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Gulf Africa Trade Relations

2026-09-01
Writer: Michael William Wilson*

Africa has become an increasingly important economic partner for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states as they seek to diversify their economies, strengthen supply chains, and secure access to strategic resources. While the GCC states share many of the same objectives, each has adopted a distinct approach toward its engagement with Africa. This report analyses the trade and investment strategies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, assessing their priorities, methods, and evolving partnerships. It also examines the challenges shaping Gulf–Africa economic relations and considers the opportunities likely to define the next phase of cooperation.

Over the past decade, economic relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Africa have expanded from primarily energy-based trade to a broad strategic partnership encompassing infrastructure, agriculture, mining, logistics, digital technologies, and finance. This evolution is driven by complementary interests: GCC states are advancing economic diversification through initiatives like Saudi Vision 2030, UAE Vision 2031, and Qatar National Vision 2030, while African countries seek investment, infrastructure financing, technology transfer, and new export markets. These parallel ambitions have positioned Africa as a critical partner in the Gulf’s long-term economic strategy.

Investment now defines GCC–Africa economic relations. Gulf states have invested over USD 100 billion across Africa, with substantial additional pledges in infrastructure, energy, mining, agriculture, telecommunications, and the digital economy. Qatar has announced commitments exceeding USD 100 billion in several African countries. Saudi Arabia pledged USD 10 billion in export financing at the Saudi-Africa Summit and is expanding partnerships through the Saudi EXIM Bank, Saudi Fund for Development, and major private-sector actors. The UAE stands out as the most active investor, deploying over 100 billion USD in the last decade, leveraging state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds to build a presence across key sectors and supply chains.

Other GCC states are also expanding their footprint. Kuwait has financed transport, energy and agricultural infrastructure through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and Oman is investing in mining, logistics, and industrial partnerships in countries such as Angola and Tanzania as part of its Vision 2040 strategy, while Bahrain is pursuing commercial partnerships in logistics, financial services, and trade facilitation, particularly in Nigeria and South Africa.

African institutions are mobilizing Gulf capital through export-credit financing, co-financing arrangements, and partnerships. The President of the African Development Bank, Dr. Sidi Ould Tah, has used Gulf relationships to attract more investment. BADEA, based in Riyadh, pledged USD 800 million, and the OPEC Fund for International Development has committed USD 2.3 billion. The AfDB aims to further increase partner contributions to expand financing access for African countries.

Infrastructure development has been a particular area of success. Emirati, Saudi, and Qatari firms are investing in logistics corridors, airports, and industrial zones. DP World and AD Ports together operate more than a dozen ports across the continent, with DP World alone committing USD 3 billion to further African port infrastructure. Qatar has invested significantly in Rwanda’s Bugesera International Airport to help establish East Africa as a logistics hub. These projects facilitate Gulf trade, address Africa’s infrastructure gaps, and support regional integration.

Critical minerals are now central to the relationship. As Gulf states pursue renewable energy and industrial diversification, securing access to copper, cobalt, lithium, and other strategic minerals is a priority. The UAE has acquired mining interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Qatar’s Investment Authority purchased a USD 500 million stake in Ivanhoe Mines, while Saudi Arabia is expanding mining partnerships continent-wide. African countries benefit from capital inflows and growing demand, though concerns remain about limited local value addition and an ongoing dependence on raw commodity exports.

Food security remains a major strategic concern for the GCC states. Situated in a desert climate with scarce water supply and limited arable land, the GCC region relies heavily on food imports, accounting for an estimated 85-90% of total consumption. This dependence makes the region vulnerable to disruptions in global supply chains, as evidenced by the 2008 food crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and global conflict, all of which sent food prices soaring. With the region’s population projected to grow by 2.4% annually, Gulf governments are faced with the urgent task of diversifying their food supply.

Africa presents a vital opportunity in this regard. The continent holds 60% of the world's uncultivated arable land, much of which remains unused due to limited infrastructure and agro-processing capacity. Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Chad, Mali, and Uganda view agricultural development as a national priority, given its importance to employment and economic growth. These dynamics align well with Gulf interests, offering a mutually beneficial avenue for strategic collaboration.

The GCC states invest in agriculture across Africa to secure their food supply chains and develop long-term partnerships. These investments focus on acquiring farmland and establishing large-scale farming operations for grain, fruit, livestock, and seed production. In return, African host countries benefit from infrastructure, technology transfer, job creation, and increased trade revenues.

As Gulf-African trade has increased over the last few years, both the value and diversity of goods traded have grown significantly. Enhanced logistics infrastructure, new institutional trade agreements, and deeper supply chain integration have made it easier for African products to access Gulf and global markets, while also enabling Gulf exports to reach a wider range of African economies.

Saudi Arabia Africa Trade

Under Saudi Vision 2030, the Kingdom is diversifying its economy away from oil by growing its trading partner base and securing access to strategic supply chains and foreign markets. Africa’s geographic proximity, vast resources, and expanding consumer markets make it a viable partner for supporting this vision. The Kingdom’s 10 billion USD commitment at the 2023 Saudi-Africa Summit to finance Saudi exports to African economies, underscores its keenness to tap into the potential of enhancing commercial ties. The financing agreement with African countries will bring the Kingdom closer to realizing its ambition to grow trade.

Yet, while Saudi exports to Africa hold opportunities, they are not immune to volatility. In 2021, Saudi exports to Africa stood at USD 24.48 billion, rising to USD 33.71 billion in 2022, then declining to USD 20.4 billion in 2023 and USD 19.52 billion in 2024. The leading export products include petroleum oil, plastics, chemicals and fertilisers.

This decline should be understood within the context of global economic conditions rather than as evidence of weakening Saudi-Africa relations. The exceptionally high trade value recorded in 2022 was largely driven by the surge in global energy prices following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. As oil prices normalised in 2023 and 2024, the value of Saudi exports declined accordingly. At the same time, many African economies experienced severe currency depreciation, rising debt burdens, and constrained foreign exchange reserves, limiting their ability to finance imports, particularly energy products that continue to account for a significant share of Saudi exports.

Rather than retreating from the African market, Saudi Arabia responded by introducing measures to facilitate trade, including the aforementioned USD 10 billion export financing commitment announced at the 2023 Saudi-Africa Summit and the expansion of Saudi EXIM Bank partnerships across the continent. The decline therefore reflects short-term macroeconomic pressures affecting African import demand, while Saudi policy since 2023 has focused on addressing these constraints and laying the foundations for sustained long-term growth in bilateral trade.

Trade Finance and Strategic Partnerships

To facilitate this expansion, Saudi Arabia is deploying export-import credit finance, strategic logistics investments, and identifying strategic partners. Since the 10 billion USD financing pledge of 2023, the Saudi EXIM Bank has signed four MoUs with Ghana Export-Import Bank, Africa50, Blend International Limited, and Guinea’s Ministry of International Cooperation to deepen trade relations and build partnerships that grow non-oil exports into Africa.

The Saudi strategy involves identifying key partners for expansion to mitigate risks. Saudi Exim’s agreements with Africa50 and Guinea’s Minister of International Cooperation aim to bolster development projects and strengthen infrastructure cooperation by partnering with Saudi construction companies. This will enable Saudi companies to lend their services for Africa’s infrastructure development.

Saudi Arabia adopts a partnership-oriented approach to mitigate risks. Rather than acquiring majority stakes across multiple sectors, the Kingdom prefers cofinancing agreements to share risks. The Saudi Fund for Development partnered with the Africa Finance Corporation to support infrastructure projects, while ACWA Power has partnered with the AfDB to tackle the continent’s energy crisis. In 2025, Saudi Exim CEO Saad Al Khalb, Saudi Fund for Development CEO Sultan Al-Marshad, and President of the AfDB, Dr. Ould Tah, affirmed their intent to partner on trade finance and credit guarantees while co-financing agricultural, energy, and logistics projects.

Logistics and Port Infrastructure

A core pillar of Saudi Arabia’s strategy is building trade corridors through logistics and port development. In Djibouti, the Saudi Federation of Chambers signed an agreement to establish a 120,000-square-meter logistics city near the Port of Djibouti, leveraging its geostrategic position as a gateway to East Africa. The logistics zone will include warehouses and integrated trading facilities designed to streamline supply chains and expand storage capacity.

Red Sea Gateway Terminal, a subsidiary of Saudi-based conglomerate Xenel, was awarded a 30-year concession to develop the USD 230 million Port of Tadjourah in Djibouti. It intends to construct a multi-purpose logistics facility capable of handling up to five million tons annually, with plans for further expansion, serving as a gateway to propel the Kingdom’s products into new markets. The project will include a dedicated free zone offering commercial incentives for foreign direct investors. The port will serve as a transit point for fertilisers, grains, construction materials, minerals, and other goods between Saudi Arabia and East Africa.

Critical Minerals

Saudi Arabia is also intent on securing access to critical minerals. It hopes to lead the energy transition and needs copper and other minerals to fuel it. At the Future Minerals Forum in 2025, the Kingdom signed an MoU with Congo for mining investments, and at the Mining Indaba 2025 in Cape Town, an official from the Saudi Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources declared that developing mineral corridors across the continent is a top priority, as is having a secure supply of minerals for the energy transition.

Another important point is that the Saudi riyal, like the currencies of other Gulf states, is pegged to the US dollar. Following the recent fluctuations in the dollar, after a year marked by trade wars and tariffs, the vulnerability of Gulf currencies has become more apparent. In response, countries, including Saudi Arabia, are stockpiling gold as a safe alternative, contributing to record-high gold prices in global commodity markets.

In 2026, Saudi Arabia and Sudan announced a strategic mining partnership. At the Future Minerals Forum, Saudi Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Bandar Al Khorayef announced plans to purchase gold from Sudan in an effort to invigorate the economy. Furthermore, the Saudi Refinery Company will refine Sudan’s gold in a partnership with the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company, the national mining company. This partnership reiterates Saudi Arabia’s preference for local partners to create job opportunities, build capacity, and mitigate risks through strategic partnerships.

Saudi Arabia announced its desire to purchase 15 billion USD in global mining stakes and secure minerals from, among others, Namibia, Guinea, and the DRC. These strategic partnerships will increase Saudi imports from Africa, which rose to 12.29 billion in 2024 from 9.29 billion in 2023. Leading imports from Africa to Saudi are copper, and agricultural products. Swiss-based commodities trader Mercuria Energy Ltd. established a joint venture with Gécamines, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s state-owned miner, and the US International Development Finance Corporation to trade in critical minerals, including copper and cobalt. In February 2026, the joint venture announced it would sell 50,000 tons of copper to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The critical minerals agenda is likely to deepen GCC-Africa trade, but it also raises the core development question of value addition. If copper, cobalt, gold, and other minerals are exported in raw form to Gulf or global refineries, African producers may gain export revenue but lose the greater benefits of refining, manufacturing, and industrial job creation. A more balanced model would link Gulf offtake agreements to African processing, skills development, power infrastructure, and industrial zones.

The Kingdom is expanding its influence on Africa’s supply chains. Vision Invest acquired USD 700 million in ARISE Integrated Industrial platforms, which develop industrial zones, logistics hubs, and processing facilities across several African countries. ARISE IIP enables domestic processing of raw materials, such as cashew and cocoa, in Cote d’Ivoire, thereby adding value within Africa and stabilizing supply flows to Gulf markets. Cold storage facilities and warehouses bolster the product’s reliability and reduce post-harvest losses, reinforcing Saudi Arabia’s long-term trade goals.

Food Security

Saudi Arabia has emerged as a leading agricultural investor in Africa. Saudi Star committed 2.5 billion USD to a rice farm in Ethiopia and Manafea Holding invested 125 million USD in a 5,000-hectare fruit farm in Zambia. Saudi firms also operate in Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. The Kingdom has acquired over 124,000 hectares of land in Ethiopia and supports agricultural development through broader regional partnerships.

Following the Saudi-Africa Summit, the Kingdom expanded agricultural initiatives with Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. The Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) plays a central role, financing 34 dams and irrigation systems across Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Chad, amounting to over 900 million USD in 2025 alone.

The urgency for food security underscores the Gulf push to invest in agricultural companies or acquire farmland in Africa. In 2026, the Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company took a controlling stake in Olam Agri, a Singapore-based agribusiness operating across multiple African countries. This move aims to bolster Saudi Arabia's domestic food security strategy. By investing in a company with established operations in markets such as Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Mozambique, Saudi Arabia is securing access to agricultural supply chains abroad to help meet domestic agri-food needs.

Food security is therefore both a pillar of cooperation and a source of political sensitivity. Gulf investment can improve irrigation, storage, cold-chain logistics, and productivity, but it can also attract criticism if food produced in Africa is exported while host communities face high prices and limited local benefits. For this sector to be sustainable, African governments should ensure that Gulf investments increase productivity, lower costs, and enable sufficient production to satisfy domestic demand. Gulf-backed agriculture should be structured around domestic supply guarantees, local processing, employment, and the export of surplus production rather than simple offshore food production for Gulf consumption.

Humanitarian Diplomacy

Along with financial pledges, Saudi Arabia is easing its way into the continent through charitable organizations such as KSRelief, which is a beacon of the Kingdom's humanitarian diplomacy. Through goodwill donations such as food, healthcare services, and education, the Kingdom is using soft power to build positive rapport with target countries.

The Saudi expansion strategy consists of institutional partnerships, infrastructure development, and trade facilitation initiatives that enable it to achieve its goals. The Kingdom incorporates itself within African industrial and trade corridors through co-investments and risk-sharing mechanisms between state and private companies.

UAE Africa Trade

The UAE’s primary objective in Africa is to diversify its trading partners, secure strategic supply chains and position itself as a central logistics and re-export hub linking Africa to global markets. Through Vision 2031, it intends to increase the value of foreign trade to 1.1 trillion USD by 2031. With 60% of Africa’s population under the age of 25 and a rapidly growing middle class, the continent represents a growing consumer market and a potential long-term strategic partner. As Africa industrialises, demand for energy, manufactured goods and logistics services is rising, and the UAE is positioning itself to capture this opportunity.

The UAE’s trade with Africa is growing, demonstrating the efficacy of its strategy. In 2024, Africa’s exports to the UAE exceeded 51 billion USD, up from 32 billion USD in 2023. Leading exports involved precious metals such as gold, alongside agricultural products such as fruits, nuts, and meat. Meanwhile, Africa imported 38 billion USD worth of goods from the UAE in 2024, compared to 32 billion USD the previous year, consisting mostly of oil and refined products; these figures thus underscore the UAE’s role as a crucial trading partner for Africa.

Trade Agreements

To institutionalize its trade with Africa, the UAE has prioritized the implementation of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs). Since 2023, it has signed nine CEPAS with Mauritius, Kenya, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Gabon, with negotiations to add further countries. These agreements reduce tariffs, remove trade barriers, and create conducive investment frameworks. Bilateral trade between the UAE and Angola has grown from USD 1.69 billion in 2021 to USD 1.75 billion in 2024. However, the 2025 UAE-Angola CEPA, for example, aims to boost bilateral trade to 10 billion USD by 2033 by opening markets for services and exports, and to create over 30,000 job opportunities in Angola.

Trade with countries with which the UAE has signed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) has grown steadily in recent years, underscoring the importance of these agreements in building commercial ties. Trade with partners such as Nigeria, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded significantly between 2021 and 2024. Nigeria, for instance, saw trade with the UAE rise from USD 240 million in 2021 to USD 2.84 billion in 2024. This trend suggests that CEPAs are strengthening bilateral trade flows while creating new investment and supply chain integration opportunities.

The UAE case shows that the most effective aspect of the GCC-Africa relationship lies in pairing institutional trade agreements with tangible operational infrastructure. By combining CEPAs - which lower formal trade barriers - with investments in ports, free zones, logistics parks, and industrial facilities, the UAE has facilitated both the regulatory and physical flow of goods. This integrated approach has positioned the UAE as the Gulf’s most commercially advanced player in Africa. However, this model also has limitations: it can provoke political resistance when operational control over strategic infrastructure is viewed as excessive, or when local value creation is insufficient.

Logistics and Ports Infrastructure

The UAE’s economic vision aims to boost its trade, prompting significant investment in logistics infrastructure. DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports collectively operate 13 ports across African countries, including Angola, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. DP World will spend 3 billion USD over the next three years on new port and logistics infrastructure in Africa to meet longterm growth as demand surges for critical mineral exports. DP World is building the Port of Berbera and the Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ) in partnership with the Government of Somaliland, which will work to transform the region into a major trade hub in the Horn of Africa, serving over 140 million people.

The UAE’s strategy involves direct operational control over logistics infrastructure. Whereas Saudi Arabia relies more on institutional partnerships, Emirati firms build, operate, and manage ports, industrial parks, and transport corridors to gain greater influence over supply chains. The UAE’s expanding logistics infrastructure across the continent will facilitate more efficient trade routes and more closely integrate African markets with Gulf supply chains. At present, DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports collectively operate 13 ports across African countries, including Angola and Tanzania. It is also modernising ports in Senegal and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to increase trade capacity.

The UAE’s AD Ports Group operates a multipurpose terminal at the Port of Luanda and is launching a 230 million USD expansion to increase trade efficiency. Angola’s container volumes are projected to grow 3.3% annually over the next decade, reinforcing its role as a regional logistics hub. Intent on boosting trade, the UAE is also building the Dubai Investment Park Angola, a fully integrated economic zone that will combine commercial, residential, and industrial facilities. Companies such as Trice Chemicals are already constructing manufacturing sites within the park, benefiting from its proximity to the Luanda Port, access to free-zone incentives, and integration into regional trade routes.

The UAE’s Etihad Railways intends to develop railway networks in Cameroon, Chad, and across the Horn of Africa, linking landlocked production zones to coastal ports such as Berbera in Somalia, where DP World is developing a port. Emirati firms have invested in agricultural and industrial production throughout Africa; therefore, these trading corridors can reduce transport costs, promote regional integration, and increase export flows, while integrated facilities will increase storage and processing capacity.

Abu Dhabi-based ADQ committed 500 million USD to food production in Kenya and is exploring further acquisitions in Zambia. In Sudan, UAE firms like International Holding Company (IHC) and Jennan farm over 50,000 hectares, with plans to expand by an additional 162,000 hectares. In Uganda, the UAE is developing an agricultural free zone to process and export food to the Gulf. These investments reflect the UAE’s broader goal of diversifying food sources and building stable, Africa-based supply chains.

Critical Minerals

Critical minerals are central to Abu Dhabi’s long-term strategy. As the country seeks a leading role in renewable energy and the green transition, it requires secure access to copper, cobalt, and gold. The UAE’s Primavera and International Holding Company have acquired mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, which are among the world’s largest producers of critical minerals. The UAE is also the world’s largest importer of African gold, with countries such as Chad and Mali among its key trade partners. However, faltering logistics challenge trade with these countries, as the African Development Bank estimates the continent must invest 150 billion USD annually in infrastructure alone. This gap reinforces the UAE’s decision to invest directly into ports, railways, and logistic hubs.

This illustrates both the advantages and challenges of the UAE’s approach. While Dubai-based commodity traders offer African exporters greater liquidity and global reach, the practice of refining and trading minerals outside Africa limits the value that remains on the continent. Looking ahead, the success of UAEAfrica partnerships will be measured not just by trade volumes but also by the ability to develop refinery capacity, industrial processing, and transparent, locally anchored mineral supply chains within Africa.

Over the past decade, the UAE has aggressively pursued its economic strategy with African governments and mining companies. As a result, the UAE has become the largest importer of African gold, especially from Sudan and has secured stakes in several mineral supply chains across the continent. However, the UAE’s influence on some African countries has faced political challenges. Relations between the UAE and the governments of Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti have been tense in recent years, complicating some Emirati trade and investment ambitions.

Such developments present opportunities for other Gulf states to grow their diplomatic and economic relations with African partners. Saudi Arabia is capitalizing on some of these opportunities. In 2026, Riyadh established a partnership with the government of Sudan to trade and refine gold in Saudi refineries. In 2026, Saudi Arabia developed defence and economic cooperation agreements with Somali following diplomatic strains between the Somali government and the UAE. In Djibouti, the government terminated DP World’s operations at the Port of Djibouti in 2018. Meanwhile, Saudi-based Red Sea Gateway Terminal secured a 30-year concession to develop the Port of Tadjourah, valued at USD 230 million.

Through its multifaceted approach, the UAE ensures:

  1. There are sufficient products to trade, with production and export capacity expanded through direct investments in ports, industrial parks, and mining assets.
  2. Secure access to strategic agricultural and mineral assets by having an active and operational role in supply chains.
  3. Efficient and timely trade routes can be achieved by improving the logistics corridors.
  4. Institutional frameworks to expand trade through CEPAs that reduce trade barriers and facilitate long-term commercial ties.

Qatar Africa Trade

As a global leader in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Qatar is seeking to reduce its reliance on hydrocarbons and increase non-hydrocarbon growth by 4%. To achieve this, it is investing in sectors such as renewable energy and critical minerals that are essential for the energy transition. Africa, which holds vast reserves of critical minerals, presents an opportunity for Qatar to diversify its economic relations and secure strategic resources.

Qatar’s trade with African economies is limited compared to other Gulf states; however, it has opportunities to expand in the coming years. Qatar’s exports to Africa increased from USD 616.27 million in 2020 to USD 1.23 billion in 2022, then reached a peak of USD 1.24 billion in 2023 and declined to USD 863 million. On the import side, Qatar’s imports from Africa grew from USD 380.66 million in 2023 to USD 463.43 million in 2024.

Qatar’s smaller trade footprint in Africa can be attributed to the absence of comprehensive trade agreements and limited direct control over key infrastructure. Unlike the UAE, Qatar has not established institutional frameworks such as CEPAs, nor has it developed a significant presence in African ports, logistics zones, or industrial facilities. Without these foundational elements, Qatar’s ability to facilitate large-scale or diversified trade has been constrained. As a result, its commercial engagement on the continent remains narrower, with fewer opportunities to expand market access.

Diplomacy and Soft Power

Qatar is expanding its influence in Africa through investment pledges, high-level diplomatic events, and soft-power initiatives to advance its economic objectives. Qatar’s expansion strategy focuses on targeted investments in a limited number of countries where it has established strong diplomatic ties and goodwill.

Through Qatar Charity and the Qatar Fund for Development, Qatar supports education, healthcare, and humanitarian diplomacy across the continent. These programmes help to build diplomatic goodwill while strengthening Qatar’s political relations with African partners. In Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Qatar has led mediation efforts between the two countries following a resurgence of violence by Rwanda-backed rebel forces who have seized control of mineral-rich cities in Eastern Congo.

Qatar’s mediation efforts have helped it establish a positive, long-standing rapport with the East African nations. As a result, Qatar can leverage its diplomatic efforts to advance its economic objectives, using its mediation efforts to build trust and open investment opportunities. Qatar’s investments in Rwanda grant it leverage and influence over Rwanda. The positive rapport developed during mediation talks with Congo has opened the door to Qatari investments.

Strategic Investments

One of Qatar’s most significant strategic investments in Africa is in Rwanda, where it aspires to transform the country into East Africa’s primary logistics hub. Therefore, it has invested in infrastructure to achieve this aim. It acquired a 60% stake in the Bugesera International Airport and is leading a 1.3 billion USD modernisation project, due for completion in 2028.

Additionally, Qatar Airways acquired a 49% stake in RwandAir and a further 25% stake in South African Airlink. These investments enable Qatar to access a wider network of goods on the continent, while airline partnerships facilitate the movement of people and cargo between Africa and Qatar.

In 2025, Sheikh Mansour Al-Thani pledged USD 102 billion to invest in agriculture, mining, telecommunications, energy, and infrastructure in Botswana, Burundi, the DRC, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Demonstrating Doha’s intent to further relations, these investment pledges present opportunities for Qatar to access a more diverse range of African markets.

Critical Minerals

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sheikh Mansour Al-Jabour Al-Thani announced a 21 billion USD investment targeting the energy, mining, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors. In the same year, the Qatar Investment Authority acquired a 4% stake in Ivanhoe Mines, which operates copper mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa, for USD 500 million. This investment aims to expand production capacity in Congolese mines, explore new mines in South Africa and Congo, and increase mineral exports that Qatar could eventually import to support its energy transition.

As Qatar aims to turn Rwanda into a logistics hub, it could likely export Minerals from Congo through neighbouring Rwanda en route to Qatar. Violence in Eastern Congo has disrupted mineral supply chains since M23 rebel forces have blocked exports and usurped Congolese mines along Lake Kivu. Hence, it is in Qatar’s direct interest for peace to prevail between the two countries, for goods to flow from Congo to Rwanda.

This also shows how Gulf economic strategy is increasingly tied to African security dynamics. Qatar's logistics and mining interests depend on stability in the Great Lakes region, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia face similar exposure in the Red Sea, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. Political mediation, security partnerships, and investment protection are therefore central to the economic relationship.

Qatar has worked in concert with the United States to promote peace between Congo and Rwanda, where the United States has traded critical minerals for security. As Qatar builds its stake in African mining, its partnership with the United States to promote security in Eastern Africa will help secure its regional investments.

The Qatar Investment Authority supported the US campaign to acquire more minerals by investing 180 million USD in TechMet, a US International Development Finance Corporation initiative. Through its relations with the US in Congo, Qatar stands to gain from the US DFC’s joint venture with Congo’s Gécamines.

Energy

In the energy sector, Qatar Petroleum and Qatar Energy are expanding operations across the continent through consortia. In Mozambique, Qatar Petroleum acquired a 25.5% stake in a consortium with Eni, Sasol, and Mozambique’s Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos to explore oil and gas reserves. QatarEnergy is similarly exploring reserves in Namibia and Mauritania and has signed an energy partnership agreement with the Republic of the Congo. These initiatives are expected to increase Qatar’s trade in energy services with African countries.

Food Security

Qatar, through Hassad Food, a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority, has made substantial investments in Sudan, including a 500 million USD joint venture with local companies. It also explored agricultural projects in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, where Qatar’s Baladna dairy company secured a 117,000-hectare wheat concession in 2024. These efforts address Qatar’s food security concerns while contributing to agricultural development in partner countries.

Qatar adopts a risk-averse expansion strategy. Doha prefers to invest through minority stakes and partnerships with established local or international firms. Its investments in Ivanhoe Mines, RwandAir, South African Airlink, and energy consortia in Mozambique and Namibia demonstrate how it selects reliable local partners and mitigates risk. At the same time, its majority stake in the Bugesera airport illustrates Qatar is also willing to assume operational roles in strategic infrastructure when doing so strengthens its position in regional supply chains.

Kuwait Africa

Kuwait aims to strengthen trade with Africa through enhancing economic ties, supporting mutual growth, and positioning itself as a long-term partner in the continent’s development. In 2024, Kuwait exported approximately USD 274 million worth of goods to Africa while importing USD 796 million, underscoring both the modest scale of current trade and the untapped potential.

Development Cooperation

To achieve its trade objectives, Kuwait has used concessional financing, humanitarian assistance, and partnership-based development cooperation to build long-term relationships and trust across the continent. Kuwait has historically prioritised development cooperation over direct commercial expansion. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has financed infrastructure, transportation, agriculture, energy, water, and education projects that align with African priorities, creating enabling environments for future trade and investment.

A significant portion of this financing has been directed towards transportation infrastructure, including roads, railways, airports, and logistics networks, which support regional connectivity and facilitate future trade flows. Kuwait has generally not sought strategic ownership of ports, logistics networks, mining concessions, or large-scale agricultural assets. Instead, it focused on building goodwill, trust, and long-term partnerships with African governments.

This approach has enabled Kuwait to establish a diplomatic presence that exceeds the scale of its commercial footprint. Djibouti is arguably Kuwait's most important development partner in Africa and illustrates how Kuwait uses infrastructure financing to create long-term economic relationships. The Kuwait Fund financed sixteen projects worth more than USD 300 million covering: ports, airports, roads, electricity transmission networks, and energy infrastructure in Djibouti.

Although these projects were not commercial acquisitions, they directly support trade flows through one of the world's most strategic maritime corridors connecting Africa, the Gulf, and Asia. Kuwait's investments have therefore strengthened economic ties while positioning it as a long-term partner in East African trade connectivity. Similarly, Kuwait has supported agricultural development in countries such as Cameroon and Angola, reflecting its preference for development cooperation over commercially driven investments.

What has worked well in Kuwait’s approach is the creation of strong political goodwill and diplomatic ties, enabling a diplomatic presence that exceeds its commercial footprint. Infrastructure financing, particularly in transportation and energy, has supported regional connectivity and laid the groundwork for future trade flows. Kuwait’s focus on development diplomacy has distinguished it from other Gulf countries, building trust and long-term partnerships.

However, this strategy has also limited the scale of Kuwait’s commercial and private-sector engagement in Africa. Unlike the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait has not aggressively pursued commercial acquisitions or large-scale trade deals. This has meant missed opportunities for commercial growth and limited influence in emerging African markets. To achieve greater trade impact, Kuwait’s approach is beginning to evolve. Nigeria, for example, illustrates a growing focus on trade facilitation.

Recent developments include:

  • A bilateral investment treaty
  • A 2023 aviation agreement
  • Direct air connectivity between the two countries
  • A USD 62.8 million Kuwait Fund loan for educational infrastructure in 2026

The combination of connectivity agreements, investment protection mechanisms, and development financing suggests that Kuwait is laying the institutional foundations for greater private-sector engagement with Africa's largest economy.

Food Security

In 2022, it imported over USD 4.78 billion in food and agricultural products from Africa. The Kuwait Fund has financed more than 45 agricultural projects in 21 countries, particularly in Sudan, Senegal, and Mali. Gulf countries aim to grow and process food in Africa and improve storage capabilities for agricultural products on the continent, thereby reducing volatility during global crises. With Africa’s food and agriculture market projected to grow from $280 billion in 2023 to $1 trillion by 2030, these partnerships represent a long-term strategic alignment.

While still limited in scale, such investments indicate that Kuwait is gradually seeking to complement its development diplomacy with greater private-sector engagement in sectors such as mining, infrastructure, and agriculture.

For Kuwait to fully realize its trade objectives with Africa, next steps should include: expanding private-sector involvement, leveraging established diplomatic relationships for commercial opportunities, and developing more targeted trade agreements in priority sectors. Strengthening trade facilitation, enhancing business-to-business connectivity, and aligning Kuwait Fund projects with commercial interests will be critical to unlocking greater trade volumes and economic impact. By building on its foundation of trust, Kuwait can position itself as a more significant economic partner in Africa’s future.

Oman Africa Trade

Oman’s trade policy towards Africa is closely aligned with the Sultanate’s economic diversification agenda under Vision 2040. Oman’s main trade objectives with Africa include securing access to key resources for domestic industrialization, expanding bilateral trade, and establishing itself as a trade and logistics hub connecting Africa with the Gulf and Asia. African markets are seen as essential for supporting growth in logistics, manufacturing, mining, food security, and renewable energy, which are all core pillars of Oman’s long-term strategy.

To achieve these objectives, Oman has leveraged its geographic position on the Indian Ocean and its historic ties with East Africa. The Sultanate is pursuing government-to-government agreements, targeted investments, and partnerships in sectors such as mining, logistics, and agribusiness. Oman is also expanding institutional engagement, including memoranda of understanding and bilateral investment treaties, and integrating African resources into Omani value chains.

Under Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, economic diversification and strengthening the national economy have become central government priorities. Through the Oman Investment Authority (OIA), the Sultanate has expanded investments across more than 50 countries, including several in Sub-Saharan Africa, as part of a broader strategy to diversify national assets and secure future growth opportunities.

What has worked well so far includes Oman's ability to secure access to strategic resources, such as sourcing iron ore from Cameroon in 2024 to support plans for steel production in the Sultanate. By moving beyond commodity trading and integrating African resources into domestic value chains, Oman has advanced its industrialization goals and supported mutual growth.

The mining sector is becoming an increasingly important pillar of Oman's engagement with Africa. In Angola, President João Lourenço's official visit to Muscat in December 2024 marked a significant step forward in economic cooperation. During the visit, the two countries signed an agreement allowing Oman to acquire a stake in Angola's Catoca and Luele diamond mines, two of the largest diamond operations in Africa.

These agreements in Angola are further examples of Oman's willingness to move beyond traditional trade, participating directly in resource and infrastructure projects. However, progress has not been uniform across countries or sectors. The relatively limited number of formal trade agreements and institutional partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that Oman’s engagement is still selective and potentially constrained by capacity or market familiarity.

Tanzania shows what has worked well for Oman’s Africa strategy. Longstanding historical ties have created a foundation for practical economic cooperation. In 2022, Oman and Tanzania signed multiple agreements in logistics, mining, agriculture, and trade, directly targeting Vision 2040 priorities. These partnerships involve key institutions from both countries and focus on sectors like logistics, food security, and mining, demonstrating how a strong political and cultural relationship can turn into mutually beneficial trade and investment.

Oman and Tanzania signed a series of memoranda of understanding:

  • Oman Airports Management Company and Kilimanjaro International Airport
  • The Oman Society for Petroleum Services and the Association of Tanzania Oil
  • The Oman Food Investment Holding Company
  • The Oman and Tanzanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Trade facilitation is another emerging priority. Oman maintains bilateral investment treaties with only two Sub-Saharan African countries, Sudan and Tanzania, suggesting that the Sultanate has historically been selective in formalizing economic partnerships. However, recent agreements among chambers of commerce, the private sector, and state-owned enterprises indicate a shift in its strategy toward stimulating private-sector trade and investment flows.

The involvement of the Oman Chambers of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Oman Investment Authority, demonstrates that Oman's Africa policy is increasingly being driven by commercial and investment objectives rather than solely diplomatic relations.

Bahrain Africa Trade

Bahrain does not currently have a formal trade strategy for Africa, nor does it demonstrate a wide-ranging interest in the continent. Its involvement is limited, largely reflecting the Kingdom’s size, economic priorities elsewhere, and lack of state-driven investment initiatives targeting Africa.

Nevertheless, Bahrain has sought to expand economic ties with African markets in areas that align with its competitive advantages, namely logistics, financial services, trade facilitation, and the digital economy. Between 2012 and 2021, Bahrain invested more than USD 5 billion across Africa, demonstrating that despite its relatively small size, the Kingdom has maintained a meaningful economic presence on the continent.

Recent engagements suggest a growing interest in expanding commercial relations with key African economies. In 2025, Bahrain and Nigeria signed a Joint Communiqué formalizing diplomatic relations and identifying trade, investment, oil and gas, and LNG cooperation as priority areas. The agreement is significant given Nigeria's position as Africa's largest economy and one of the continent's leading energy producers.

Similarly, the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce met with South Africa's Ambassador to Bahrain to explore opportunities in food security, pharmaceuticals, trade, and direct connectivity, highlighting the growing role of Bahrain's private-sector institutions in developing partnerships with Africa.

Overall, Bahrain's Africa strategy remains narrower and more commercially focused than those of other GCC states. Rather than seeking access to strategic resources or undertaking large-scale infrastructure investments, Bahrain is positioning itself as a service, logistics, and financial partner. Its engagement is largely private-sector-led, centered on trade facilitation, commercial partnerships, and niche service industries. While Africa does not yet occupy a central place in Bahrain's economic strategy, recent engagements with Nigeria and South Africa suggest a gradual effort to expand commercial relationships in sectors that align with Bahrain's domestic economic strengths.

Gulf Africa Trade Challenges One of the most persistent challenges in Gulf–Africa economic relations is the continued dependence on primary commodity exports from Africa. Despite large investments by Gulf states, trade is still dominated by raw materials, including gold, copper, and agricultural products, rather than value-added goods. This leaves African economies vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices and limits opportunities for broader-based development. For example, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia have poured resources into African mines and farmland, the vast majority of exports remain unprocessed, and African countries struggle to move up the value chain.

Closely related is the challenge of limited local value addition. Many Gulf investments prioritize extraction and transportation, such as mining ventures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and large-scale farming in Ethiopia, over developing local processing and manufacturing industries. As a result, a significant portion of economic value is captured outside Africa, and opportunities for local job creation, skills transfer, and industrialization are missed. Initiatives like ARISE Integrated Industrial Platforms in Côte d’Ivoire, which support domestic processing of cashews and cocoa, demonstrate the benefits of value addition, but such examples remain relatively rare.

Regulatory and institutional barriers also present significant obstacles to smoother trade. Fragmented customs procedures, inconsistent trade regulations, and weak enforcement across African states create a complex bureaucratic environment. This lack of harmonization adds costs and uncertainty for both Gulf and African businesses. Even when Gulf capital is available, navigating these regulatory hurdles can delay projects and undermine their effectiveness.

Political and security risks further complicate the landscape for Gulf–Africa trade and investment. Instability in regions such as the Horn of Africa, paired with geopolitical tensions in the Gulf, including threats to Red Sea shipping lanes, can jeopardize critical trade routes and deter long-term investment in infrastructure.

Recent attacks on key maritime corridors and port facilities have highlighted the vulnerability of these supply chains to both local and regional disruptions.

Another challenge lies in underdeveloped financial and trade facilitation systems. Many African exporters lack access to trade finance, insurance, and modern payment systems, making it difficult to scale up trade with Gulf partners. While some Gulf-backed projects have improved physical infrastructure, they have not always addressed these financial bottlenecks, limiting the ability of African businesses to fully capitalize on new opportunities.

Finally, infrastructure gaps persist despite significant investment in flagship projects like ports and corridors. While companies such as DP World and AD Ports have improved major gateways, supporting infrastructure, including rural roads, railways, energy grids, and digital connectivity, often lags behind. These gaps restrict the broader impact of Gulf investment on regional trade integration and economic growth.

Regional Integration

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar would benefit significantly from the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) initative, which aims to promote intraAfrican trade and regional integration by removing trade barriers across the continent. The free trade bloc will transform Africa into one of the world’s largest single markets, connecting 1.3 billion people across 55 countries with a combined economic output of 3.4 trillion USD.

As African markets become more integrated, trade routes connecting Africa to the Gulf are likely to expand, making it cheaper and easier to move goods between the two regions. This would allow Gulf producers to access a larger pool of African markets while also enabling African countries, including landlocked economies, to trade more efficiently through Gulf logistics hubs in Djibouti, Rwanda, and Angola, among others.

The UAE is taking advantage of such opportunities by pursuing CEPAs that will create a favourable environment for investment and trade. These agreements complement Africa’s regional integration efforts by similarly lowering tariffs and improving investment frameworks. As the UAE moves ahead with these agreements, other Gulf states may consider similar strategies to expand trade flows.

The Gulf states could draw lessons from the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Under AGOA, African economies competed to become signatories because America offers a large market of 300 million consumers and provides global exposure; their consumers can afford more than those of other nations, thus ensuring steady demand for their products. The Gulf states should consider establishing a common market that unites their populations, thereby providing larger markets and increased purchasing power.

Outlook: Priorities for Gulf–Africa Economic Cooperation

Regional Conflict

The US-Israel-Iran conflict in the Middle East has created serious consequences for global commodity prices and the stability of Gulf-Africa economic ties. Iranian attacks on oil facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have forced the closure of major refineries and reduced the region’s oil supply to global markets.

The situation is further complicated by disruptions to key maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil passes. With commercial vessels unable to transit these routes, reaching global destinations has become increasingly difficult.

Africa’s trade with the Gulf is deeply dependent on these shipping lanes and on the Gulf states’ role as major logistics, trading, and refining hubs for African commodities. Dubai, for example, stands out as a central hub for Africa’s gold trade, processing and re-exporting significant volumes to global markets.

However, the recent escalation of attacks and instability has exposed strategic vulnerabilities. Disruptions at Gulf ports and logistics centers threaten to impede the flow of African gold and other minerals, and if attacks reemerge, African exporters may be compelled to diversify their trade routes and partners to mitigate risk.

Finally, these challenges are forcing Gulf states to reconsider their investment and diversification strategies. Declining export revenues and the high cost of rehabilitating damaged infrastructure have prompted governments to shift focus toward domestic security and economic resilience.

Sectors

Critical minerals are a major opportunity, but value addition must take place in Africa. African countries, particularly Zambia and the DRC, are central to global supply chains for copper, cobalt, lithium, and other minerals required for the energy transition. Cooperation should move beyond extraction toward processing, beneficiation, manufacturing, and skills transfer within Africa.

Food security is a shared strategic priority. The Gulf’s food security needs and Africa’s agricultural potential create a clear basis for cooperation. Agricultural partnerships should benefit local economies, raise productivity, support irrigation and storage, and avoid models in which food is exported without improving domestic supply.

Telecommunications, technology, and digital infrastructure should be part of the next phase. Digital connectivity, fiber networks, fintech, and technology partnerships are emerging areas for cooperation. Digital infrastructure can support regional integration, trade facilitation, financial inclusion, and modern logistics systems.

Political and security dialogue should not be separated from economic cooperation. Economic partnerships require political understanding, stability, and security cooperation. Maritime security, the Red Sea, Indian Ocean connectivity, and broader geopolitical tensions are factors affecting Gulf–Africa trade and investment.

Conclusion

Economic relations between the Gulf and Africa are growing as Gulf states seek to diversify their economies, secure strategic supply chains, and expand their role in global trade. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are establishing themselves across African logistics networks, mining sectors, energy projects, and agricultural supply chains. Through infrastructure investments, trade finance, diplomatic partnerships, and partnership agreements, Gulf states are positioning themselves as key intermediaries connecting African exports to global markets.

Each Gulf state has adopted a distinct approach. The UAE has taken the lead by directly controlling logistics infrastructure and ports, enabling it to shape trade corridors and supply chains across the continent. Saudi Arabia has pursued a partnership-based strategy focused on trade finance, infrastructure development and mineral supply security as part of its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Qatar has adopted a more targeted approach, combining diplomacy, strategic investments, and minority stakes in key sectors to gradually expand its economic influence.

In this relation, Africa benefits from increased investment in infrastructure, agriculture, and industrial development. Initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area create additional opportunities for Gulf-Africa trade by lowering barriers and strengthening regional integration, while Gulf logistics networks provide the infrastructure necessary to connect African markets to global supply chains. Gulf-Africa economic ties are likely to expand further as the Gulf states diversify away from hydrocarbons and Africa seeks capital, infrastructure, and new trade partners.

Michael W. Wilson is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)

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