On January 1, 2026, the Republic of Cyprus will assume the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. Following the previous presidencies of Poland (first half of 2025) and Denmark (second half of 2025,) Cyprus is the last country in this trio’s rotation, implying continuity in the priorities set out in the 18-month agenda. With a reiteration on the dossiers of migration, competitiveness, strategic autonomy, and defense, Cyprus builds on existing momentum to further pursue the EU’s agenda on strategic autonomy and an outward-looking approach, as well as emphasizing social cohesion. The presidency also highlights its focus on better engagement with Southern Neighborhoods, water security, and enlargement talks, all while ensuring space to identify and address its own regional priorities.
This is Cyprus's second time in the presidency, fourteen years after its first mandate in 2012. Cyprus is expected to carry out its mission through the various economic and geopolitical challenges facing the bloc. Marilena Raouna, Deputy Minister of European Affairs, indicates that this presidency is the country's national mission and opportunity to act as a united voice for all twenty-seven countries. Cyprus will be required to steer critical negotiations on major issues because the presidency represents a long-term investment for Cyprus to anchor itself as a core EU member capable of creating solutions to the challenges facing the bloc.
To strategically oversee these objectives, Cyprus increased its staff in Brussels and has already identified over 270 meetings to engage in at various levels, including but not limited to high-level meetings, informal ministerial councils, etc. This also includes potentially hosting member countries from the Mediterranean Pact in April 2026.
Building on Draghi and Trio Momentum
Many of the elements Cyprus’s presidency will focus on have been outlined in the Draghi report, predominantly competitiveness, security and defense, energy, and overregulation. On competitiveness, Cyprus emphasizes its focus on fostering a more business-friendly environment by reducing bureaucracy, simplifying regulations, decluttering EU tax regulations, and rapidly integrating the EU’s capital markets, as well as the bloc’s Banking Union. The aim of this approach is not eventual deregulation, but to ensure the effectiveness, ease of use, and proportionality of the rules in place. This is consistent with the Danish presidency's emphasis on competitiveness, while also reflecting Poland's economic security priorities (primarily streamlining regulations and fostering clean energy transitions to bolster its resilience.)
On energy, Michael Damianos, Cyprus’s Energy Minister, emphasizes the Republic’s readiness to continue working “with determination” towards a more sustainable European energy union. He identified the EU networks package as “essential and crucial,” therefore envisioning to enhance energy security through a combination of affordable pricing and alternative supply routes. This directly supports Danish calls to accelerate the bloc’s REPowerEU plans and Polish efforts to ensure diversification of supplies amid rising hybrid threats.
On Security and Defense, and despite Cyprus not being a NATO member, it envisions a 360- degree approach aimed at broadening the lens through which the EU and its partners engage with major strategic objectives. Deputy Minister Raouna emphasizes that Ukraine will not constitute the sole analytical lens through which these objectives will be approached. The 360-degree approach expands existing frameworks and enhances the mechanisms in place to ensure the bloc comprehensively addresses the threats at its borders. The Republic is set to promote the rapid implementation of the White Paper on European Defence - Readiness 2030 and its accompanying Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. This will encompass transatlantic relations and the rollout of the Migration Pact and broaden the scope of the shared security initiative, building upon Poland’s defense program and Denmark’s Strategic Compass.
In alignment with Draghi's call for competitiveness through fiscal efficiency, the Republic also aims to address the bloc’s legislative load and budget. Cyprus inherits over 300 legislative and other files from previous presidencies and is expected to negotiate them within 190 working groups and subgroups in Brussels. Cyprus prioritizes addressing all sectoral legislative files, targeting an indicative MFF 2028-2034 framework by June 2026. The emphasis will be on boosting defense expenditures and securing funding for the green transition.
Beyond the Draghi report, Cyprus sees enlargement and EU-Turkey relations as shared geopolitical priorities in the trio presidency. On enlargement, Cyprus is expanding on ongoing support for Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and Moldova toward an “autonomous Union open to the world.” It indicates hosting ministerial meetings aimed at navigating roadblocks faced in fundamental reforms, the rule of law, and economic integration for Montenegro and Serbia. Simultaneously, Cyprus will work to propel Ukraine's progress in the face of the country's war challenges. This strategy builds on Poland's view of enlargement as a bulwark against Russian influence and Denmark's emphasis on aligning the Western Balkans with both the EU and NATO. The goal is to ensure consistent advancement toward a geopolitically robust and relevant EU, a vision that echoes Draghi's call for greater strategic depth.
In the context of EU-Turkey relations, Cyprus will leverage its presidency to serve as an honest mediator. The Republic will be expected to uphold the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Varosha red lines while pursuing maritime security and regional stability. Moreover, Cyprus indicated its willingness to invite Turkish President Recep Erdoğan to the informal council meeting in Cyprus next April, which could prove effective in easing tensions around gas exploration and the reunification of Cyprus. This initiative could also foster confidence through people-to-people interactions and joint maritime patrols, all without compromising the country’s sovereignty. This effectively integrates Cyprus's national priorities into Draghi's call for secure supply chains and border resilience.
New Mediterranean Priorities
Cyprus upholds migration as a core priority in its presidency. Given its position as a frontline Mediterranean state, Cyprus indicates full commitment to the implementation of the bloc’s Pact on Migration and Asylum. It backs the EU-wide “Safe Country” list to fast-track its asylum rejections - unless applicants can prove individual risk. The list includes Bangladesh, India, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Colombia, and Kosovo. The approach is believed to complement Cyprus’s existing strategy of prioritizing returns and includes stricter border controls and efforts to curb secondary movements. It recognizes the need for realistic, rules-based migration management and improves burden-sharing among member states.
Moreover, Cyprus’s “open to the world” pillar is driving the country’s outreach to Southern and Eastern Neighborhoods, Arab League partners, and Gulf states for trade, security, and energy resilience, as well as migration returns through “voluntary programs” and “return hubs.” Raouna stresses that the EU must be present at the decision-making table on matters that concern the Middle East, so the bloc can effectively lead the way in the global and, most importantly, the EU’s, efforts on regional de-escalation. Raouna also emphasized the Presidency’s aim to support the New Pact for the Mediterranean through concrete collaborative projects. On a more transatlantic level, Cyprus highlights strengthening ties by leveraging EU-NATO synergies, joint defense procurement, and increased EU-US engagement and consultations on critical dossiers- especially the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, all to ensure burden-sharing.
Cyprus integrates the most prominent Mediterranean vulnerability, water security, into the core of its green transition agenda. Nicosia will build on the EU Commission’s Water Resilience Strategy to further address mounting threats. The focus will be on sharing desalination technology, building climate-resilient infrastructure, and establishing neighborhood agreements to manage resource scarcity. Furthermore, Cyprus could also bring together Southern Neighborhood partners through water diplomacy forums, promote EU-funded projects aimed at drought mitigation and the management of cross-border aquifers, and strengthen food security in the face of climate challenges.
Cyprus places a particular focus on the GCC countries, emphasizing its commitment to “developing a structured partnership with Gulf countries and pursuing mutually advantageous trade agreements.” The partnership will aim to diversify energy sources, secure LNG imports, and ensure the reliability and sustainability of critical raw materials supply chains. Moreover, the Republic will work to bolster “the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, including enhanced cooperation with...partners in...the Gulf,” with a particular focus on Red Sea chokepoints and anti-piracy efforts. The Presidency also highlights its commitment “to supporting the implementation of the comprehensive peace plan in Gaza and facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid.” This will allow Cyprus to leverage its strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean to foster both EU-GCC cooperation on regional stability as well as the country’s position as a regional mediator.
Cyprus’s Strategic Balancing Act
Cyprus is set to carefully manage the competing demands of the European Union and its own unique geopolitical situation. This positions Nicosia as a credible mediator and potential bridge between the East and West, North and South of the EU. The success of this final rotation is contingent on progress in MFF negotiations and Mediterranean agreements, especially considering the changing US policies under President Trump. This could open doors for EU-Gulf energy collaborations, while also advancing EU-Turkey negotiations. Nicosia could advance water diplomacy as a fundamental EU-Southern Neighborhood project, strengthening strategic independence. However, failure to reconcile national interests with the consensus of the bloc or consider Southern perspectives will slow down the enlargement process and aim for larger regional cooperation.
*Houda Barroug is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)
