Commentary & Analysis

Executive Summary

The trade relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Latin America has entered a period of sustained and structurally significant expansion. Total trade between the GCC and the twelve Latin American countries covered in this paper reached USD 26.38 billion in 2025, with GCC exports to the region amounting to USD 6.15 billion and GCC imports from Latin America reaching USD 20.23 billion. Over the ten-year period from 2016 to 2025, cumulative GCC-Latin America trade totaled USD 210.44 billion, with GCC imports from the region growing at a compound rate of 124.7 percent and GCC exports expanding by 83.8 percent. Latin America accounted for approximately 1.6 percent of GCC total global trade in 2025, a share that, while modest in relative terms, has been growing steadily and masks a relationship of far greater strategic importance than the aggregate figures alone suggest.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the dominant GCC actors in the relationship, accounting for 42 and 35 percent of total GCC-Latin America trade in 2025, respectively. Yet the relationship extends beyond these two states. Qatar accounts for 5 percent of GCC-Latin America trade and recorded the highest GCC trade growth rate in the region at 54 percent from 2024 to 2025. Oman accounts for 10 percent of total GCC-Latin America trade and is a growing participant through energy and industrial imports from Latin America. Bahrain accounts for 6 percent, underpinned by strong aluminum trade flows and bilateral investment frameworks with Mexico. Kuwait accounts for 3 percent and participated in the collective GCC sovereign commitment to Argentina in 2022. Taken together, all six GCC member states have documented economic relationships with Latin America, and the breadth of the GCC-wide engagement, not only its depth in specific bilateral pairs, is what makes this a structurally significant inter-regional relationship.

Since 2020, there has been a quantitative expansion accompanied by a qualitative deepening of political and diplomatic ties. Gulf states have pursued structured political engagement in Latin America, motivated by a desire to consolidate positions within South-South multilateral frameworks, including BRICS and the G20. The convergence of Latin American and Gulf positions on the Palestinian question, within the frameworks of international law, has created an additional layer of significant strategic political alignment.

Keywords: Gulf Cooperation Council, Latin America, GCC foreign policy, South-South cooperation, BRICS, CEPA, trade, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, food security, critical minerals, Palestine, Strait of Hormuz.

1. Introduction: Establishing the Economic Weight of the Relationship

Any rigorous assessment of Gulf-Latin America political relations must begin with an accurate account of the economic weight that underpins and motivates those relations. The GCC and Latin America together represent a combined GDP of well over USD 10 trillion and a combined population exceeding one billion people. Yet trade and investment flows between these two regions have historically been modest relative to that combined weight. Understanding precisely where the relationship stands quantitatively is the prerequisite for assessing where it is going strategically.

Table 1 below presents the most current available bilateral trade data for 2025, drawn from Trade Map and compiled by the Gulf Research Center, covering all twelve Latin American countries examined in this paper. The table presents absolute trade values rather than growth rates alone, providing the factual foundation on which the subsequent political and strategic analysis rests. Trade balance figures in red indicate a GCC deficit; those in green indicate a GCC surplus.

Trade patterns demonstrate a strong concentration toward a small number of countries. Brazil alone accounts for 51.5 percent of all GCC trade with Latin America at USD 13.59 billion in 2025. The top four countries, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru, together account for over 90 percent of total GCC-Latin America trade. The GCC maintains a consistent and widening trade deficit with Latin America: In 2025, exports totaled USD 6.15 billion while imports reached USD 20.23 billion, resulting in a negative balance of USD 14.07 billion. This deficit reflects the structural logic of the relationship: The GCC is a net importer of the food, minerals, and raw materials that Latin America produces in abundance, and a net exporter of the industrial inputs, fertilizers, and processed goods that Latin American agriculture and industry require. Table 2 below disaggregates GCC trade with Latin America by member state.

Table 2 reveals several important features. The UAE and Saudi Arabia together account for 77 percent of total GCC-Latin America trade. Qatar, at 5 percent and USD 1.35 billion, recorded the highest trade growth rate among GCC members with Latin America in 2024 to 2025 at 54 percent, signaling accelerating Qatari engagement with the region. Qatar is also the only GCC member to record a trade surplus with Latin America, reflecting its LNG and hydrocarbon export profile. Oman accounts for 10 percent of the total at USD 2.53 billion, a figure driven substantially by aluminum exports to Brazil and iron ore imports from Brazil for its steel industry. Bahrain, at 6 percent and USD 1.53 billion, is the smallest GCC economy engaged with Latin America, yet it has developed the highest compound annual growth rate for its exports to the region at 23.6 percent between 2016 and 2025, driven by aluminum products. Kuwait accounts for 3 percent at USD 734.8 million, with imports from Latin America concentrated in food and agricultural commodities. Table 3 provides a detailed breakdown of Saudi Arabia's bilateral trade.

The commodity composition of GCC-Latin America trade, presented in Table 4, illustrates the structural complementarity that constitutes the economic logic of the relationship. In 2025, 83 percent of GCC exports to Latin America were concentrated in five categories, led by fertilizers at USD 2.07 billion. On the import side, 65 percent of GCC imports were concentrated in five categories, led by precious metals and stones at USD 4.04 billion, followed by meat at USD 3.38 billion.

The Gulf Research Center's GCC-Latin America research program was established in recognition that understanding the full architecture of this relationship requires sustained analytical effort. This paper analyzes the political drivers of Gulf engagement, traces country-level developments, and assesses sectoral and multilateral cooperation, drawing on verified 2025 trade data, alongside diplomatic and investment analyses.

2. The Political Framework of Gulf Engagement in Latin America Since 2020

2.1 GCC States as Active Diplomatic Players

The political context of GCC–Latin America relations since 2020 has been shaped by the Gulf states’ broader efforts to diversify their international partnerships and expand diplomatic engagement across the Global South. This shift reflects a growing recognition among GCC countries that emerging geopolitical and economic dynamics require broader international outreach beyond traditional partnerships and regional frameworks.

In recent years, GCC states have increasingly positioned themselves as active diplomatic and economic actors with expanding global reach. Alongside their growing roles in international mediation, multilateral diplomacy, development initiatives, and global economic governance, Gulf countries have pursued wider engagement with regions such as Latin America through political dialogue, trade initiatives, investment partnerships, and institutional cooperation.

This broader diplomatic expansion has elevated the strategic relevance of GCC–Latin America relations. For many Gulf states, Latin America represents an increasingly important partner in areas including food security, energy transition, mining and critical minerals, logistics, infrastructure, and South–South cooperation. At the same time, Latin American governments have shown growing interest in engaging Gulf countries as emerging international actors with significant financial capacity, investment potential, and expanding diplomatic influence.

The growing interaction between the two regions is also reflected in the gradual development of institutional and diplomatic channels supporting long-term engagement. Economic forums, diplomatic exchanges, investment initiatives, academic cooperation, and business outreach efforts have all contributed to expanding the foundations of GCC–Latin America relations beyond traditional trade ties toward a more diversified strategic partnership.

2.2 The US-Israel-Iran Conflict: A Shared Strategic Vulnerability

The military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which intensified dramatically from 2024 onward and encompassed direct US and Israeli strikes against Iranian targets, represents a shared strategic vulnerability for both the Gulf states and Latin America that has paradoxically strengthened the case for deeper inter-regional cooperation. From the Gulf perspective, any significant escalation involving Iran carries direct risks to the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 percent of the world's oil transits. Financial analysts have estimated that even a single day of a full Hormuz blockade could cause global oil prices to double from USD 66 to more than USD 120 per barrel. For energy-importing Latin American economies, a sustained closure of the Hormuz or severe disruption of Gulf oil flows would represent an economic shock of the first order.

The fertilizer dimension of this shared vulnerability is equally direct and particularly relevant to the GCC-Latin American agricultural relationship. GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are among the world's leading exporters of petrochemical fertilizers, which constitute the single largest GCC export category to Latin America at USD 2.07 billion in 2025. Any sustained conflict scenario that disrupts Gulf industrial and export capacity would directly affect the fertilizer supply available to Latin American farmers, with cascading consequences for the food production systems that the GCC simultaneously depends upon for its own food security.

The structural interdependence is thus circular and mutually reinforcing: Gulf fertilizer exports sustain Latin American agricultural productivity, and Latin American food exports feed Gulf populations. A conflict that disrupts one side of this loop damages both.

The convergence of Latin American and Gulf positions within international law frameworks and multilateral forums on the Palestinian question has added a political dimension to this shared vulnerability. Multiple Latin American governments, including Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Cuba, joined or supported South Africa's ongoing genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Brazil and Colombia endorsed the ICJ case in January 2024. Chile and Mexico presented a referral to the International Criminal Court in January 2024. Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024. Chile withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Brazil's President Lula described the situation in Gaza as a genocide. These positions brought Latin America into open alignment with the political stance maintained by Gulf states, which have collectively condemned Israeli actions in Gaza while calling for a two-state solution and a ceasefire through the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

This convergence is not merely symbolic. It reflects a genuine overlap in foreign policy values between Latin American governments, which have historically defended international law norms and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and Gulf states, which have a direct political stake in the Palestinian question as Arab and Muslim-majority nations. From a Gulf diplomatic perspective, the support of major Latin American economies at the ICJ and ICC represents tangible political capital within the Global South coalition that Gulf states have been building. For Latin American governments, alignment with Gulf positions on Palestine opens the door to closer engagement with GCC states that possess the capital, logistics networks, and food import demand that Latin America needs. The shared vulnerability created by the US-Israel-Iran conflict dynamic, in this sense, functions as a political accelerant for Gulf-Latin America bilateral engagement.

2.3 BRICS, the G20, and Multilateral Architecture

The BRICS bloc decided in 2023 to extend membership invitations to six new states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and Argentina. The UAE formally joined BRICS in January 2024. Saudi Arabia was invited to join and has continued active engagement with the bloc, participating in its summits, contributing to the New Development Bank, and aligning with its strategic agenda, without yet formalizing its full membership. This careful engagement reflects Saudi Arabia's broader diplomatic approach of maintaining optionality across multiple multilateral frameworks without irrevocably committing to any single alignment.

Brazil is a founding BRICS member. The institutional overlap between Gulf states and Latin America within BRICS has created a new setting for political and economic dialogue that operates outside Western-dominated frameworks, which is of genuine value to both sides in the current geopolitical environment.

Brazil's presidency of the G20 in 2024, culminating in the Rio de Janeiro Summit in November, provided one of the most important diplomatic opportunities for advancing Gulf-Latin America relations. Saudi Arabia, as a full G20 member, and the UAE, as a repeat guest member, used the summit to formalize the Saudi-Brazilian Coordination Council and the UAE-Brazil joint investment mechanism. Qatar has also been a G20 invited guest member in recent years, participating in discussions on food security and energy transition financing. The summit's thematic agenda on food security, climate finance, and digital infrastructure aligned closely with the strategic investment priorities of GCC sovereign wealth funds, enabling Gulf states to demonstrate both commercial intent and developmental solidarity simultaneously. Figure 1 below presents the key milestones in the relationship since 2020.

3. Diplomatic Infrastructure: Embassy Presence as a Measure of Momentum One of the clearest indicators of the deepening relationship between the GCC and Latin America is the gradual expansion of diplomatic representation and institutional engagement between both regions. The establishment and strengthening of embassies, resident diplomatic missions, and bilateral diplomatic channels reflects a broader commitment to sustaining long-term political and economic relations beyond episodic high-level visits or transactional cooperation. Diplomatic presence plays an important role in facilitating political coordination, commercial engagement, investment flows, cultural exchange, and broader people-to-people connectivity. It also enhances the practical capacity of governments to manage bilateral relations, support trade and investment initiatives, and institutionalize cooperation across multiple sectors. In recent 

years, GCC states have increasingly expanded their global diplomatic outreach as part of wider foreign policy diversification strategies, while Latin American countries have similarly shown growing interest in strengthening political and economic engagement with Gulf partners.

he evolving diplomatic landscape between the two regions reflects a gradual but noticeable shift toward more structured and institutionalized relations. Political dialogue mechanisms, economic forums, business councils, investment agreements, academic exchanges, and ministerial visits have all contributed to expanding channels of engagement between GCC and Latin American countries. While the level of diplomatic representation and institutional presence varies across states, the overall trajectory points toward steadily deepening interregional interaction and a growing recognition on both sides of the strategic value of sustained GCC–Latin America cooperation.

4. Country-by-Country Political and Economic Analysis

4.1 Brazil

Brazil is the anchor of Gulf engagement in Latin America. As Table 1 confirms, Brazil accounted for 51.5 percent of total GCC-Latin America trade at USD 13.59 billion in 2025 and 52.5 percent of Saudi-Latin America trade at USD 4.82 billion. The GCC imports USD 10.32 billion worth of goods from Brazil annually, led by precious metals, meat, ores, and sugar. The return of President Lula da Silva to the presidency in January 2023 re-energized Brazil's South-South diplomatic orientation and created a more receptive environment for Gulf engagement. Qatar's investment balance in Brazil stood at USD 1.05 billion in 2022, with QatarEnergy holding a 20 percent stake in the Agua Marinha offshore oil block acquired in 2022, alongside TotalEnergies and Petronas. The Qatar Investment Authority holds a 12 percent stake in Adecoagro, an agribusiness operating across Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, and a 40 percent stake in a joint venture with the Brazilian food-processing company, BRF. Iron ore exports from Brazil to Oman and Bahrain grew substantially in 2023 and 2024, feeding their expanding steel production and aluminum industries. The Saudi-BRF partnership, the PIF's announced USD 15 billion program in Brazil, and the G20 bilateral frameworks have made Brazil the most institutionally dense GCC-LATAM bilateral relationship.

4.2 Argentina

Argentina ranked third in total GCC-Latin America trade in 2025 at USD 3.46 billion and second in Saudi bilateral trade deficit. The country's political turbulence has complicated Gulf engagement: Argentina accepted a BRICS invitation in 2023 but declined membership under President Milei after December 2023. Despite this divergence, UAE-Argentina non-oil trade surged more than 70 percent in 2024. Argentina holds investment protection agreements with the UAE (signed 2018, in force 2024) and Qatar (signed 2016, in force 2018), and an investment promotion agreement with Saudi Arabia (signed 2023, in force 2024). In 2022, the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait collectively committed USD 1 billion to Argentina. The Qatar Investment Authority's stake in Adecoagro, which operates across Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, gives Qatar a distinctive investment footprint in the Argentine agribusiness sector.

4.3 Colombia

Colombia's engagement with Gulf states accelerated markedly in 2024. The UAE is Colombia's main Arab trading partner, accounting for 40 percent of Colombia's total Arab region trade. UAEColombia trade surged more than 43 percent in 2023. The UAE-Colombia CEPA was concluded in April 2024 and focuses on energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and food production. Colombia's President Gustavo Petro engaged constructively with the UAE, framing the partnership as an expression of South-South solidarity. Colombia's severing of diplomatic ties with Israel in May 2024 and its joining of South Africa's ICJ genocide case placed Bogota clearly within the Global South coalition on Palestinian rights, a position that resonates with Gulf states' own political stances and facilitates diplomatic convergence. Abu Dhabi's International Holding Company holds approximately 15 percent of Colombia's Grupo Nutresa.

4.4 Chile

Chile's relationship with Gulf states has produced two landmark milestones: Aramco's acquisition of Esmax in March 2024, its first South American downstream investment, and the UAE-Chile CEPA signed in July 2024, targeting USD 750 million in bilateral trade by 2030. GCC-Chile trade grew 38 percent between 2018 and 2022. Chile holds the world's largest lithium reserves, and its active alignment with Gulf positions on Palestine, including withdrawing its ambassador from Tel Aviv and joining the ICJ proceedings, has created political common ground that supports commercial deepening. The UAE and Bahrain both maintain bilateral commercial engagement with Chile, with Bahraini aluminum exports benefiting from Chile's demand for construction and industrial materials.

4.5 Cuba

Cuba accounts for less than 0.1 percent of GCC-Latin America trade. Gulf states maintain diplomatic relations with Havana and engage through South-South forums. Cuba's statecontrolled economy and the comprehensive US sanctions regime have kept Gulf-Cuba economic engagement to a minimum. Cuba has maintained diplomatic non-recognition of Israel since 1973, and the Cuban government's strong public support for Palestinian rights aligns it with Gulf political positions on that question, providing a basis for diplomatic engagement even in the absence of significant commercial content.

4.6 Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic's total GCC trade of USD 117.58 million in 2025 understates its growing strategic significance. The first Saudi-Dominican resident embassies, operationalized in 2024, and DP World's USD 760 million port and free trade zone agreement signed in May 2025, together represent a qualitative step change in the bilateral relationship. The Dominican Republic's Vice President Raquel Pena hosted a 60-plus-member Saudi investment delegation in April 2023, announcing Dominican support for Saudi Arabia's Expo 2030 bid and committing to a joint agenda for trade facilitation, infrastructure, and investment promotion.

4.7 El Salvador

El Salvador accounted for USD 54.97 million in total GCC trade in 2025, among the smallest bilateral relationships covered in this paper. The UAE maintains an embassy in San Salvador and engages through Central American sub-regional frameworks. No major Gulf investment commitments have been publicly documented. El Salvador's abstention in certain UN votes, reflecting its positioning under President Bukele's neutrality doctrine, means the country does not align as cleanly as some of its neighbors with the Gulf-Latin America political convergence on Palestinian rights.

4.8 Mexico

Mexico ranks second in GCC-Latin America trade at USD 3.93 billion in 2025 and second in Saudi bilateral trade. Mexico holds investment protection agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, giving it the broadest bilateral investment legal architecture of any country in this analysis. Non-oil trade with the UAE has nearly doubled over the past decade. Mexico's participation in the ICJ proceedings on Gaza in May 2024 alongside Chile placed it within the Latin American-Gulf alignment on Palestinian rights, adding a political dimension to an already 

substantial commercial relationship. QatarEnergy has invested in offshore oil fields in Mexico's Campeche Basin, adding Qatar to the roster of Gulf states with direct energy sector investment in Mexico.

4.9 Panama

Panama's USD 157.03 million in total GCC trade in 2025 reflects its structural role as a logistics and financial hub rather than a primary bilateral trade partner. Panama records one of the two positive GCC trade balances in this analysis, at USD 92.99 million, reflecting the re-export and transshipment character of its trade. DP World's presence in Panama's logistics sector and Gulf airlines' incorporation of Panama into hemispheric route networks make it a gateway rather than a destination. Panama's geographic position at the narrowest point between the Pacific and Atlantic means that any significant disruption to either the Suez Canal or the Strait of Hormuz increases traffic through the Panama Canal, creating an indirect link between Gulf geopolitical stability and Panamanian trade.

4.10 Peru

Peru ranked fourth in total GCC-Latin America trade at USD 3.02 billion in 2025, with GCC imports from Peru at USD 2.93 billion concentrated in ores, precious metals, and agricultural products. Oman's growth in imports of Brazilian iron ore partly reflects broader GCC demand for Latin American minerals, and Peru's copper and gold reserves are increasingly in the sights of Gulf sovereign wealth funds. DP World committed USD 1 billion to Peru's port sector in January 2025. Emirates signed a travel agreement with Peru in 2023, enabling direct flights to Lima, and the UAE maintains an active embassy there.

4.11 Uruguay

Uruguay's total GCC trade of USD 241.23 million in 2025, while modest, carries considerable value. Saudi Arabia's USD 86.73 million in imports from Uruguay are almost entirely halal-certified beef and dairy. The Qatar Investment Authority's stake in Adecoagro, which operates farms in Uruguay, and DP World's port presence give Doha and Dubai a physical investment footprint in the country. Uruguay's Foreign Minister visited Riyadh in November 2025 for the first time in 11 years, specifically to sign an investment promotion MoU with Saudi Arabia, showcasing the growing importance of the relationship to Uruguay. Bahrain, through its aluminum and chemicals trade relationship with MERCOSUR countries, also engages Uruguay through the bloc-level framework.

4.12 Venezuela

Venezuela recorded a total GCC trade of only USD 2.11 million in 2025. The only meaningful GCCVenezuela interaction occurs within OPEC and OPEC+, where Saudi Arabia and Venezuela coordinate on production. Qatar played a notable diplomatic role, mediating discussions between the United States and Venezuela through an undisclosed Memorandum of Understanding signed with Venezuela in September 2023, which contributed to a temporary easing of US sanctions on Venezuelan oil exports. This reflects Qatar's broader positioning as a neutral diplomatic facilitator- - a role it has leveraged to build a political presence in Venezuela that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have largely avoided. Despite Venezuela's OPEC membership and vast hydrocarbon reserves, its economic collapse and sanctions isolation make it effectively non-investable for Gulf capital in the current period.

5. Thematic Analysis of Political and Economic Cooperation

5.1 Food Security and Agricultural Trade

Food security is both the most economically significant and the most politically consequential dimension of Gulf-Latin America cooperation. As Table 4 demonstrates, meat and edible offal, at USD 3.38 billion, and cereals, at USD 1.82 billion, together accounted for nearly 25 percent of total GCC imports from Latin America in 2025. Sugars at USD 1.92 billion added a further 10 percent. The GCC states collectively import between 80 and 85 percent of their total food requirements. The Saudi-BRF relationship, involving SALIC's equity stake in BRF and the BRF-HPDC halal joint venture, creates a direct ownership link between Saudi sovereign capital and Brazilian poultry production capacity. Qatar's 40 percent interest in the BRF joint venture and 12 percent stake in Adecoagro add a Qatari dimension to the agrifood investment architecture. The UAE's CEPA with Colombia prioritizes agricultural trade and Emirati fertilizer exports. GCC fertilizer exports to Latin America totaling USD 2.07 billion add a further dimension of supply chain interdependence, with Gulf petrochemicals underpinning the soil productivity of the agricultural systems that then export food back to the Gulf.

5.2 Energy, Critical Minerals, and the Diversification Agenda

Saudi Aramco's acquisition of Esmax in Chile, completed in March 2024, marks its first downstream retail investment in South America, reflecting a strategic shift toward an integrated downstream presence in high-growth markets. The Saudi Fund for Development's USD 500 million commitment to Argentina's Nestor Kirchner Gas Pipeline, commissioned in July 2023

represents Gulf development finance on a scale that signals a genuine strategic commitment. QatarEnergy's 20 percent stake in Brazil's Agua Marinha block and its investment in Mexican offshore oil fields demonstrate Qatar's growing direct participation in Latin American energy production, not merely trade. Oman's imports of iron ore from Brazil and Bahrain's demand for aluminum inputs and processed metals from the region reflect the energy and industrial supply chain connections that Oman Vision 2040 and Bahrain's Economic Vision are building with Latin America's resource base. Critical minerals, particularly lithium in Chile and Argentina and copper in Chile and Peru, have emerged as the next frontier for Gulf sovereign wealth fund engagement as all six GCC states execute diversification strategies that require securing positions in the materials underpinning clean energy transitions.

5.3 Logistics Infrastructure

DP World operates in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. Its USD 1 billion commitment to Peru's port sector in January 2025 and its USD 760 million port and free trade zone agreement in the Dominican Republic in May 2025 represent the continued deepening of Gulf logistics presence across the continent. Oman's LNG agreements with Mexican partners, documented by Middle East Briefing, represent a complementary strand of Gulf infrastructure engagement, in which Oman's energy infrastructure connects with Latin American demand through longer-term LNG supply arrangements. Bahrain's adoption of open banking in 2019 and the fintech regulatory development in the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia create financial infrastructure complementarities with Latin America's dynamic fintech sector.

5.4 The Role of Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait

It would be analytically incomplete to treat the Gulf-Latin America relationship as synonymous with the engagement of the UAE and Saudi Arabia alone. Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait each have documented and growing economic relationships with Latin America that reflect both their national diversification strategies and their specific commercial complementarities with the region.

Qatar's engagement is notable for its investment depth and diplomatic creativity. Its investment balance in Brazil of USD 1.05 billion in 2022, QatarEnergy's equity positions in Brazilian offshore oil blocks and Mexican Campeche Basin fields, the Qatar Investment Authority's stakes in Adecoagro across Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, and its 40 percent interest in a BRF joint venture collectively make Qatar one of the most actively invested GCC states in Latin American food and

energy production. In addition, Qatar Airways operates direct routes from Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo to Doha, providing commercial connectivity that supplements investment ties. Diplomatically, Qatar's mediating role in Venezuela-US talks in 2023 and its LNG and hydrocarbon partnerships with Latin American countries illustrate an engagement strategy that combines commercial investment with soft-power diplomacy.

Oman is the third-largest GCC trade partner with Latin America, with trade totaling USD 2.53 billion in 2025, contributing 10 percent of total GCC-LATAM trade. Oman's exports to Latin America have grown at a compound annual rate of 15.7 percent between 2016 and 2025, reflecting the expansion of Omani industrial products, particularly chemicals and processed materials, in Latin American markets. Oman's imports of Brazilian iron ore and minerals feed its expanding steel and industrial production. Brazil's Vale is among the major foreign investors in Oman, creating a further node of economic interdependence between the two regions. Oman Vision 2040 explicitly prioritizes economic diversification through international partnerships in manufacturing and industry, and Latin America's resource base aligns with those priorities. Longterm LNG supply arrangements with Mexican partners documented from 2024 to 2025 illustrate Oman's interest in becoming a sustained energy supplier to Latin American markets.

Bahrain accounted for 6 percent of total GCC–Latin America trade in 2025, equivalent to USD 1.53 billion. Although it is the smallest GCC economy in absolute terms, it has developed a distinctive engagement profile. Mexico's bilateral investment protection agreement with Bahrain, signed in 2012 and in force since 2014, makes Bahrain one of only three GCC states with a formal investment protection framework in Mexico. Bahrain's exports to Latin America recorded a compound annual growth rate of 23.6 percent between 2016 and 2025, driven primarily by aluminum exports. Bahrain's early adoption of open banking in 2019 and its advanced fintech regulatory environment create complementarities with Latin America's rapidly expanding fintech sector, providing opportunities for co-investment in digital financial services.

Across the 2020–2025 period, Kuwait's engagement with Latin America remained primarily commercial and institutional rather than investment driven. Its most visible sovereign investment related action during this period was its participation in the GCC's collective USD 1 billion commitment to Argentina in 2022. Mexico's bilateral investment protection agreement with Kuwait, signed in 2013 and in force since 2016, provides a formal legal framework for the protection and promotion of Kuwaiti investment in Mexico. Kuwait's commercial relationship with Latin America is centered on imports of food and agricultural commodities, particularly from 

Brazil and Mexico, reflecting the country's structural dependence on imported food supplies. While the Kuwait Investment Authority has exposure to Latin American assets through its globally diversified investment portfolio, there is limited public evidence of a dedicated regional investment strategy comparable to those pursued by the Qatar Investment Authority or Mubadala Investment Company.

6. Challenges and Structural Constraints

Despite the genuine advances documented in this paper, the Gulf-Latin America relationship faces structural constraints that require deliberate effort to overcome. The most fundamental challenge is the modest share of Latin America in GCC global trade. In 2025, Latin America accounted for approximately 1.6 percent of total GCC global trade. Even rapid growth rates, impressive in percentage terms, translate into absolute volumes that leave the relationship peripheral to the core economic interests of most governments involved. Sustained deepening will require institutional investment in diplomatic networks, legal frameworks, transport links, and people-topeople connectivity.

Macroeconomic instability in key Latin American economies, particularly Argentina and Venezuela, creates genuine risk management challenges. The persistent GCC trade deficit of USD 14.07 billion in 2025 reflects a relationship still anchored in primary commodity trade rather than in the diversified, higher-value economic interaction that would characterize a mature strategic partnership. Even in Brazil and Colombia, regulatory uncertainty and judicial risk remain concerns for investors with access to more predictable environments elsewhere. The geopolitical risk posed by the US-Israel-Iran conflict, while creating political alignment between Latin America and the Gulf as described above, also creates real economic uncertainty: A sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or a broader Gulf conflict would damage the GCC-Latin America agricultural and fertilizer supply chain that both sides depend upon.

The competitive dynamic between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while stimulating in some respects, can produce coordination failures in Gulf engagement with Latin America. Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait each have valuable but underutilized potential in Latin America, and the absence of a coordinated GCC-level approach to Latin American engagement means that the full complement of GCC capabilities, commercial, diplomatic, financial, and logistical, is not being deployed in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner. A more structured approach to GCC-level

coordination on Latin America would improve both the efficiency and the impact of Gulf engagement across the region.

7. Conclusion

The Gulf-Latin America relationship has undergone a qualitative transformation since 2020, and the verified 2025 trade data presented in this paper confirm that it has real and growing economic substance. Total GCC-Latin America trade reached USD 26.38 billion in 2025. Saudi Arabia's FDI stock from Latin America reached USD 1.94 billion in 2024. Qatar's investment balance in Brazil was USD 1.05 billion in 2022, with active positions in offshore oil, agribusiness, and meat processing. Oman contributes 10 percent of GCC-Latin America trade through industrial and energy complementarities. Bahrain's 23.6 percent compound annual growth rate of exports to the region is the highest among GCC members. Kuwait participated in the collective USD 1 billion sovereign commitment to Argentina. All six GCC states are participants in a relationship that is structurally significant and deepening.

The political drivers of this transformation are equally durable. The Saudi-Iran normalization freed Gulf diplomatic bandwidth for wider South-South engagement. The convergence of Latin American and Gulf positions on the Palestinian file and international law, demonstrated through ICJ case support and diplomatic realignments, has created genuine political common ground. The shared vulnerability created by the US-Israel-Iran conflict dynamic, including the Strait of Hormuz energy-supply risk and the Gulf fertilizer-export dependence that sustains Latin American agriculture, has reinforced the alignment of Gulf and Latin American strategic interests. The BRICS expansion, Brazil's G20 presidency, and Qatar's diplomatic activism in Venezuela have all added institutional substance to what was previously a more episodic engagement.

The Gulf Research Center's GCC-Latin America research program reflects an institutional conviction that rigorous analysis of this relationship is a prerequisite for its strategic management. The period from 2020 to 2026 has demonstrated what is possible when political will, economic interest, and institutional investment align. The period to come will reveal whether those foundations can be consolidated into a durable, strategically managed inter-regional partnership that serves the long-term development interests of both sides.

*Hannan Alghamdi is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)