Commentary & Analysis

Growing tensions in Europe and persisting instability in the Middle East have given rise to a broader trend of states upping their defense capabilities through diversification of partnerships and strengthening domestic industrial capacities. This comes as tactical shifts change the face of war in Ukraine and the Iran War manifests profound changes underway in the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and the Gulf, with severe international repercussions that span both political and economic realms.

The GCC member states, bearing much the brunt of the continued skirmishes in and along the Strait of Hormuz, have recalibrated their strategic outlook, shifting from more loose dialoguefocused frameworks to more transactional and industry-based partnerships. All Gulf states, apart from Oman, hold defense-industrial partnerships with Turkey, focusing on aerial systems and technology transfer. Further examples include UAE-South Korea joint military-industrial projects and Saudi Arabia’s latest Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey - the latter boasting NATO’s second-largest army. It has become apparent that the Gulf states are seeking to establish a more regionalized defense governance framework, complemented by a diversified defense procurement landscape which features a growing Chinese role in GCC procurement, and EU-GCC security relations that are increasingly oriented towards defense-industrial cooperation and technology transfer.

Albeit both the EU-GCC 1989 Cooperation Agreement and the individual Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPAs) currently in the works between Brussels and the GCC do foresee a partnership that includes security cooperation, neither contain binding or operational defense provisions. This institutional gap means that defense engagement continues to be driven by bilateral agreements between EU member states and Gulf governments, with maritime security operations as the only domain where a coordinated EU-level approach prevails. France sells Rafales. Germany supplies Rheinmetall systems. Italy and Spain pursue their own contracts. None of it adds up to a European strategy. The question is whether the current moment of regional upheaval changes that calculus - not just on paper, but at the EU ministerial negotiating table - and what the consequences could be for Brussels’ political and humanitarian self-perception.

The Iran War and a New Reality for Gulf Defense Ties

Prior to the regional escalation of the Gaza War, accompanied by an unprecedented level of tension between Israel and Iran that ultimately led to open conflict, the questions around securing maritime shipping routes and upgrading air defense systems were of lesser priority as developing EU-GCC relations largely focused on strengthening economic and energy cooperation, knowledge transfer, and broader diplomatic engagement. The GCC members have always been well aware that the neighborhood they call home is troublesome and volatile. But awareness does not equate urgency. 2026 has turned the Gulf states into a direct frontline in a military confrontation. Now, they are seeking to reinforce their defense capabilities substantially, and thereby increasingly look to Europe for cooperation.

European policymakers perceive the conflict’s implications extending beyond the Gulf with worry. Disrupted energy flows and maritime supply chains through the Strait of Hormuz directly threaten European energy security and economic stability, and Iran continuously supports Russia’s war in Ukraine, providing aerial assets and technical knowledge to Moscow. Against this backdrop, EU governments now have a material stake in ending the war with Iran and curbing regional escalation. The strategic imperative for both the EU and the GCC should be to build a sustainable relationship that allows for impactful cooperation to effectively navigate cross-regional uncertainties.

Beyond the maritime sphere, where Operation ASPIDES and the longer-running Operation ATALANTA already represent points of operational convergence between European and Gulf security interests, cooperation extends to air defense, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, satellite technology, and electronic warfare. European actors, from established primes to a new generation of defense tech start-ups, are flocking to the Gulf as they eye joint ventures with regional firms like the Emirati EDGE Group in counter-drone systems, AI-enabled surveillance, and precision munitions. For Gulf governments, these partnerships mean a stronger posture and technology access. For European companies, it means entering one of the world’s highest-spending markets.

There is also a structural argument for treating this as more than procurement. Gulf air defense networks currently combine American, French, Russian, and Chinese systems with significant interoperability gaps. Adding more European capabilities into that mix without an overarching coordination framework risks compounding the problem rather than solving it. The Saudi-Ukraine relationship illustrates the same point from a different angle: Riyadh’s reported interest in Ukrainian air defense components and loitering munitions reflects a Gulf that is learning fast from the new character of warfare. As Ukraine moves toward EU membership, this triangular relationship between Kyiv, Riyadh, and Brussels bears significant potential, but would need to be managed as part of a coherent European approach rather than left to develop ad hoc.

The GCC Perspective: Transactionalism Turned Strategic Depth?

For GCC member states, engagement with Europe is not about replacing the US as existing security guarantor, but about reducing single-source dependency through diversification of partnerships and building domestic industrial capacity. In this context, technology transfer and coproduction, not arms sales alone, are the primary currency.

The Gulf’s interest in European partners specifically is shaped by what they offer that others do not: interoperability, strong intellectual property protections, and political relationships that come without the strategic entanglements of Chinese or Russian equipment. For states keen to maintain multipolarity in their defense posture, European partnerships offer a way to diversify without the geopolitical complications deeper Chinese or Russian integration would entail, and without falling subject to the temper of an increasingly inconsistent US relationship.

Chantal Hohe,  Non-Resident Fellow (GRC)