
Introduction
The security of maritime trade routes, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, is a major component of global economic stability, directly impacting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the European Union (EU). Recent escalations in the Middle East, marked by a significant deterioration in maritime security since late 2025 and early 2026, underscore the fragility of these critical arteries. This volatility reinforces the importance of closer GCC-EU cooperation.
The recent maritime disruptions following the outbreak of the U.S.- Israel-Iran war demonstrated both the strategic importance of the Gulf and Red Sea maritime corridors and the limitations of existing security arrangements. Rather than viewing maritime security as the responsibility of any single actor, the post-conflict environment requires a reassessment of how regional and international stakeholders can contribute to a more resilient framework. While neither side can independently guarantee stability across the region's maritime domain, deeper GCC-EU cooperation offers an opportunity to strengthen deterrence, improve crisis response, and contribute to a more secure operating environment for global trade and energy flows.
A realistic assessment of the technical and political contributions each side can bring to the table is thus a first step toward identifying areas of practical collaboration. Closer GCC-EU relations would focus on tangible security interdependence, diplomatic influence, and deepening economic integration to safeguard shared interests.
A Shared Maritime Domain
The global economy relies heavily on maritime channels, with 80-90% of world trade traversing the seas. Strategic chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are indispensable arteries for global commerce and energy supplies. The Strait of Hormuz facilitates approximately a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, as well as significant volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers. In 2024, total oil transported through the Strait was around 20 million barrels per day (bpd). Disruptions there go far beyond the region and pose a significant challenge to international energy markets, maritime transport, and global economic stability. Oil markets have reacted quickly, with Brent crude prices now rising above $90 per barrel. Higher energy, fertilizer, and transport costs, including freight rates, bunker fuel prices, and insurance premiums, would increase food costs and intensify cost-ofliving pressures.
For the European Union, maritime security in the Middle East is a matter of significant economic factors and strategic resilience. Europe's reliance on seaborne trade and imported energy from the Middle East means instability in these corridors can rapidly translate into severe supply chain disruptions, energy shortages, and inflationary pressures. The disruptions in the Strait have thus increased shipping costs, transit times, and insurance premiums, impacting consumer prices and economic growth.
Already, the economic fallout from the recent maritime security crises has been substantial for the EU. The European Commission downgraded its 2026 economic growth forecast for the EU to 1.1%, a significant reduction from the previously projected 1.4%, primarily due to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, which is driving energy prices sharply higher. The eurozone outlook was revised further, down to 0.9%. Inflation is also expected to rise sharply, reaching 3.1% in 2026, a full percentage point higher than anticipated, driven by soaring energy costs.
The crisis has moved beyond a temporary disruption, evolving into a systemic shock that threatens the EU's industrial competitiveness and food security, with the EU categorizing the war as “one of the most significant global energy supply disruptions in recent history.” The European Commission’s Spring 2026 Forecast highlighted that the “virtual closure of the Strait of Hormuz has curtailed seaborne flows of oil and LNG by around 15% and 20%, respectively,” showcasing how dependent European global markets are on the Gulf region’s fuel exports, paired with the limited access of alternative transport routes. Moreover, the disruption of exports in the Gulf had repercussions for European energy markets, where gas prices spiked by 50% and crude oil prices by 65% in the initial months of the escalation.
The agricultural sector faces a dual threat from rising energy costs and direct disruptions to fertilizer trade. The Strait of Hormuz is also a critical artery for global urea and phosphate supplies. Since the escalation began, global urea prices have surged by 50%, while fertilizer prices in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, which are major suppliers of agricultural products to the EU, have increased by 20-35%. The UN General Assembly has warned that these disruptions could drive up to 45 million additional people into acute hunger globally during 2026.
The automotive and shipping industries, cornerstones of the European economy, have also been affected by the maritime disruptions in the Gulf region. The rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope has extended transit times by 10-14 days, leading to “massive impacts” on supply chains and capacity strains, as described by Maersk CEO Vincent Clerc.
German shipping group Hapag-Lloyd, for example, reported a first-quarter net loss of 219 million euros (compared to a profit of 446 million euros in the first three months of 2025), citing the impact of lower freight rates and operational disruptions due to the war (as well as instances of severe weather). Shipping companies continue to warn that prolonged instability could have lasting effects on supply chain reliability and freight rates.
Major automotive manufacturers like Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, and BMW also face greater exposure due to the Middle East's role as a high-margin market and a key node in global logistics. Volkswagen Group CEO Oliver Blume stated that “we are simply seeing how volatile and fragile our world is, with new issues arising every month.” All of the above suggests that prolonged disruption could lead to further production halts and increased costs for European manufacturers, impacting their competitiveness and ultimately, consumer prices.
Similarly, GCC states, as major energy producers and trading hubs, have a profound interest in safeguarding freedom of navigation and ensuring the stability of these critical routes. The immediate consequence of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was an unprecedented disruption to energy markets, with international Brent crude prices surging by 60% in March 2026 alone. This closure not only jeopardizes the primary revenue streams of the GCC states but also poses an existential threat to food security and regional stability.
The economic impact on GCC states has been highly differentiated, largely depending on their ability to bypass the Strait. Kuwait, lacking alternative export routes, experienced severe revenue plunges, with estimated notional oil export revenues falling by 73% in March 2026. Saudi Arabia's 1,200-kilometer East-West pipeline, operating at its expanded 7 million barrel per day (bpd) capacity, allowed it to reroute a significant portion of its crude exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
Despite this, Saudi crude exports fell 26% year-on-year in March to 4.39 million bpd. The UAE's HabshanFujairah pipeline, with a capacity of 1.5- 1.8 million bpd, also provided some mitigation, though its estimated oil export value still fell by more than $174 million. Qatar, a major global LNG exporter, also faced significant disruption because about 94% of its Arabian Gulf LNG exports transit the Strait of Hormuz. Further to QatarEnergy's announcement to stop production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products, QatarEnergy has also declared Force Majeure to its affected buyers in March 2026.
Beyond energy, the closure has triggered an acute food security crisis for the import-dependent GCC states. Over 70% of their food imports, including grains, perishables, and agricultural inputs, traditionally arrive via the Strait. The disruption led to the activation of emergency protocols, rerouting logistics, and a substantial increase in costs. For instance, fertilizer prices, critical to global agriculture and with roughly onethird of its global trade routed through the Gulf, spiked by 40-60%.
In this context, the mutual interest of the EU and GCC creates a powerful incentive for a more resilient partnership based on genuine security interdependence. The EU’s need for stable energy prices and secure supply chains is inextricably linked to the GCC’s need for a secure environment to execute its economic transformation. Thus, the partnership must move beyond traditional arrangements toward a comprehensive framework that includes joint protection of critical maritime infrastructure, shared intelligence on asymmetric threats, and concrete steps to ensure that the maritime corridors of the Middle East remain open and predictable nodes of global commerce.
The Evolving Landscape of Maritime Security in the Gulf and Red Sea
The Middle East has witnessed a significant deterioration in maritime security, particularly since late 2025 and early 2026.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have become flashpoints, with repeated attacks on commercial shipping disrupting global trade and energy flows. In light of the evolving maritime threat environment, Gulf strategic thinking has shifted to a broader approach that considers the maritime domain a core component of national security, economic resilience, energy security, and digital sovereignty.
This comprehensive perspective recognizes the interconnectedness of maritime stability with broader national interests. Based on this shift, the Gulf’s strategic vision for maritime security rests on five main pillars:
First, Protecting Strategic Flows: Ensuring the uninterrupted flow of vital resources, particularly energy and trade, through critical maritime chokepoints.
Second, Securing Maritime and Digital Infrastructure: Safeguarding physical assets such as ports, offshore platforms, and submarine cables, as well as the digital networks that underpin maritime operations.
Third, Addressing Asymmetric Maritime Threats: Developing capabilities and strategies to counter unconventional threats, including piracy, smuggling, and attacks by non-state actors.
Fourth, Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness: Improving intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance to create a comprehensive understanding of activities within the maritime domain.
Fifth, Strengthening Partnerships and Joint Readiness: Fostering collaborations with international partners, including Europe, and enhancing the readiness of naval forces through joint exercises and training.
This strategic outlook underscores the GCC's commitment to a proactive and integrated approach to maritime security and to seeking a partnership with Europe that aligns with these foundational principles. This strategic alignment is further reinforced by the convergence of national security interests among key European powers.
The updated European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) of 2023, for instance, prioritizes freedom of navigation, energy and trade security, and critical infrastructure protection. Similarly, Italy considers the Gulf and the Red Sea as natural extensions of its “Enlarged Mediterranean” security concept. Germany's 2023 National Security Strategy links its national security to energy security, supply chains, and the stability of critical infrastructure in regions such as the Middle East, underscoring a shared understanding of the comprehensive scope of maritime security.
The EU has responded to these challenges by gradually developing and deploying maritime security capabilities in the region. EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, launched in 2008 to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, had its mandate updated in March 2026 to monitor illicit arms and narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing, and suspicious activities related to critical submarine infrastructure.
The European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), initiated in January 2020 by a coalition of European states that includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal, focuses on protecting freedom of navigation and improving maritime situational awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Gulf region. Its military track, Operation AGENOR, is headquartered at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi and involves several European nations. Finally, EUNAVFOR Operation ASPIDES, established in February 2024 as a defensive operation in response to attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, was further updated in March 2026 to include information-sharing on critical submarine infrastructure, capacity-building for Djiboutian maritime forces, and cooperation with the Yemeni Coast Guard. Since its launch, Operation ASPIDES has supported over 1,960 merchant vessels, ensuring their safe transit and protected more than 650 ships.
In the wake of the escalating conflict, GCC states have responded to heightened maritime threats through a combination of enhanced regional coordination and the deployment of their naval assets. The GCC Emergency Management Center played an important role, being formally activated as a precautionary measure during the June 2025 Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites to monitor environmental and radiological indicators.
The GCC nations have also actively contributed to maritime security efforts. The joint military “Gulf Shield Exercise 2026” concluded in Saudi Arabia on January 10, 2026, with the participation of the air forces and air defense forces of the GCC countries alongside the GCC Unified Military Command. This exercise aimed to enhance regional defense cooperation, raise combat readiness, and develop qualitative military capabilities to confront threats. These actions underscore the GCC states’ commitment to safeguarding regional stability and their expectations for international cooperation, as they have also voiced strong positions on maritime security.
At the Emergency Joint Ministerial Meeting between the GCC and the European Union on March 5, 2026, H.E. Jasem Albudaiwi, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, underscored that respect for international law is the only path to ensuring peace and stability in the region.
He condemned missile attacks and drone strikes that targeted civilian facilities, including ports, airports, and basic infrastructure. These actions, he noted, constitute flagrant violations of International Humanitarian Law and Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of states.
Furthermore, the Secretary-General emphasized that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the targeting of commercial vessels passing through it constitute a direct attack on crucial international maritime passages, threatening global trade and international energy security. The Secretary-General urged the international community, including the European Union as a strategic partner, to recognize its responsibility to help halt these attacks and to ensure that any future regional frameworks are developed in consultation with GCC countries.
In this context, the GCC referred to the EU Joint Communication on a Strategic Partnership with the Gulf, adopted by the EU in 2022, that underscored the importance of supporting the rules-based international order and joint efforts to prevent escalation. “Recalling this document today is not merely a reference to a political text, but a reminder of a clear commitment that must translate into practical positions when partners are subjected to attacks affecting their sovereignty and security,” he stated, underlining that the EU bears responsibility in contributing to halting these attacks.
A similar pattern appears in the individual statements of the GCC countries. Through official statements, the region has repeatedly condemned Iranian attacks against GCC states and called for the protection of civilians, full respect for international law, international humanitarian law, and the UN Charter. EU official statements and visits provide a useful balance to the GCC position. The EU’s April 2026 statement at the UN General Assembly described freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz as essential for Middle East stability, global trade, energy and food security, and critical supply chains.
The EU also argued that maritime security, freedom of navigation, and safe passage through international straits must be respected in line with international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and that such passage cannot be conditioned by individual states.
European Council conclusions likewise called for safeguarding regional airspace, ensuring maritime security, respecting freedom of navigation, and condemning acts that threaten navigation or prevent vessels from entering or exiting the Strait of Hormuz.
European visits to the Gulf reinforce this convergence. During his March 2026 visit to the Gulf, EU Special Representative for the Gulf H.E. Luigi Di Maio framed his visit as an act of solidarity with the region following the Iranian strikes as part of the wider confrontation unleashed by US-Israeli strikes on Iran. The EUSR stated that the EU “strongly condemned the unjustifiable Iranian attacks against the GCC countries,” backed Saudi Arabia’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and said Europe was “at their disposal” in response to Gulf requests.
The EU official also linked Gulf security to European security and discussed crisis management, emergency response, capacity-building, radiation and nuclear security, and complex cross-border risks. High Representative Kaja Kallas made a similar argument in her April 2026 visit to the region, describing European and Gulf security as increasingly interlinked, condemning Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and neighboring states, and stressing that attacks on civilian infrastructure affect oil, gas, fertilizer flows, and overall global stability. Kallas underlined the EU's call for a deescalatory strategy, underscoring the importance of diplomatic avenues and the need to prevent further military escalation in the Gulf.
The convergence between GCC and EU positions is therefore significant. The GCC side has asked for recognition of the seriousness of attacks, stronger international action, support for selfdefense and deterrence, and protection of maritime passages. The EU side has emphasized international law, freedom of navigation, defensive maritime operations, and crisis-management cooperation. Taken together, these statements provide an outline for a more balanced GCC-EU framework: operational coordination at sea, diplomatic work on land conflicts, and legal action through international institutions.
GCC Expectations for European Commitment
Given the elevation of the maritime security domain, the potential for a European role has increased. The GCC states perceive Europe as a crucial strategic partner in ensuring maritime security, advocating for a commitment that extends beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric to tangible, long-term support. This perspective is rooted in the understanding that regional security is inextricably linked to the international system, thereby reinforcing the importance of international guarantees over ad hoc responses.
The GCC Vision for Regional Security, released in March 2024, explicitly calls for strong international partnerships and a collective security framework, emphasizing adherence to humanitarian law and support for accountability mechanisms to foster a predictable and legitimate regional order.
In that context, several key expectations arise regarding Europe’s role in maritime security in the region, particularly a shift from reactive interventions to sustained, comprehensive engagement. A primary expectation is for a sustained European presence across the critical maritime expanse from the Red Sea and Bab elMandeb, through the Gulf of Aden, and into the Strait of Hormuz. This continuous engagement, rather than episodic responses to crises, is important for long-term regional stability and effective deterrence.
Concurrently, enhanced European cooperation in maritime domain awareness (MDA), involving the integration, analysis, and sharing of intelligence to forge a common operational picture, will lead to accurate threat assessment and coordinated responses.
Furthermore, Europe could play a greater role in protecting freedom of navigation, a role that would require a nuanced understanding to avoid escalating regional tensions. This necessitates sophisticated diplomatic and operational capabilities to balance security imperatives with de-escalation efforts.
Finally, Europe could contribute to capacity and institution building within the maritime domain, including modernizing coast guards, strengthening port security, providing specialized training in counter-smuggling, implementing cybersecurity measures, and safeguarding critical submarine cables and offshore energy infrastructure.
The contributions of Gulf states to this partnership extend beyond mere logistical support and port access, offering deeper strategic value to Europe. Firstly, the Gulf’s broader conceptualization of maritime security links it not only to the protection of vessels but also to national security, economic resilience, energy flows and sources, ports, facilities, supply chains, and critical infrastructure. This expanded view moves beyond the narrow concept of freedom of navigation to encompass a more holistic understanding of maritime threats. Secondly, the GCC states would contribute as financial and industrial partners, including through joint funding of advanced maritime projects.
This includes investments in surveillance systems, unmanned vessels, and the military applications of artificial intelligence, demonstrating a commitment to shared technological advancement and burden-sharing. The GCC states have already been developing their own naval capabilities in order to deter attacks on their waters. Saudi Arabia, for instance, under Vision 2030, has been focusing on localizing its military industry and strengthening the capabilities of its defense ministry in order to enhance maritime security in the Gulf and protect the region’s interests.
Steps for Enhanced GCC-EU Maritime Security Cooperation
Given the ongoing crisis and the shared vulnerabilities, the following steps can be considered to enhance GCC-EU maritime security cooperation. These measures build upon existing frameworks while addressing critical gaps in capabilities and coordination.
First is the expansion or adaptation of existing EU operations, such as ASPIDES or EMASoH. While recent updates to ASPIDES and ATALANTA mandates are positive, a more unified presence in the Strait of Hormuz would contribute to greater maritime security. European leaders should consider expanding existing mandates to include protective measures in the Strait of Hormuz, in coordination with GCC states.
This would involve deploying additional naval assets and organizing escort operations for commercial vessels, with clearly defined rules of engagement.
Furthermore, establishing a formal mechanism for real-time intelligence sharing and joint operational planning between EU maritime forces (ASPIDES, ATALANTA, EMASoH) and GCC naval forces would enhance situational awareness and threat assessments, and enable rapid, coordinated responses.
This mechanism could involve dedicated liaison officers, secure communication channels, and joint intelligence fusion centers, drawing lessons from successful multilateral security operations.
Second, a dedicated platform for continuous dialogue and operational coordination could further support cooperation. Establishing a dedicated GCC-EU Maritime Security Dialogue and Task Force would go beyond ad hoc meetings and provide a permanent framework to address maritime security challenges. There are three actions here:
First, Formalizing an EU-GCC Maritime Security Dialogue: Creating a regular, high-level dialogue dedicated solely to maritime security, involving relevant military, diplomatic, and technical experts from both sides, would serve as a forum for strategic discussions, threat assessments, and policy coordination.
Second, Exploring a mandated EUGCC Naval Task Force: Initiate discussions on the feasibility and structure of a joint EU-GCC naval task force. Such a task force, with a clear mandate to protect commercial shipping and deter aggression, would symbolize a strong commitment to shared security.
Third, Initiating joint training and capacity building: Expand existing training programs and create new ones focused on maritime domain awareness, interdiction operations, and crisis response. European expertise in peacekeeping and civil defense can be leveraged to enhance GCC capabilities.
Third, as diplomacy remains the cornerstone of conflict resolution, the EU and GCC have an important role to play in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts. One avenue worth exploring is establishing a joint GCC-EU Middle East Peace Platform.
This joint platform would focus on confidence-building measures, structured negotiation tracks, and supporting backchannel diplomacy for broader regional issues, including nuclear proliferation and geopolitical security guarantees. The platform would aim to de-escalate tensions, build trust between regional players, and create pathways for sustainable peace.
The proposed GCC-EU Middle East Peace Platform would be developed as a land-sea security mechanism to reduce the land-based drivers of maritime insecurity. The platform could include a track focused on ceasefire support, coastal governance, port administration, customs integrity, humanitarian access, coast guard capacity, and prevention of arms flows to non-state actors.
The GCC-EU partnership should cooperate in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By actively promoting a rules-based international order, the EU and GCC can collectively advocate for adherence to international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, and the protection of sovereign rights, thereby creating a more predictable and stable maritime environment. This diplomatic engagement is closely linked to maritime security and can serve as a key foundation, as political stability reduces the likelihood of maritime incidents and conflicts.
Conclusion
The recent deterioration of maritime security in the Gulf has reinforced the point that, for both the GCC and the European Union, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have far-reaching economic and security consequences, highlighting the growing interdependence between Gulf and European interests.
Against this backdrop, GCC-EU maritime cooperation should evolve beyond a crisis-driven relationship toward a structured and long-term strategic partnership. The convergence between Gulf and European approaches to maritime security provides a strong foundation for such cooperation. Both sides share an interest in protecting critical trade routes, safeguarding energy flows, upholding international law, and preventing regional escalation. At the same time, each partner brings distinct strengths to the table. Europe contributes operational experience, technological capabilities, and diplomatic influence, while the GCC offers regional knowledge, strategic geography, political legitimacy, and growing defense and industrial capacities.
Moving forward, GCC-EU maritime cooperation should focus on both sides' ability to institutionalize coordination, deepen operational cooperation, enhance information sharing, and address the land-based drivers of maritime insecurity. Strengthening maritime domain awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, building local capacities, and promoting diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts should form the pillars of a comprehensive partnership. Equally important is the recognition that maritime security cannot be separated from broader efforts to promote regional stability, economic development, and conflict prevention.
Ultimately, by combining their resources, capabilities, and political influence, the GCC and EU can contribute to a more resilient and predictable regional security architecture. In an era of increasing geopolitical competition and growing threats to global trade and energy networks, a stronger GCC-EU maritime partnership has become a strategic necessity to safeguard shared interests and support the stability of the international economic system.
*Amnah Mosly is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)