Commentary & Analysis

The 26th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek from August 31 to September 1, 2026, produced the Bishkek Declaration and 28 outcome documents covering regional security, technology, connectivity and economic cooperation. The summit’s outcomes reflected the SCO’s gradual development from a primarily political forum into a more institutionalised platform for practical cooperation across Eurasia.

This distinction is important. The SCO is frequently presented as a central component of an emerging multipolar order and as a potential counterweight to Western-led institutions. However, its members continue to hold different foreignpolicy priorities, security interests and economic relationships. These differences constrain the organisation’s ability to act as a cohesive geopolitical bloc. The significance of the Bishkek summit therefore lies less in the announcement of an alternative international order and more in the steady development of mechanisms through which member states can coordinate on shared concerns.

One of the summit’s important political outcomes was its position on Iran. The SCO condemned the military strikes against Iranian territory and unilateral sanctions while reaffirming Iran’s right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For Iran, which became a full SCO member in 2023, this collective support provides a measure of diplomatic legitimacy at a time of heightened regional and international pressure. For example, all ten SCO members, including China, Russia and India, endorsed the Bishkek Declaration’s support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means. This enables Tehran to present its position not simply as a national response to Western pressure, but as one supported by a broader group of influential Eurasian states opposed to military intervention and unilateral coercive measures. However, such political support does not necessarily mean that all SCO members will provide Iran with equivalent economic or military assistance.

Nevertheless, the practical value of this solidarity should not be overstated. Many SCO members maintain important commercial, technological and financial relationships with the United States and Europe. They may therefore be reluctant to expose their companies and banking institutions to secondary sanctions by expanding transactions with Iran. China, India and the Central Asian states may oppose unilateral sanctions in principle while continuing to adopt cautious policies in practice. The Bishkek Declaration strengthens Iran’s diplomatic position, but it does not necessarily provide Tehran with a comprehensive mechanism for overcoming its economic isolation.

The summit also reflected the SCO’s broader demand for reforms to global governance. Participating leaders and guest speakers, including UN SecretaryGeneral António Guterres, called for a fairer and more representative international system. Such messaging resonates across much of the Global South, where governments increasingly seek a greater voice in institutions established after the Second World War. Yet the SCO has not developed a unified vision of what a new global order should look like. Its members agree more readily on opposition to Western dominance than on the political, economic and security structures that should replace or reform the existing system.

The gap between the SCO’s geopolitical rhetoric and its capacity for collective action remains one of the organisation’s central limitations. Tensions between some of its major members, differences over regional conflicts and competing infrastructure projects continue to restrict deeper integration. Rather than functioning as a military alliance or a fully integrated economic bloc, the SCO remains a flexible platform through which states can cooperate selectively without surrendering their strategic autonomy.

The Bishkek summit’s institutional outcomes may therefore prove more consequential than its broader declarations. The adoption of formal regulations for the SCO Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats indicates an effort to strengthen operational coordination. The establishment of an Anti-Drug Center similarly responds to the interconnected challenges of narcotics trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and instability along regional borders.

These mechanisms reflect the SCO’s original security mandate but also demonstrate how the definition of security within the organisation is expanding. Member states increasingly view terrorism, cyber threats, drug trafficking, economic vulnerability and technological dependence as interconnected challenges. Whether the new centres become effective institutions will depend on intelligence sharing, funding, operational coordination and the willingness of members to overcome political distrust. Nonetheless, their establishment shows that the SCO is seeking to move beyond summit diplomacy towards more permanent forms of cooperation.

Technology and economic development represented another important dimension of the Bishkek outcomes. China pledged to establish an international artificial-intelligence cooperation centre and implement 100 joint scientific and technological projects over the next three years. These initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s ambition to position itself as the principal provider of technological capacity and development partnerships within the SCO.

For participating countries, Chinese investment and technology may provide alternatives to Western systems, particularly in areas where access is restricted by sanctions, export controls or political conditions. At the same time, China’s growing role could deepen technological dependence on Beijing and reinforce existing inequalities within the organisation. Smaller SCO members may benefit from new infrastructure and expertise but will have limited influence over the standards, financing and strategic direction of these initiatives.

The planned China-SCO port-economy cooperation centre in Tianjin further illustrates the importance of connectivity within the organisation’s evolving agenda. Ports are no longer viewed only as commercial infrastructure; they are increasingly connected to supply-chain resilience, energy security, industrial development and geopolitical influence. The initiative could support greater trade between China, Central Asia, South Asia and other SCO-linked markets while complementing broader Chinese connectivity strategies across Eurasia.

For the Gulf states, these developments carry direct political, security and economic implications. The SCO’s support for Iran may provide Tehran with greater diplomatic backing, but it does not fundamentally alter the regional balance of power or remove Iran’s need to engage with its Gulf neighbours. Political endorsement from SCO members is unlikely to compensate fully for the economic costs of sanctions or the vulnerabilities created by continued regional tensions.

Gulf governments are therefore likely to maintain their dual approach: pursuing dialogue and de-escalation with Iran while preserving strong defence and security partnerships with the United States and other Western countries. They will also closely monitor whether the SCO’s political support encourages greater Iranian flexibility or reduces Tehran’s incentives to compromise. Much will depend on whether the organisation uses its relationship with Iran to promote regional stability or confines itself to expressions of political solidarity.

The SCO’s expanding security architecture may also interest Gulf governments. Terrorism, drug trafficking, maritime insecurity, cyber threats and organised crime are not confined to Eurasia; they extend across Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. Greater cooperation between the SCO,

GCC institutions and individual Gulf states could therefore be useful, particularly in the exchange of information, border security, counter-narcotics efforts and the protection of critical infrastructure. However, the Gulf states are unlikely to view SCO mechanisms as substitutes for their existing national, regional and international security arrangements.

Economically, the SCO’s growing emphasis on connectivity, ports and technology presents growing opportunities for the Gulf. The GCC states are investing heavily in ports, railways, logistics zones, artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure as part of their economic-diversification strategies. Their geographic position enables them to serve as an intersection between East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Africa and Europe. Gulf ports and logistics hubs could consequently become important maritime extensions of emerging SCO-centered trade networks.

This opportunity is accompanied by competitive pressures. New overland and maritime corridors may strengthen Gulf hubs if they are effectively connected to them, but they could also redirect trade through alternative routes. The Gulf states will therefore need to ensure that SCO-related initiatives complement their own connectivity projects and national development programmes. This will require investment in interoperability, customs coordination, digital trade systems and cross-border infrastructure, as well as careful engagement with competing initiatives promoted by China, India, Europe and the United States.

Pakistan’s assumption of the SCO chairmanship for 2026-2027, under the theme “Turning Vision into Action: Connectivity, Innovation and Shared Prosperity,” may provide an additional bridge between the organisation and the Gulf. Pakistan maintains close political, economic and security relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, while also holding an important position within the SCO and China’s wider connectivity agenda. Islamabad could therefore encourage greater attention to maritime links connecting Central Asia and China with the Arabian Sea and the Gulf.

Ultimately, the Bishkek summit should be viewed as an example of gradual institutional development rather than an immediate geopolitical turning point. The SCO remains constrained by internal differences and a persistent gap between its multipolar rhetoric and its capacity for collective action. Yet its widening agenda demonstrates that it is becoming increasingly relevant to questions of security, technology, trade and connectivity extending beyond its immediate membership.

For the Gulf states, the SCO is neither an alternative to Western partnerships nor an organisation that can be overlooked. It represents an additional platform through which they can deepen relations with China, India, Pakistan, Central Asia and other Eurasian actors while maintaining their own strategic autonomy. The Gulf’s challenge will be to engage with the SCO’s emerging opportunities without becoming drawn into rigid bloc politics. In this respect, the Bishkek outcomes reinforce the Gulf’s growing role as an intersection between Asian connectivity, global energy security and competing visions of the international order.

Layla Ali is the Senior Research Associate at the Gulf Research Center (GRC)