Commentary & Analysis

The Gulf conflict that erupted in February 2026 has created a powerful new incentive for the region’s Arab states to reduce their reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, especially in the oil and gas sector. The crisis has highlighted a harsh reality: the ability to produce petroleum is of little value without the corresponding ability to export it. For the Gulf, without the capacity to export its oil and gas, production itself halts, bearing direct consequences on their national economies and the broader petroleum industry. For the Arab Gulf states, reducing reliance on Hormuz is not just about the immediate risks associated with transiting the Strait. It is also about preparing for the consequences of any future arrangements that might be made regarding its reopening and operation. Such arrangements could carry potential direct and indirect impacts on these countries’ oil exports, especially liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. It is clear that both the United States and Iran are trying to control passage through Hormuz. Any ability to govern movement through the Strait would give them leverage over Gulf LNG exports, especially since American gas has emerged as a serious competitor to Gulf gas suppliers, while Iran is considered a potential competitor in the post-crisis phase.

With that in mind, the countries in the region are seriously working on finding alternative routes for exporting oil. However, these efforts will take many years to come to fruition. As for the liquefied gas sector, Hormuz will remain significant, as there is currently no tangible alternative to passing through it, at least in the next few years. Therefore, the prediction by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in early September of this year that “the Strait of Hormuz will become worthless within two years” appears unlikely. Reducing the Gulf’s dependence on Hormuz is a complex and lengthy process, and the Strait is likely to retain its importance well beyond the next two years.The current Gulf crisis has clearly demonstrated the strategic necessity for regional oil producers to maintain, develop, and operate alternative export routes. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively paralyzed, crude oil shipments from the region dropped from around 20 million barrels per day to just a fraction of that amount. Maritime traffic through the passage has been heavily disrupted, and direct attacks have forced ships to completely avoid the Strait of Hormuz altogether. This disruption represents one of the most significant supply shocks in recent decades, revealing that dependence on a single chokepoint is unsustainable and that diversifying export routes is indispensable.

However, as the crisis has shown, the use of some existing oil pipelines has eased the transit crisis through Hormuz, allowing some outlets to continue exporting oil, even if only partially. Still, their cumulative capacity has not been enough to make up for the significant shortfall in oil exports from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia was the only Gulf producer able to export its oil almost fully without going through Hormuz, while Iraq and the UAE could only divert part of their exports outside the strait. Kuwait and Qatar remained entirely dependent on it.

Some of the oil pipelines that are currently out of operation, many of which were built decades ago, could provide a way to compensate for the shortfall in export capacity outside of Hormuz. These pipelines can be rehabilitated and activated to provide the flexibility and momentum needed to diversify export routes and strengthen the region’s ability to withstand disruptions. At the same time, several projects for new oil pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz have also been proposed, reflecting growing efforts to establish alternative transit routes to international markets.

There is a clear need in the Gulf for a dual strategy: upgrading the current export infrastructure while investing in new pipelines. These massive efforts should be carried out at both the national and regional levels, with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) potentially playing a central coordinating role for the benefit of all its member states. Other regional bodies that include all or most Middle Eastern countries, could also contribute to the effort, ensuring the necessary trade agreements and political understandings on all related issues, such as cost sharing, pumping and transport rights, transit fees, and governance.

Even if a solution to the current Hormuz crisis is found, Gulf Arab oil exporters urgently need to develop these pipelines, use them to their full capacity, and ensure they remain operationally ready for future emergencies. While such projects are costly, time-consuming, and politically and security-wise complex, they remain crucial to ensuring long-term export flexibility and resilience.It must also be noted that the pipelines themselves remain vulnerable to missile and drone attacks, as well as terrorist campaigns, a risk underscored by recent attacks on oil pipelines in the region. Political instability and regional conflict certainly present major challenges to the secure operation of alternate pipelines. Still, they provide a critical alternative to the export problems of the Strait of Hormuz and offer vital surplus and flexibility in times of disruption. Coordinated investment in existing and new pipeline projects is thus essential for long-term Gulf energy security--not as a choice, but as a duty and a necessity.

This also applies to LNG exporters in the Gulf. Developing alternative export routes instead of relying on Hormuz is not an option for Qatar and the UAE but a strategic necessity to diversify supply routes and ensure long-term resilience. A long-term export interruption without alternative routes could permanently threaten the Gulf’s competitive position. Therefore, Gulf LNG exporters face several strategic options to mitigate risks, including reducing dependence on maritime transport and developing gas pipelines that can reach consumer markets in Asia and Europe and represent the most reliable way to reduce exposure to the fluctuations of the Strait of Hormuz.

In addition to rehabilitating existing pipelines and building new ones, the Gulf countries should aim to expand oil storage capacity both domestically and in key consuming countries to provide a buffer against disruptions or closures of vital export routes. They should likewise increase gas storage capacity both inside and outside producing countries to handle chokepoint shutdowns and reduce the risk of forced production cuts.

In terms of pipelines, when building and maintaining them, strict attention should be paid to their ability to withstand and adapt to disturbances, as well as recover from them, while maintaining core functional performance. This was recently demonstrated by Saudi Arabia when it managed, in less than ten days, to repair the damage caused to three pumping stations of the East-West Pipeline after it was hit by drone attacks.

The ability of pipelines to resist damage from external events (like earthquakes, accidents, missile attacks, and cyberattacks) and remain resilient is essential. This ability depends on the pipeline design, the durability of the materials, the availability of backup structural elements, and the protection of digital control systems from disruptions and cyberattacks.

New technologies can be used to enhance the resilience and robustness of pipelines by placing them deep underground (as is the case with most pipelines in the region), building parallel pipelines, and creating alternative flow routes, mobile pumping stations, and backup control units. Sensors can also be operated remotely using artificial intelligence to detect leaks or corrosion early and carry out necessary maintenance at the right time. Emergency planning and precautionary measures should also be strengthened through advance planning, including rapid shutdown protocols and ensuring that maintenance teams, spare parts, and logistics support is readily available at all times.

As for adaptability, it is measured by how effectively the system can cope with evolving failures or sequential events, limiting the deterioration of functional performance. This includes operational flexibility, deploying safety barriers, and immediate response, while recoverability is defined by how robustly and quickly the system can return to normal operations after any disruption, including repair speed, resource allocation, and emergency measures.

In addition to these operational aspects, there are many issues that need to be addressed for oil and gas pipelines to function properly. Besides ensuring political and security stability in the exporting, importing, and transit countries, there is the matter of transit fees, especially when a pipeline passes through the territory of third countries. These fees, whether monetary or in-kind, can significantly impact the economic feasibility of any pipeline project.

To ensure continuous pumping in any pipeline, especially one that passes through multiple countries, the pipeline must meet the needs of all these countries, from the country of origin to the destination country, passing through transit countries. The reliance on the pipeline of the involved countries must be mutual: everyone should benefit from the smooth operation of the line, and everyone loses if the pumping is disrupted.

Dr. Naji Abi-Aad Senior Energy Advisor – Gulf Research Center