Commentary & Analysis

Over recent decades, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have undergone a significant transformation in their international roles. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, in particular, have emerged as a new type of middle power that challenges traditional international relations theory. Rather than functioning solely as secondary actors within a Western-led order, they are increasingly shaping global agendas through strategic autonomy, economic influence, diplomatic mediation, and institutional innovation. Their growing influence reflects both structural changes in the international system and deliberate national efforts to convert geographic advantages, financial resources, and political flexibility into international leverage. In this sense, Gulf states are moving beyond the role of norm-takers and attempting to participate in the production of norms, institutions, and policy agendas within an increasingly multipolar order.

Unlike many established middle powers, whose influence is often associated primarily with multilateralism and niche diplomacy, the GCC states employ a more pragmatic, flexible, and multidimensional strategy. They engage selectively with international institutions while pursuing flexible foreign policies oriented toward concrete national interests. Their location at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, combined with their energy resources and financial capacity, enables them to act as geopolitical intermediaries and agenda-setters. Saudi Arabia’s participation in the G20 and other multilateral initiatives, together with Qatar’s mediation and humanitarian diplomacy, illustrates the shift from reactive diplomacy toward more proactive forms of statecraft.

The expansion of Gulf influence is closely connected to the fragmentation of the post-Cold War order and the intensification of great-power competition. In response, GCC governments have adopted strategic autonomy as a guiding principle and increasingly pursued a form of multi-vector diplomacy. Rather than aligning exclusively with one major power, they maintain and develop relationships with the United States, China, Russia, India, the European Union, and states across the Global South. This approach is intended not to abandon existing alliances, particularly the security relationship with Washington, but to reduce excessive dependence on any one external partner. By cultivating a wider range of diplomatic, economic, technological, and security relationships, Gulf capitals seek to increase their room for maneuvering and strengthening their capacity to respond to an uncertain regional environment. Sovereign wealth funds, economic diversification programs, and strategic investments have further expanded the instruments through which they can pursue this autonomy.

A related development is the transformation of Gulf diplomacy from a primarily resource-based form of influence into a broader model of multidimensional statecraft. Although hydrocarbon wealth remains central to the region’s international position, Gulf influence increasingly also derives from diplomatic entrepreneurship, soft power, investment, and institutional participation. The UAE’s role in climate diplomacy through COP28, Saudi Arabia’s growing role in multilateral institutions and cultural diplomacy, and Qatar’s humanitarian and mediation efforts illustrate this evolution. Gulf states generally assess international partnerships in transactional and outcome-oriented terms, emphasizing such considerations as investment, technology transfer, market access, and economic cooperation rather than relying exclusively on ideological alignment.

This pragmatic approach allows GCC states to preserve close security ties with the United States while simultaneously expanding economic relations with China and other emerging powers. The United States remains an important security partner, while China has become a major trade, energy, infrastructure, and technology partner. At the same time, Gulf states continue to engage with Russia, India, the European Union, Africa, Southeast Asia, and other emerging centers of influence. Participation in frameworks such as BRICS+, the G20, and the India–Middle East– Europe Economic Corridor reflects an effort to diversify external relationships and to gain influence in the formation of new rules and standards in trade, energy, investment, and diplomacy.

Economic power remains a central foundation of Gulf diplomatic influence. Through OPEC and OPEC+, Gulf states retain considerable significance in global energy markets, with implications for inflation, economic growth, and international politics. Simultaneously, they are investing in renewable energy, green technologies, and low-carbon infrastructure. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, the UAE’s investment in Masdar, and Qatar’s solar-energy projects indicate an attempt to protect their relevance in conventional energy markets while also positioning themselves within the emerging green economy. This dual strategy allows them to manage the risks associated with the energy transition while seeking new sources of international influence.

Sovereign wealth funds, including Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, the UAE’s Mubadala and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and the Qatar Investment Authority, have become important instruments of external engagement. Their investments in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, defense, logistics, entertainment, and other strategic sectors are not simply financial transactions.

They can facilitate technology transfer, deepen bilateral relationships, and connect Gulf economies to critical global value chains. Sports, culture, aviation, infrastructure, and international events similarly contribute to the region’s visibility and soft power.

Another defining feature of contemporary Gulf statecraft is multi-vector diplomacy combined with mediation. This approach is based less on permanent blocs than on flexible, interest-based partnerships that can be adjusted as circumstances change. Gulf capitals increasingly portray themselves as capable intermediaries in disputes where traditional powers may lack credibility or access. The development of Gulfled forums, security dialogues, economic corridors, and interregional partnerships suggests that this diplomatic flexibility is becoming more institutionalized. Saudi-hosted Arab–China and Arab–African summits, the UAE’s commercial and logistical engagement with East Africa, and the expansion of Gulf diplomatic activity in Central Asia all indicate a deliberate effort to broaden the region’s external relations.

Despite these achievements, the GCC states’ rise as middle powers is not linear. Although Gulf governments are broadening their relationships with China, Russia, India, Europe, and other partners, they continue to rely heavily on Western, particularly American, security capabilities and guarantees. Their objective is therefore not to abandon existing alliances, but to diversify them. By expanding partnerships and developing domestic capacity, they seek greater strategic autonomy without severing established security ties. This approach creates additional room for maneuver, but it also leaves the GCC states balancing competing expectations among major powers. Regional insecurity presents a further obstacle. Conflicts, rivalry, maritime threats, and missile and drone attacks continue to threaten the Gulf states.

Economic and technological dependence also complicates the Gulf’s ambitions. Hydrocarbon revenues still finance much of the region’s global activism, while diversification programs have yet to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with commodity markets and the energy transition. AI and other advanced technologies offer opportunities for productivity, public-service improvement, and new industries, but much of the region’s technological ecosystem depends on imported platforms, foreign investment, and expatriate expertise. Without stronger domestic research institutions, STEM education, private-sector innovation, and contextsensitive governance, Gulf states may become advanced consumers of technology without becoming leading producers.

In conclusion, the GCC case illustrates how contemporary middle powers can use economic resources, diplomatic flexibility, and multi-vector partnerships to expand their influence beyond traditional structural constraints. These states represent a proactive form of statecraft that complicates the distinction between norm-takers and norm-setters. Nevertheless, their trajectory is not predetermined. Continued dependence on external security guarantees, regional instability, and economic and technological vulnerabilities, may restrict their ability to translate visibility into lasting authority. Understanding the contemporary international order therefore requires a framework that recognizes both the multidimensional opportunities available to middle powers and the structural obstacles that continue to constrain them.

*Amnah Mosly is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)