Commentary & Analysis
The Gulf States and Multilateral Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order
The shifting global order has rendered long-held assumptions about alliance choices increasingly uncertain. The Gulf states offer a clear example of how this uncertainty can be effectively managed. By leveraging the competition between great powers, the Gulf states have balanced ties to both spheres of influence, asserting their own agency and making strategic hedging vital to their multilateral diplomacy. This research paper will examine the six GCC members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE - and their role in the new world order.
Some terms require clarification. The shifting global order refers to various trends, including the erosion of US unipolarity, the rise of China and the broader diffusion of power among middle powers in particular - developments that change the position and relative weights of specific actors within Gulf states’ respective geopolitical equations (Kausch, 2014). Multilateral diplomacy is understood as engagement through shared formal or informal institutional frameworks.
This paper begins by outlining how the global order is changing and how this impacts the Gulf states. It then analyzes how different Gulf states have leveraged energy diplomacy in their respective bids for increased agency within this order. Then it explores how Gulf states have leveraged economic diplomacy through trade and their respective sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Finally, it examines Gulf states’ contrasting approaches to conflict resolution in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, before outlining how they have utilized minilateralism. Overall, this paper concludes that Gulf states have leveraged multilateral diplomacy in an assertive bid for influence in an increasingly multipolar world order. Gulf states have adjusted to a world in transition by supplying solutions to their own needs and problems, a defining feature of a foreign policy strategy that is actively reshaping the Gulf’s position in the international system.
Section 1: The Shifting Global Order
During the post-Cold War US-led unipolar world order, Gulf states’ foreign policy was heavily influenced by their interdependence with the US. This relationship meant states like Saudi Arabia satisfied US energy needs in exchange for a strong US military presence and the guarantee of security (Wright, 2025). However, the relationship began eroding after the US’ 2003 Iraq invasion. The Gulf, who had long relied on this partnership, began seeing US engagement as destabilizing in the region (Macdonald, 2014). The erosion of confidence ran parallel to a shift in the global energy economy. China’s rapid economic growth drove higher demand for energy imports, whereas the US’ 2010s fracking boom enabled energy independence that reduced reliance on the Gulf’s energy imports (Wright, 2025). Together, these dynamics positioned China as the Gulf’s leading economic partner since (2013 Niblock and Malik 2013).
China presents the Gulf with a different type of partner that enables an autonomous foreign policy strategy by not attaching political conditions to economic partnerships. Additionally, a new generation of leaders in the region, such as Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia or Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed in the UAE, have become more willing to diversify partnerships away from the US and the traditional Western sphere of influence (Feierstein, Saab, and Young, 2022). The clearest example of this hedging logic came in March 2023, when Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations with Iran through the China-mediated Beijing Agreement (Omar, 2026). Thus, some Gulf states have pursued strategic hedging - that is, maintaining their security relationship with the US while simultaneously turning to China as an alternative diplomatic partner capable of delivering outcomes Washington could not or would not broker (Wright, 2025).
Beyond hedging, Gulf states have also grown more willing to assert themselves independently of Washington on regional security matters unrelated to broader great power competition. Saudi Arabia’s foreign interventions, such as in Bahrain’s 2011 Arab Spring protests or Yemen in 2015, reflected regional security calculations based on fears of Iranian influence spreading rather than any China-related strategic realignment (Jones, 2020). In addition, the UAE’s foreign policy reflects a similar trend: Sending forces to Libya and Yemen and the decision to seek ties across the Horn of Africa reflects an increasingly independent security posture. Qatar’s independent foreign policy decisions, meanwhile, contributed to a Saudi-led blockade of the country between 2017 and 2021, demonstrating how Gulf assertiveness can fracture the GCC from within. Taken together, calculated hedging between Washington and Beijing, and a broader willingness to act independently of the US’ preferences on regional security reveal a Gulf no longer operating within Washington’s parameters as each state pursues its independent vision of the regional order on its own terms.
Section 2: Energy Diplomacy
Energy has long been the Gulf’s main mechanism for global engagement and its primary source of revenue. However, as the global dynamic has shifted, it has evolved into a diplomatic tool enabling the Gulf states to assert their agency on the global stage. As a result of US energy independence and growing Asian energy demand Gulf states have redirected their energy exports eastwards: “Over 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil exports [and ]over 90 percent of crude oil exports by the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar go to Asia” (El-Katiri, 2014). This growth means increased energy demand from Asian economies, such as India or China, is pulling Gulf exports towards Asian markets.
By 2020, China emerged as the largest trade partner for most of the GCC countries (Fulton, 2022). The difference in posture between China and the US towards energy trade is evident. Whereas the US’ position became “more imbued with security drawdown and normative conditionalities on democracy and human rights,” China’s model of engagement rested heavily on trade, investment, and noninterference (Wright, 2025). The increase in Chinese investments - particularly in technology, renewable energy, and infrastructure - and its non-interference make China a trading partner that strengthens the Gulf’s strategic autonomy rather than constrains it.
Furthermore, GCC production decisions within multilateral institutions such as OPEC+ continue to be driven by market forces rather than alignment with any single partner’s interests. This was visible in Saudi Arabia and the UAE driving OPEC+ to slash oil production by 2 million barrels per day in October 2022. The production cuts were consistent with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s own assessment of market conditions, even if it diverged from Washington’s preference for increased output ahead of the crucial 2022 US midterm elections (Ziady, 2022).
Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) export strategy remains oriented towards Asian markets, reflecting its commercial priorities as one of the world’s largest gas producers. Separately, Qatar has used LNG as a means of gaining a foothold in Africa. Through investment in Mozambican and Namibian LNG infrastructure, Qatar has extended its reach into new markets (Wilson, 2025). Qatar’s African LNG strategy reflects the same underlying principle of energy being used diplomatically in an effort to expand influence.
The UAE’s official withdrawal from OPEC on May 1, 2026 underscores how individual Gulf states have sought increased agency through diversified partnerships. Economically, the impact is significant - the UAE was OPEC+’s third biggest producer at 12 to 15 percent of total production, and its departure weakens the cartel’s ability to manage prices via coordinated supply cuts (Mohammed, 2026). The withdrawal means OPEC+ loses its third-largest producer and that Saudi Arabia must now single-handedly enforce OPEC quotas, monitor compliance, and hold spare capacity -burdens which were previously shared by the two countries Mohammed 2026) ,
Beyond its economic significance, the withdrawal also holds symbolic weight. The UAE’s compliance with cuts reinforced Saudi Arabia’s influence in that an independent Gulf power was making the strategic choice to align itself with Riyadh (Mohammed, 2026). This, in turn, meant that unilateral Saudi Arabian proposals became Gulf coalition positions that Russia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, and other members were pressured into accepting. This second voice is now gone. The UAE’s exit reflects a different assessment on the future of energy markets, favoring an independent approach to production and trade partnerships over coordination with Saudi Arabia within OPEC+. Whether this strategy ultimately gives the UAE increased leverage within the global energy market remains to be seen.
Taken together, Gulf states’ energy diplomacy reveals that production and export decisions are dictated by market conditions and national interest rather than by any single trade partner’s interests. Because of this, the cumulative effect has been a steady reduction in US leverage over Gulf production decisions and a corresponding shift in market orientation towards Asia.
Section 3: Economic Diplomacy
GCC financial power, primarily driven by individual Gulf states’ respective sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), is tangible regionally and beyond (El-Katiri, 2014). The scale of these funds is tremendous: As of 2026, the GCC states control $4.9 trillion in assets, equivalent to 38 percent of global SWF assets (Bakshi, 2026). These investments are increasingly focused on sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, mining, and industry (El-Katiri, 2014). Through these funds, Gulf states aim to assert themselves as increasingly influential global powers, prioritizing economic diversification, military self-reliance, technological advancements, and regime stability (Wright, 2025).
Examining the GCC’s three largest SWFs reveals a consensus on the importance of diversification, though discrepancies exist on how exactly to achieve this. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), founded in 1971, holds roughly $900 billion in assets. The PIF has targeted AI, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, and investment in sport domestically and abroad, particularly in the West (Wright, 2025). Investments in the Saudi Pro League, the purchase of Newcastle Football Club, the creation of LIV Golf, and the development of MBS’s Vision 2030 program are all diversification efforts that bring in tourists. By leveraging its SWF not only as an economic tool but also as a mechanism for its rebranding and repositioning, Saudi Arabia has solidified itself as a significant economic power within the new world order.
The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), founded in 2005, has “invested far and wide, from equities to real estate and high-profile acquisitions in Western commercial brands, banks, and corporations” (Young, 2020). Qatar has also employed its SWF as a political tool, exemplified by its investment commitments in Turkey (Young, 2020). Though Qatar’s diplomacy resembled that of Saudi Arabia until the mid-1990s, its desire for autonomy in a shifting world order means the two have since diverged, with Qatar’s focus on soft power instruments such as “media, diplomacy, education, culture, sports, tourism, economics, and humanitarianism” providing a platform for enhanced international legitimacy and agency (Abdullah, 2014).
The UAE’s multiple SWFs are held by individual emirates and ruling families (Young, 2020). The UAE’s approach has been similar to Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s in its attempts to become a hub for tourism and innovation (Hussain, 2017). Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has invited opportunities to form partnerships with higher-risk technology firms such as SoftBank (Young, 2020). Interestingly, Kuwait’s SWF, known to prefer safer investments, rejected this SoftBank partnership, demonstrating the discrepancies in Gulf SWF’s investment strategies. Through investments in technology, renewable energy, and infrastructure, the UAE aims to build a web of interdependencies that ensure economic stability and guaranteed returns in the near future. Whereas Saudi Arabia utilizes the PIF to rebrand and reposition and Qatar deploys it for soft power and political purposes, the UAE’s approach is arguably more structurally ambitious. By creating overlapping economic dependencies in both spheres of influence, the UAE establishes itself as an indispensable economic power.
However, trade presents a different picture - the Gulf has increasingly integrated itself economically with China, India, South Korea, and Japan (Kupchan, 2023). Through “overlapping economic ties that reduce vulnerability to external pressure,” Asian economies have become increasingly important for individual GCC trade relations (Wright, 2025). In tandem, China and India accounted for 21 percent of total GCC trade in 2011, with the US and the EU together falling from around 40 percent in the early 1990s to 20 percent (El-Katiri, 2014).
Additionally, by 2011, the US was not a top-five trading partner to the UAE, Kuwait, or Qatar. The UAE’s top partner was India at 17.8 percent and Kuwait’s was South Korea at 14 percent, implying that the Asianization of the Gulf’s trade cannot be reduced to China alone (El-Katiri, 2014). This shift in economic ties will impact both the global economy and the security architecture of the Gulf and Red Sea corridor (Young, 2020), with the figures reflecting the Gulf’s strategic reorientation.
Overall, the Gulf states’ economic diplomacy reflects two parallel yet distinct logics: SWF investment, which continues to chase the depth and returns offered by Western markets, and trade, which has increasingly shifted towards Asian demand. This divergence demonstrates that Gulf states are not pursuing eastern or western alignment; rather, they continue to balance the two in pursuit of maximized national interest.
Section 4: Approaches to Conflict Resolution in the MENA Region
The shifting global order has allowed Gulf states to take initiative on global conflicts, particularly in the MENA region. The Palestine-Israel conflict and Iran’s involvement have prompted contested approaches to resolution within the Gulf. Through the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel, even exchanging diplomatic representatives (Middle East Institute, 2025). These accords were driven by Washington under the Trump administration. Despite this, they do not reflect the UAE and Bahrain simply accepting Trump’s demands; instead, they were driven by the “pragmatic pursuit of national interest” given perceptions of Iran as a threat to regional stability (Wright, 2025). Following reciprocal attacks on Abu Dhabi and Bahrain in February 2026, the UAE and Bahrain closed their respective Tehran embassies (Omar, 2026). However, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait have formal relations with Iran but not Israel, with Saudi Arabia repeatedly making it clear that it refuses to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel unless concrete steps towards a Palestinian state are made (Middle East Institute, 2025). The divergence of GCC multilateral policy in conflict resolution is illustrated by the parties mediating - whereas Bahrain and the UAE normalized relations through Washington’s mediation, Saudi Arabia normalized ties with Iran through Beijing’s involvement. Qatar’s non-aligned posture has enabled it to act as a mediator for ceasefires, thus proving to be an invaluable asset across spheres of influence. Similarly, Oman has mediated agreements such as the JCPOA in 2015. It was also the only GCC state to avoid military intervention during the Yemeni civil war, instead brokering ceasefires between the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi forces. The conflicts in the Middle East thus demonstrate that despite regular GCC meetings and shared regional security concerns, Gulf policy is not uniform.
Syria’s diplomatic relations with multilateral institutions such as the Arab League and the GCC , both during the Assad regime and after its fall, demonstrate Gulf states’ willingness to make autonomous foreign policy decisions. On May 19, 2023, Assad’s regime regained Syria’s seat at the 32nd Arab League Summit in Saudi Arabia after over a decade of exclusion (Alamer, 2023). This reintegration was not because Syria reduced the brutality that caused its exclusion in 2012; it was because of the shifting Arab regional order, reflecting Gulf states’ collective reassessment of regional priorities in a multipolar context (Alamer, 2023). While some states, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, restored diplomatic relations with Assad, Qatar remained a holdout, demonstrating intra-GCC divergence on multilateralism. Since Assad’s ousting, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has prioritized efforts to deepen diplomatic relations with GCC members, largely because of the financial and political benefits such a partnership offers (Matamis, 2025). Qatar has since repositioned itself - together with Saudi Arabia, it settled Syria’s $15.5 million debt to the World Bank and committed to a three-month, $29 million per month program aimed at funding public sector wages (Matamis, 2025). Overall, Syria serves as a case study of collective GCC agency in the region - despite initial divergences on Assad’s regime, these separate national interests have happened to align in backing Syria’s new government through reopened diplomatic ties, trade, and funding projects.
Section 5: Minilateralism
One focal point of the Gulf’s approach to the shifting world order has been its focus on minilateralism. Minilateralism can be understood as a flexible “halfway solution between a unilateral foreign policy imposed on partners and a multilateral approach,” (Samaan, 2023). Minilateralism requires functional, pragmatic cooperation rather than permanence, making such initiatives attractive for ‘swing states’ that prioritize flexibility and minimum commitment. The aforementioned
Abraham Accords demonstrate this clearly, as the treaty was signed by just the US, Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain. Similarly, through joint investments, initiatives like I2U2, comprising India, Israel, the US and the UAE, focus on expanding economic cooperation, sharing technology, and climate protection. I2U2 was framed by some as an anti-China grouping, an interpretation that the UAE resisted. This underscores Abu Dhabi’s reluctance to choose sides and its belief that multilateralism creates “a ‘multinetworked’ environment that could [keep] great power competition at bay” (Samaan, 2023). Beyond its diplomatic significance, I2U2 pools UAE sovereign wealth, US private capital, and Indian emerging market institutions to mitigate the risks of greenfield energy investments (Afterman and Jaspal, 2026). Such independent efforts counter Saudi Arabia’s long-held regional dominance, given that resource pooling with great powers gives the UAE outsized influence - though the resulting competition complicates a GCC consensus position (El-Katiri, 2014).
However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE share some minilateral ties - particularly through the planned IMEC corridor and the BRICS partnership. The US-backed IMEC corridor - incorporating India, Europe, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Jordan - aims to bolster economic development by facilitating connectivity and economic integration between Europe, the Gulf, and Asia. Crucially, I2U2 and the IMEC corridor are complementary: I2U2 could serve as the corridor’s governance and innovation engine, suggesting that Gulf states’ minilateralism is strategically coherent rather than ad hoc (Afterman and Jaspal, 2026). Gulf states have also used minilateralism as a form of strategic hedging, as demonstrated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s decision to join the BRICS partnership (Ellison et al., 2025). Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognize the paramount importance of their maritime routes and are not willing to let the Western sphere of influence constrain what benefits they can extract from them. Qatar has employed minilateralism effectively in Africa through its aforementioned LNG projects,
enabling it to manage its foreign policy without rigid blocs. Overall, minilateralism is not merely a diplomatic preference for Gulf states; it is core to their foreign policy logic. In enabling strategic autonomy and economic diversification, minilateralism has allowed Gulf states to strategically assert themselves in an increasingly unpredictable world order.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Gulf states have adjusted to a shifting world order by balancing both spheres of influence and seeking independent solutions to regional needs and problems - grounded in maximizing national interest. This is evidenced across domains by the five sections of this paper. Gulf states’ energy diplomacy is dictated by market conditions and national interest, not any individual trade partner’s will. The UAE’s departure from OPEC+ demonstrates how the new world order has empowered Gulf states to make autonomous decisions in their search for increased agency. Furthermore, Gulf SWFs and trade show how GCC states have balanced their ties to Western and Eastern partners without becoming heavily reliant on either. Beyond economic diplomacy, conflict mediation demonstrates how Gulf states have taken different approaches to conflict resolution - whereas Washington mediated for the UAE and Bahrain in the Abraham Accords, it was Beijing that restored relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar and Oman’s position as key mediators is unique in the region, proving vital in increasing their respective influence. The case of Syria ultimately serves as a broader depiction of Gulf multilateral diplomacy - the GCC’s stance is reached through convergent self-interest, not true consensus. Finally, minilateralism’s flexibility and minimal commitment serve as the structural framework through which the hedging strategy operates - exemplified by Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s agreements with both spheres of influence under the IMEC corridor on one hand and BRICS on the other. Ultimately, Gulf states’ rise as independent.
geopolitical actors is part of a larger spread of power in the multipolar world order. The result is a global order where the ambitions of contending hegemonic powers now come second to “the cumulative impact of the actions and choices of middle powers as they pursue their own unique visions of national interest and regional stability” (Wright, 2025). Thus, as the global order continues to fragment, Gulf states’ multilateral foreign policies will become more consequential as they become increasingly independent.
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Nico Bach Gulf Research Center