had been biased with regard to the actions of Russia and detrimental to the country’s interests.
In 2014, the media instrument of Russia’s soft power strategy was further expanded with Sputnik, a multilingual international news agency and radio broadcaster. Adopting a similar editorial orientation and tone to RT, the agency, as its website notes, produces content in over 30 languages, including English, Spanish, French, German, Arabic, and Chinese, and has established regional offices across the world, from Washington to Beijing and Cairo.
Expert and Knowledge-Based Diplomacy
In the realm of science diplomacy, the creation of the Valdai Discussion Club in 2004 marked an important step. Designed as a platform for dialogue between the Russian and the international expert community, Valdai provides informal channels of communication and analysis. However, a key factor in its visibility has been the participation of the Russian President, offering an opportunity for direct interaction with the Russian head of state.21 In the same vein, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), originally launched in 1997, gained renewed momentum in 2006 when it started to be held under the auspices of the Russian President.22 These major annual forums serve as venues for image-building and prestige diplomacy, projecting Russia’s openness to dialogue, economic and scientific partnership, and global engagement, while the participating high-level international delegations signal Russia’s international relevance. Thus, together with offering an official environment in which Russia can present its policy positions, showcase economic and academic potential, and underscore its cultural strength, these platforms contribute to branding the Russian state as a stable and globally integrated actor.
In 2010, further institutionalization of soft power instruments continued with the establishment, by a presidential order, of the Alexander Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy (also known as the Gorchakov Fund, named after one of Russia’s most prominent diplomats of the 19th century). Presenting as one of its missions “to support the creation of a public, political, and business climate abroad favorable for Russia,”23 the Fund’s activities span several main sectors. According to its official presentation, the Fund’s flagship programs include expert meetings, dialogues, and workshops, as well as research schools and programs, all focused on thematic and regional priorities. In addition, the Gorchakov Fund provides grants to Russian and foreign non-profit (NPO) and non-governmental (NGO) organizations engaged in international projects, thereby playing a coordinating role in Russia’s public diplomacy. The grants are allocated in line with the Fund’s priority areas, which, for 2026, as stated on its website, emphasize cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, and Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American states, as well as multilateral formats in these regions, thereby coinciding with Russia’s broader shifting foreign policy priorities. Furthermore, coordination and support for NPOs and NGOs is pursued through Fund-organized courses for leaders and international project managers of Russian and foreign NGOs. Another significant area of activity is the organization of “internship programs for foreign specialists.” Alongside these initiatives, the Fund regularly hosts its own events, including conferences, roundtables, forums, expert discussions, public lectures, and the allocation of Russian specialists to universities in Russia and abroad to deliver lectures on Russian foreign policy. One of its major projects, organized annually from 1999 until 2021, was the Potsdam Meetings, a Russian-German conference addressing issues related to politics, economics, and society in bilateral relations. This forum brought together high-level participants held under the patronage of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries. Overall, the activities of the Gorchakov Fund seem to be particularly aimed at fostering relationships with scholarly, expert, and diplomatic communities, especially among younger generations, which indicates the intention to build a lasting international cooperation network.
In addition, among other important institutions, in 2011, a Russian presidential order established the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a new think tank created to foster intellectual exchange with international expert communities, with one of the main aims, as stated in its Statute, to promote public opinion, both in Russia and abroad, supportive of moving beyond confrontational approaches in international relations.24 Meanwhile, the Council was founded with the participation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, indicating convergence of policy and expertise within the RIAC’s purview.
Cultural and Humanitarian Diplomacy
The establishment of the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007 and the revitalization of the previous Soviet mechanism for working with foreign audiences to transform it into Rossotrudnichestvo in 2008 marked another phase in the consolidation of Russian cultural diplomacy.
Although officially a non-governmental organization, Russkiy Mir (Russian World) was created by presidential decree, represented a joint initiative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, and together with private funding, receives public support.25 The foundation was primarily tasked with the promotion and preservation of the Russian language and cultural heritage within Russia and abroad,26 and was modeled after the experience of other cultural diplomacy institutions such as the Goethe-Institut, the British Council, and the Alliance Française. Formally, Russkiy Mir has established a network of “Russian Centers” and smaller “Russkiy Mir Cabinets” on every continent. However, many of these representations are modest in size and often embedded within local educational institutions.
In this context, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a governmental agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has emerged as a central institutional actor in the Russian soft power landscape. Created by presidential decree in September 2008, Rossotrudnichestvo was also aligned with efforts to address reputational setbacks in the aftermath of the military conflict in Georgia, especially in the post-Soviet space. The agency formulates its main mission as the “strengthen[ing] of Russia’s humanitarian influence in the world.” While its primary geographic focus is defined by the Commonwealth of Independent States, Rossotrudnichestvo now operates 87 overseas official offices in 71 countries. Since 2021, these representations have been labeled as “Russian House.
Together with “promoting international development,” Rossotrudnichestvo’s core spectrum of activities includes the “promotion of Russian education, science and culture,” “support for compatriots abroad,” and “strengthening the positions of the Russian language.” The apparent intersection and occasionally overlapping mandates of Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir Foundation have generated a degree of ambiguity in the delineation of institutional roles. Meanwhile, such an intersection of ideas can also be observed in the ideological underpinnings of Russia’s soft power doctrine.
2) Conceptualization of the Soft Power Approach
Conceptual Formalization
The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation is a strategic document guiding the country’s external policy. Adopted for the first time in 1993, it has been periodically reviewed to reflect changing strategies of the country’s policy. The 2008 version, for the first time, explicitly emphasized the importance of public diplomacy, where it stated that “Russia will seek its objective perception in the world, develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad, [and] strengthen the role of the Russian mass media in the international information environment by providing them with essential state support.
The further consolidation of the presence of a distinct term of “soft power” within the official foreign policy discourse became more visible with the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency. The term was notably employed in his 2012 programmatic (for the upcoming 2012 elections) article “Russia and the Changing World,”30 where soft power was defined as “a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence.” In this context, institutions such as Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and “leading universities [that] recruit talented students from abroad” were referred to as institutions similar to “agents of influence from big countries.” The 2013 edition of the Foreign Policy Concept (FP Concept) further institutionalized the term by formally integrating it into a strategic policy document for the first time.31 The subsequent version, published in 2016, pursued this trajectory by describing soft power as “an integral part of contemporary international policy.
On the one hand, this conceptual articulation of soft power in official doctrine reflects a growing awareness of its importance in Russian foreign policy. It aligns both with the intention to mitigate reputational costs associated with the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the need to attract investment into the Russian economy. In this regard, the preparations for hosting major international sporting events, most notably the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup, exemplified the most notable concrete efforts to promote a renewed and positive image of Russia on the global stage. It is also important to mention that since the early 2000s, sports diplomacy has become one of the notable tools of Russia’s international image-building strategy. The Rapid Growth Markets Soft Power Index, developed in 2012 by the Moscow-based Skolkovo Institute for Emerging Market Studies (SIEMS) in collaboration with Ernst & Young, is particularly illustrative, as the index included the number of Olympic medals won by a country among its variables.
On the other hand, the official language of these programmatic foreign policy documents also reveals a more “hard” and confrontational approach to the concept of soft power, implying the intent to counter, what the 2013 edition of the FP Concept states as, the “unlawful use of “soft power” and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, [and] manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad.
Indeed, this reactive approach can trace its origins to the early 2000s with the unveiling of the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), which Moscow perceived as being encouraged by the US and the European Union (EU) in an effort to extend their influence in Russia’s “near abroad.” The conflict in Georgia and the “Western” media coverage, considered by Russian officials to have been one-sided and favorable to Tbilisi, further reinforced this dynamic.35 Subsequent events, such as the “Arab Spring,” also left their mark on Russian perceptions of the evolving international information and ideological landscape. These uprisings once again underscored the pivotal role of media and social networks, while highlighting the influence of values-based discourse in political mobilization. In this light, both the 2008 and 2013 editions of Russia’s FP Concept advanced the assertion that “global competition takes place on a civilizational level.
This reactive posture was further reinforced by the 2014 events in Ukraine, which, from Russia’s perspective, stemmed from external interference by the US and the EU. The subsequent negative portrayal of Russia in international media, along with the imposition of sanctions, was seen as further evidence of the difficulties Russia faces in shaping the global narrative in its favor. This heightened perception of information asymmetry and strategic pressure deepened the sense of urgency to protect its image and to counter external narratives more actively.
Ideological Foundations
At the same time, the term “civilization” has begun to appear with increasing frequency in the political discourse of Russia’s senior leadership, serving as a framework to express Russia’s distinctiveness and to “articulate a system of internal values as a latent element of soft power.”37 Within this discourse, Russia is portrayed as a “unique,” “multiethnic civilization with Russian culture at its core.”38 Notably, while the 2013 FP Concept, despite articulating a worldview grounded in value-based rivalry, still referred to Russia as “an integral and inseparable part of European civilization,”39 the most recent version of the FP Concept, adopted in 2023, presents a significant shift. In its opening “General Provisions,” the document refers to “Russia’s special position as a unique country-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power that brings together the Russian people and other peoples belonging to the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world.
This civilizational framing of identity, however, brings together different ideological underpinnings. On the one hand, Russia is described as a “Eurasian” power. On the other hand, the idea of “Russian civilization” encompasses the broader, as per the text, “civilizational community of the Russian World.” Indeed, the two ideological constructs of Eurasianism and the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) stand among the principal discursive axes of contemporary debates on Russian identity, with direct implications for the country’s foreign policy orientation. The intellectual roots of both of these ideologemes can be traced back to the 19th century, particularly to the debates between proponents of Westernism, who emphasized Russia’s belonging to a shared European civilization and its alignment with Western values, cultural and political models, and the Slavophiles, who underscored the unique nature and identity of the Russian people and Russian culture, promoted the idea of a distinctive path for Russia’s development, different from Western Europe, together with assuming a central role of Russia in a distinct civilizational project.
Drawing inspiration from these historical debates and further ideas, both Eurasianism and the Russkiy Mir concepts re-emerged with renewed prominence in the 2000s. They converge on the idea of a “special path” for Russia, the central role of religion in Russian culture and society, and the foundational importance of traditional values as the core of societal organization. At the same time, in the context of shaping a coherent ideological basis for Russia’s foreign policy course, the question arises as to whether these two frameworks can be complementary, as they emphasize different aspects of Russia’s identity. A particularly notable point concerns the religious dimension. While both frameworks acknowledge the multi-layered nature of Russia’s cultural and confessional identity, the Russkiy Mir concept places particular emphasis on the interrelationship between the “Russian World” and Orthodox Christianity as integral components of an “authentic Russian civilization.” Within this vision, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is considered one of the principal agents of identity formation. Meanwhile, although both can be observed through a geopolitical lens, Eurasianism has a more explicitly developed and theorized geopolitical aspect. In this vision, “Russia-Eurasia” is apprehended as a continental power center, playing a key role in shaping the global geopolitical landscape. Various integration projects across the Eurasian space, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, can be interpreted as practical manifestations of Eurasianist ideas. Hence, the question of integrating these two concepts into a coherent identity narrative represents one of the main challenges in the development of Russia’s soft power strategy.
Thus, in the evolution of Russia’s post-Soviet soft power policy, it is possible to trace, among other aspects, a clear continuity in the perceived need to respond to the image of Russia constructed within the “Western”-dominated global information sphere, and to articulate a counter-narrative to prevailing interpretations of global affairs. At the same time, there is a discernible sequence in efforts to construct an independent ideological narrative aimed at reinforcing a distinctive positioning for Russia on the global stage that corresponds to Russia’s perceived unique role in international affairs, one that, in its view, is either neglected or denied within mainstream global narratives.
III. Russian Soft Power in the Face of New Challenges
1) The Challenge of International Sanctions
Since February 2022, comprehensive international sanctions imposed on Russia have had a pronounced impact not only on its economy and political structures but also on its instruments of soft power. These measures have significantly affected the country’s cultural diplomacy, international influence platforms, and global symbolic presence. One of the immediate repercussions was what Russian officials and public figures referred to as a “cultural boycott” or the “cancellation of Russian culture,”42 whereby Russian cultural figures and state-affiliated cultural institutions faced exclusion from foreign and international platforms.
To elaborate, in February 2022, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) suspended Russia from participation in the Eurovision Song Contest. Meanwhile, ballet, one of the major pillars of Russia’s cultural diplomacy, also faced limitations. Scheduled international tours and performances by Russian state ballet theaters were cancelled. One of the examples is the cancellation of the Bolshoi Theatre’s planned summer season performances at the Royal Opera House in London in 2022.43 Simultaneously, in the cinema industry, a number of major international film festivals, including Cannes, Venice, and Berlin, imposed restrictions on the official representation of Russian cinema, banning state-supported delegations and productions. The participation was only open for individual filmmakers “opposed to the current regime in the country.
In parallel, Russian athletes and teams were suspended from participating in international competitions, including those organized under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), or Formula 1. The Executive Board of the IOC further recommended45 that all international sports federations refrain from inviting athletes from Russia and Belarus. These measures excluded Russia from the majority of the international sporting arenas, thereby narrowing one of its most prominent soft power channels.
Another important area in which Russia’s presence has been significantly affected is the international scientific sphere. While person-to-person academic interactions were not formally restricted, several European countries, including Germany, France, and the UK, as well as the US and Canada, decided to freeze official institution-to-institution research projects with Russia and suspend dual-degree programs and other cooperative initiatives. In addition, the European Commission terminated funding for Russian research in the framework of its Horizon 2020 program.46 At the same time, the growing number of “Western” research institutions and think tanks designated by Russia as undesirable organizations, owing to their stance on Russia, has further complicated collaboration between Russian scholars and these bodies.
These measures have inevitably led to a decline in research ties between Russian and “Western” institutions, reflected in, among other indicators, a drop since 2022 in the number of joint publications between Russia and, for example, the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan. Furthermore, sanctions affecting logistics, software, computing, banking, and technology imports have also contributed to Russia’s reduced participation in the global academic sphere, adding to travel difficulties and limiting access to laboratory equipment. A decline in the participation of Russian experts at international conferences represents another visible manifestation of the retreat from the scientific arena trend.
The media sector became one of the main fields for imposing restrictions with regard to Russian influence platforms. As Russia terms them, these “foreign reprisals against Russian journalists and media” were enacted by countries of the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, and other countries close to them, such as New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, as well as, in some instances, countries of the “Global South” like Colombia and Uruguay. These measures targeted state-funded broadcasters, primarily RT but also Sputnik and its parent organization, the international media group Rossiya Segodnya. Other affected outlets included the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and national television channels such as Channel One and Rossiya 1. These outlets faced bans or suspensions, revocation of broadcasting licenses, asset freezes, and, in several cases, individual sanctions or the withdrawal of press accreditations for their personnel.
