Commentary & Analysis

For the first time in the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), all of its member states were subjected to Iranian missile and drone attacks, despite the fact that none of them was a party to the U.S.–Israeli– Iranian war. These attacks revealed both Iran’s willingness and capacity to threaten the security of GCC states, impose direct costs upon them, and even turn their security into a bargaining instrument in Tehran’s conflicts with Israel and the United States. The war also exposed the limitations of existing security partnerships and their inability to prevent such attacks.

During the conflict and in its aftermath, Iranian behavior reflected the posture of a state acting from a position of strength and convinced of its ability to impose its will on its neighbors. At the same time, some GCC states sought channels of communication and accommodation with Tehran in order to avoid further attacks, particularly in the absence of a final settlement capable of ending the war and addressing its underlying causes.

This contrast between continuing Iranian pressure and threats on the one hand, and the Gulf states’ desire to avoid escalation on the other, raises important questions about the type of post-war security arrangements that may emerge in the Gulf. These questions become even more significant in light of reports concerning meetings and initiatives undertaken by some of the smaller Gulf states toward Iran, developments that may serve Iranian interests and implicitly acknowledge that Tehran emerged from the war in a stronger position. It is in this context that this article invokes the concept of Finlandization as a possible analytical framework for understanding some of the directions that relations between Iran and the smaller Gulf states may take in the years ahead.

The concept of Finlandization emerged during the Cold War to describe the relationship that developed between Finland and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Broadly defined, it refers to a situation in which a small or medium-sized state retains its sovereignty, political system, and formal independence while adjusting important aspects of its foreign and security policies in ways that accommodate the interests and preferences of a more powerful neighboring state. From this perspective, Finlandization represents a strategy for adapting to an unfavorable balance of power and avoiding confrontation with a stronger neighbor through policy adjustments designed to reduce the likelihood of conflict.

The model emerged from the geopolitical circumstances confronting Finland after 1945. Sharing a long border with the Soviet Union, Finland faced the challenge of preserving its independence without entering into confrontation with a superpower possessing overwhelming military and political superiority. The 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance provided the framework governing this relationship. Under this arrangement, Finland retained its democratic political system, capitalist economy, and extensive ties with Western Europe, while adopting a highly cautious foreign and security policy toward Soviet interests.

Finlandization came to be associated with several defining characteristics. First, the smaller state preserves its sovereignty and domestic political institutions. Second, its foreign policy is shaped by a high degree of caution regarding issues that affect the interests of the neighboring great power. Third, political and media elites develop a form of self-adjustment in which awareness of the constraints imposed by an unequal balance of power becomes integral to decision-making. Finally, the relationship rests on an implicit recognition of asymmetry in power and a willingness to manage, rather than ignore, its consequences in political and security calculations.

The concept has long been controversial. Supporters regard it as a pragmatic strategy that enabled Finland to preserve its independence in a difficult strategic environment, while critics view it as a form of indirect constraint on sovereignty. Nevertheless, Finlandization has remained a useful analytical framework for understanding how smaller states adapt to unfavorable distributions of power.

The concept re-entered strategic debates following the 2014 Ukraine crisis, when prominent thinkers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger proposed that Ukraine adopt a status resembling the Finnish model as a basis for a stable settlement with Russia. Although these proposals generated considerable controversy, they reaffirmed the continuing relevance of Finlandization as a tool for understanding how weaker states manage relations with stronger neighbors.

From this perspective, invoking Finlandization in the Gulf context does not imply that the circumstances faced by Finland during the Cold War are identical to those confronting the smaller Gulf states today. Nor does it suggest that these states are inevitably moving toward a relationship similar to that which existed between Finland and the Soviet Union. The two cases differ significantly in their historical context, regional environment, and broader international setting. Nevertheless, the concept remains useful for understanding how smaller states behave when confronted by a larger neighboring power that possesses greater coercive capabilities, seeks to expand its influence, and aspires to exercise a degree of regional dominance, particularly at a time when confidence in external security guarantees is increasingly uncertain.

A well-known Finnish political anecdote illustrates the extent to which Finns understood the imbalance of power between themselves and the Soviet Union. During an election campaign, a Finnish politician reportedly proposed allocating only five dollars to the national defense budget, arguing that this amount would be sufficient to make a telephone call to the Kremlin and inform it of Finland’s surrender. Whether the story is true is beside the point. The anecdote reflects a deep awareness of the realities of power and the constraints imposed by proximity to a much stronger state. That awareness is not entirely unlike the dilemma facing the smaller Gulf states as they confront a regional neighbor with greater capabilities and a leadership that increasingly behaves as though it emerged from the recent war in a stronger position.

Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the future of the war, the durability of the ceasefire, and the prospects for a final settlement, coupled with concerns about renewed hostilities and the limited self-defense capabilities of some Gulf states, several smaller Gulf countries appear increasingly inclined to seek arrangements that minimize direct friction with an Iran emboldened by the outcome of the conflict and more willing to employ military and security pressure. This tendency is reinforced by the priority these states attach to economic stability and the protection of development visions and investment flows, considerations that make them particularly sensitive to security risks and regional instability.

In this context, efforts to engage and reach understandings with Iran can be viewed as a form of strategic adaptation to an increasingly dangerous security environment, rather than as an acceptance of Iran’s regional role. From this perspective, Finlandization helps explain such behavior as a mechanism through which smaller states seek to reduce risks and preserve their core interests when confronted by a larger neighbor with broad regional ambitions and a greater capacity to exert pressure. Should these initiatives continue and evolve into more durable arrangements, it may become possible to speak of the emergence of behavioral patterns sharing some of the characteristics historically associated with the Finnish model, even if the two cases differ in important respects.

In 2019, Tehran introduced the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) as a framework for a regional security order based on the principle that the security of the Gulf should be the responsibility of the states of the region themselves, rather than external powers. With the exception of Oman, the initiative was largely ignored by the Gulf states, which viewed it as an Iranian attempt to reduce the American security role in the region and constrain their defense options. Yet the early signs of what is unfolding today suggest that Iran may be achieving, through war and the coercive leverage generated by it, what it was unable to secure through diplomacy alone. If so, the result could be the gradual emergence of a pattern of relations exhibiting some of the characteristics historically associated with Finlandization.

Should the current contacts between some Gulf states and Iran evolve into more permanent arrangements, they are unlikely to remain confined to financial or economic issues. Media reports have referred to possible understandings involving Iranian assets or economic incentives, although such reports have been denied by the Gulf governments concerned. The Finnish experience nevertheless suggests that the essence of such arrangements lies not in material benefits but in the reorientation of the smaller state’s political and security behavior in ways that reduce the likelihood of confrontation with the stronger power.

Such arrangements could take several forms. First, they may involve continuing assurances to Iran that Gulf territory, airspace, and military facilities will not be used in military operations directed against it. Elements of this approach were already evident during the war, when GCC states repeatedly emphasized that their territories would not serve as launching grounds for attacks on Iran.

Second, they may entail greater caution in entering into security or military partnerships that Tehran could perceive as directed against it. This would not necessarily require terminating security relations with the United States or other Western powers, but it could lead to the avoidance of certain forms of cooperation or the deployment of military capabilities that Iran might interpret as a direct threat.

Third, smaller Gulf states may adopt more restrained positions toward regional crises involving Iran. Rather than participating in policies of containment or confrontation, they may increasingly prefer mediation, dialogue facilitation, and confidence-building efforts. In such circumstances, preventive diplomacy becomes a principal instrument for managing relations with Tehran.

Fourth, they may limit participation in regional arrangements that Iran could interpret as part of broader efforts to contain or encircle it. This could include greater caution toward regional security initiatives or projects that Tehran regards as contrary to its strategic interests.

The implications may also extend into the political and media spheres. One of the defining features of the Finnish model was the growing sensitivity to the preferences and reactions of the neighboring great power. In the Gulf context, this could be reflected in avoiding escalatory rhetoric toward Iran, prioritizing reassuring messages, and seeking to avoid appearing as part of any regional alignment openly hostile to Tehran.

The most important element of Finlandization, however, is the point at which the stronger neighbor’s interests become a regular factor in the decision-making process of the weaker. In the Finnish case, the issue was not simply one of specific concessions; anticipated Soviet reactions became part of the daily calculations of Finnish foreign policy. This shift in decision-making is among the features most closely associated with Finlandization. If a similar pattern were to emerge in the Gulf, the question asked when making any foreign policy decision related to regional and strategic issues would no longer be only: “Does this decision serve our interests?” It would also be: “How will Iran view this decision, and what implications might it have for the relationship with Tehran?”

Nevertheless, such a trajectory, if it emerges, would not necessarily mean accepting Iranian hegemony or abandoning relations with the United States. Rather, it would represent an attempt by smaller Gulf states to manage a high-risk and uncertain security environment by reducing the likelihood of direct targeting and avoiding becoming arenas for regional conflict.

This issue is especially important given that the Gulf states, despite more than four decades of institutional cooperation and the existence of a collective defense agreement stipulating that an attack on one member state is an attack on all, have been unable to translate these arrangements into a shared vision of external threats and how to address them. At a minimum, such arrangements might have been expected to produce a common understanding of regional threats. Yet the recent war revealed the limits of this expectation. Although Iranian attacks reached all Gulf states, this was not sufficient to produce a unified Gulf position or a shared assessment of the nature of the Iranian threat and the requirements for dealing with it. Instead, each state continued to adopt its own approach according to its priorities and national calculations.

This reality has given Iran greater room for maneuver and enabled it to exploit intra-Gulf differences, a pattern that has long been a strength of its regional policy. In the absence of a common Gulf security vision and given the continued tendency of the states to act individually, patterns of bilateral adaptation with Iran become more understandable from both political and strategic standpoints.

From this perspective, the article invokes Finlandization as an interpretive framework for understanding how smaller Gulf states may behave toward Iran in the post-war period, within a regional environment lacking effective collective security and defense arrangements, and amid growing doubts about the reliability of the region’s main security partner.

Prof. Saleh Al-Khathlan Senior Advisor Gulf Research Center (GRC)