Commentary & Analysis

The U.S.-Israel-Iran War has forced the Gulf states to fundamentally reassess their strategic outlook. Recent attacks targeting energy and critical infrastructure have underscored the region’s vulnerabilities, prompting an urgent reallocation of budgets toward defense, infrastructure protection, and reconstruction. More significantly, the conflict has accelerated the imperative to diversify both economic and strategic assets far beyond the Gulf’s borders.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar continue to pursue bold economic diversification strategies, with Africa as a central focus. Gulf capital is already shaping African infrastructure, logistics, ports, energy, agriculture, and, most notably, critical minerals. But the calculus is shifting: future investments must now deliver clear strategic value, whether by securing food, energy, trade routes, or the vital raw materials underpinning new industries.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar all aspire to lead the global energy transition and next-generation technologies. Saudi Arabia, for example, is investing heavily in electric vehicles, renewables, data centers, and artificial intelligence--sectors whose expansion requires vast quantities of copper, cobalt, lithium, and other critical minerals. Africa, with its extensive reserves of many of these resources, has thus been of growing interest to the Gulf governments, even before the outbreak of conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran.

Saudi Arabia has been particularly explicit about this objective. In 2024, at the Future Minerals Forum, the Kingdom announced plans to acquire up to $15 billion in global mining stakes and secure minerals from countries including Namibia, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It subsequently established Manara Minerals through Ma'aden and the Public Investment Fund to pursue international mining opportunities. At the Future Minerals Forum in 2025, the Kingdom signed an MoU with the DRC for mining cooperation, while at the Mining Indaba in Cape Town, Saudi officials identified African mineral corridors and secure mineral supplies as priorities.

Then, in July 2026, as part of its broader energy diversification strategy, Saudi Arabia and the US signed a 123 Agreement, establishing the legal framework for civilian nuclear cooperation. Riyadh has long sought access to civilian nuclear technology and as nuclear cooperation progresses, Saudi Arabia will eventually need access to uranium. Africa produces approximately 18% of the world's uranium supply, with significant reserves and production potential in Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, and Tanzania. Critical minerals are thus critical building blocks for the Gulf’s future energy, industrial, and technological landscape.

The GCC's Expansion into African Mining

The Gulf states have already accumulated positions across several important African mineralproducing countries. The UAE has moved most aggressively. International Resources Holding acquired a majority interest in Zambia's Mopani Copper Mines and subsequently expanded across the DRC. In 2025, IRH acquired a majority stake in Alphamin Resources' Bisie tin complex for approximately $366 million. UAE-linked NG9 Holding has also partnered with Congolese company Buenassa to develop an integrated copper-cobalt refinery capable of producing approximately 30,000 tonnes of copper cathodes and 5,000 tonnes of cobalt sulfate annually.

Saudi Arabia is developing a different network. In Zambia, the Saudi and Zambian mining ministries signed an MoU covering exploration, processing, joint ventures, and skills and technology transfer. In Namibia, Saudi Arabia's Obeikan Group entered an agreement connected to the restart of the Okanjande graphite mine. The project includes a long-term offtake of up to 50,000 tonnes of graphite concentrate annually to support a $200 million battery-anode-material facility in Yanbu.

Qatar is also entering the sector. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) invested $500 million for a stake in Ivanhoe Mines, which has major copper operations in the DRC and is pursuing further opportunities across southern Africa. QIA separately committed $180 million to TechMet, giving Qatar exposure to a wider portfolio of critical-mineral investments. Oman has also begun securing mining interests. Following Angolan President João Lourenço's 2024 visit to Muscat, Oman secured access to interests in Angola's Catoca and Luele diamond mines.

Taken together, these investments reveal three main approaches the Gulf states use to access African minerals. The first approach is direct ownership or investment, such as the UAE’s stake in Mopani Copper Mines and Qatar’s investment in Ivanhoe Mines, where Gulf countries buy shares in mines or mining companies. The second approach involves forming strategic partnerships with African governments, state-owned enterprises, and local firms, like Saudi Arabia’s mining cooperation with Zambia and the UAE-backed Buenassa refinery in the DRC. The third approach is through trading and offtake agreements, where Gulf states secure rights to future mineral production without having to own or operate the mines themselves.

These investments confirm that a substantial GCC mineral footprint is taking shape across Africa. But the central question is shifting: as Gulf demand for African minerals increases, what will African governments demand in return?

Africa Is Changing the Terms: From Extraction to Value Addition

For decades, much of Africa's mineral wealth has been exported in raw or semi-processed form, while the higher-value stages of refining, manufacturing, and trading occurred elsewhere. African governments are increasingly challenging this model.

The DRC has sought greater domestic processing of its minerals and banned exports of copper and cobalt concentrates as it escalates efforts to force domestic processing and retain more value from its mineral resources. Similarly, in 2026, Guinean President Mamadi Doumbouya announced a ban on raw gold exports to boost local processing and support the domestic economy, stating that “Guinean gold will be melted, certified, and processed in Guinea before being exported to international markets.”

The trend is spreading. In July, Zambia banned the export of unrefined copper to encourage mining and industrial companies to build local processing capacity, while a few months earlier Zimbabwe suspended exports of raw lithium concentrates. Ghana's President Mahama has similarly signalled his intention to ban raw-material exports by 2030, aiming instead to “add value, create jobs, and industrialise.”

This shift extends beyond minerals. Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon are moving to reduce raw cocoa exports and expand domestic processing. In 2026, the countries signed the Abuja Declaration, creating a Cocoa Value Addition Alliance intended to expand local processing, harmonise standards, and strengthen their collective position with international buyers. The objective is the same: retain more of the cocoa value chain in Africa rather than exporting the raw commodity.

Nigeria's Dangote Refinery demonstrates what this shift can look like at scale. Rather than exporting crude and importing more expensive refined petroleum products, the refinery processes African crude domestically and increasingly supplies both African and international markets. During the Iran war, European buyers also turned to Dangote for refined products, and the refinery became the world's largest single exporter of jet fuel in April and May.

With plans to establish a $17 billion refinery in Kenya to refine East African crude, the trend extends beyond individual commodities. African countries are increasingly seeking to become producers and exporters of higher-value products rather than simply suppliers of raw materials.

Zambia: The Political Pressure Behind Value Addition

Zambia’s recent election illustrates why the politics surrounding minerals are changing. The country is one of Africa's largest copper producers and has benefited from growing international demand for the metal. Yet voters were frustrated as mineral wealth does not automatically translate into improvements in living standards.

This creates political pressure. As copper becomes more valuable to foreign governments and companies, local populations will increasingly ask why producing countries are not capturing a greater proportion of that value. For governments such as President Hakainde Hichilema's, attracting foreign investment must be balanced against demands for jobs, tax revenue, domestic processing, and visible economic benefits.

For Gulf investors, the lesson is clear: the most durable partnerships will not necessarily go to the highest bidder, but to those who can demonstrate a tangible contribution to the domestic economy. Saudi Arabia’s mining MoU with Zambia stands out precisely because it includes commitments to processing, joint ventures, knowledge transfer, and skills development.

Commodity Traders as a Route to African Minerals

The DRC is taking this a step further by seeking greater control over how its minerals are traded. State-owned Gécamines holds stakes of between 20% and 51% in most of the country’s major mining projects. Rather than simply receiving dividends from these holdings, Gécamines is negotiating to receive a share of the physical copper produced, which it can then market itself.

Since 2024, it has been building this trading capacity with Mercuria, including trading around 88,000 tonnes of copper from Tenke Fungurume and another 80,000 tonnes from its Sicomines joint venture.

Mercuria is effectively helping turn Gécamines from a state mining company that primarily collects income from its shareholdings into an active commodity trader. Mercuria provides the financing, trading expertise, technology, and access to international markets, while Gécamines brings something equally valuable: ownership stakes across some of the world’s most important copper assets. This gives the DRC greater control over its copper revenues and allows the state to capture more of the commercial value between production and the final buyer, rather than leaving that activity entirely to foreign mining companies and traders. Zambia is pursuing a similar model. Its Industrial Development Corporation established an equally owned trading venture with Mercuria in 2024, which has already sold more than 200,000 tonnes of copper concentrates.

Direct ownership of African mining assets will not always be possible. Competition for highquality assets is intense, particularly from established international mining companies with greater operational experience on the continent. Securing long-term access to the physical commodity can therefore be as important as owning the mine itself.

The Gulf states are also at different stages of their African mining strategies. The UAE is furthest ahead in direct ownership, with UAE-linked companies acquiring assets including Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia and interests in the DRC. Qatar has taken a different route, investing in established mining companies such as Ivanhoe Mines, while Saudi Arabia has made its ambition to acquire international mining assets clear. For Saudi Arabia and Qatar, commodity traders could provide a faster route to securing mineral supply as their own mining portfolios develop.

Companies such as Mercuria, Trafigura, and Glencore already have relationships with African mines, governments, and state-owned mining companies, as well as offtake agreements giving them access to physical production. Mercuria, for example, is working with Gécamines to market copper from the DRC and has secured uranium marketing rights alongside financing for Malawi's Kayelekera mine. Trafigura is similarly providing $65 million in financing to Ghana's Heath Goldfields alongside an agreement to purchase 700,000 ounces of gold doré. These arrangements show how trading houses use financing and relationships with producers to secure long-term access to African mineral production.

Partnerships with these trading houses allow Saudi Arabia and Qatar to secure African copper, cobalt, uranium, and other minerals through financing and long-term offtake without having to acquire and operate every underlying asset. Commodity traders would not replace direct Gulf mining investment, but provide another route to securing the minerals required for the Gulf's energy transition and economic diversification.

Conclusion

The U.S.-Israel-Iran War has added urgency to a shift that was already underway. As the Gulf states expand into electric vehicles, nuclear energy, data centers, and other new industries, secure access to critical minerals will become increasingly important. Africa will therefore play a growing role in the Gulf’s economic diversification and longer-term strategic security.

But access to these resources will increasingly come on different terms. African governments are seeking more than foreign capital or royalties from extraction. They want minerals processed locally, greater participation in their trade, and investment that creates jobs, skills, and industrial capacity. For the Gulf states, securing long-term mineral supply will therefore depend increasingly on aligning their investment strategies with these priorities.

And they are well positioned to do so. The UAE has already demonstrated the potential of direct investment in African mining assets, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar can expand their access through strategic partnerships, investments in established mining companies, and offtake arrangements with commodity traders.

Michael W. Wilson is a Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)