Commentary & Analysis

Abstract

Media and political attention surrounding the Houthis has largely focused on their attacks against Saudi Arabia, threats to Red Sea and Bab alMandab maritime security, and clashes with Yemen’s internationally recognized government. However, a critical dimension receives far less attention: the group’s ties to terrorist organizations. These links threaten global counterterrorism efforts and risk fueling a new wave of terrorism, the kind of fallout the international community has fought to contain over the past three decades.

In this regard, reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (established under Security Council Resolution 2140) detail expanding ties between the Houthis and terrorist groups in Yemen and the Horn of Africa; most notably Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Somalia’s alShabaab, and ISIS in Somalia. This collaboration includes security and intelligence sharing, prisoner swaps, ceasefires, arms transfers, military training, technical exchange, and shared smuggling networks. The Panel’s 2024 and 2025 reports specifically highlight a significant surge in joint military and logistical cooperation.

Among the Panel’s most critical findings was an agreement between the Houthis and AQAP involving drone, missile, and explosive transfers, alongside military training, intelligence sharing, and safe harbor for AQAP operatives. Furthermore, the Panel documented deepening ties between the Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab in weapons smuggling and technical training, while noting ongoing contact with ISIS in Somalia.

The findings in these reports align with investigations and studies published by specialized research institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Century Foundation, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and other research centers and international organizations. These studies have examined how these relationships evolved, the role of intermediaries, arms-smuggling networks, and the transfer of military expertise between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

The danger of these emerging alliances lies in the strategic access they provide to both AQAP and al-Shabaab: modern weaponry, technical training, intelligence sharing, and resilient logistical corridors. Such resources bolster the groups’ survival, amplify their military capabilities, and widen their operational scope. Consequently, this dynamic threatens to compromise broader counterterrorism initiatives and create opportunistic openings for organizations that international efforts have long sought to suppress.

First: The Terrorist Dimension of the Houthi Threat Imperatives for an International Response

Since seizing power in Yemen in 2014, the Houthis have drawn international attention primarily for their conflict with Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the coalition supporting it, their attacks on Saudi Arabia, and their threats to maritime security and commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

While these developments are undeniably significant, focusing on them alone risks overlooking another equally serious aspect of the group’s activities: its ties to terrorist organizations. These relationships could undermine counterterrorism efforts and contribute to a renewed wave of terrorist threats that the international community has spent decades confronting.

The Houthi threat cannot be viewed merely as a localized Yemeni conflict or an isolated danger to neighboring states and Red Sea shipping. A comprehensive assessment requires evaluating the group’s ties to terrorist networks and the far-reaching security implications, a critical dimension that demands prominent placement on the international counterterrorism agenda.

Reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen consistently document growing operational links between the Houthis, AQAP, and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. This collaboration spans critical capabilities, granting these organizations access to weaponry, tactical training, intelligence sharing, and key logistical networks.

Drawing primarily on UN Panel of Experts reports from 2020 through 2025, alongside independent research, this report details the evolution of these alliances and assesses their broader threat to regional and global security.

Second: Houthi Cooperation with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Shifting from Hostility to Cooperation

The Houthis and AQAP have historically been ideological adversaries, repeatedly confronting one another on the battlefield. Yemen’s war, however, created conditions that gradually reshaped this relationship, paving the way for pragmatic arrangements driven by shared interests.

Prisoner exchanges were among the earliest signs of this shift. The 2020 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen documented a September 2019 prisoner exchange involving individuals linked to AQAP. Subsequent investigations examined similar exchanges that occurred throughout the war (UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2020).

In December 2021, the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies published an investigation based on interviews with former Al-Qaeda members, tribal figures, and informed sources. The investigation documented prisoner exchanges between the Houthis and AQAP from 2016 to 2021. It found that these exchanges secured the release of dozens of AQAP members, helping to bolster the group’s ranks and ease some of the difficulties it faced in recruiting new members (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 2021).

Military and Intelligence Coordination

The 2024 UN Panel of Experts report on Yemen provided further detail on this relationship, describing it as an opportunistic alliance driven by shared military and security interests. It noted that cooperation included security and intelligence coordination, providing safe refuge, strengthening military positions, and coordinating operations against forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government (UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2024).

The Panel reported on an agreement reached in early 2024 under which the Houthis would supply AQAP with four drones, heat-seeking missiles, and explosive devices, and provide training to its members. The two sides also discussed the possibility of AQAP participating in operations against maritime targets. These findings suggest that their cooperation had expanded to include arms supplies, military training, and direct operational coordination (UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2024).

A study by Michael Horton, published in December 2024 in CTC Sentinel, the journal of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, provided further evidence that some aspects of this cooperation had already been put into practice. Horton reported that the Houthis had already supplied AQAP with limited-capability drones, while ruling out the provision of long-range drones given the persistent mistrust between the two sides (Horton, 2024, p. 17).

Continued Cooperation in 2025

The 2025 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen confirmed that coordination between the Houthis and AQAP had continued. It noted contacts between leaders of the two organizations and coordination between individuals linked to AQAP and the Houthis’ Security and Intelligence Service to advance their mutual interests (UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2025).

Additionally, the Panel reported that AQAP fighters received tactical training and medical care within Houthi-controlled territory. It also noted ongoing ceasefires and prisoner exchanges between the two groups, including a notable exchange on March 31, 2025.

The Impact of Houthi-AQAP Cooperation on AQAP’s Operational Capabilities

These ties take on added significance given that AQAP continues to conduct military operations. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen’s 2025 report noted that, in August 2024, the group carried out a suicide carbomb attack on a military base in Mudiyah District, Abyan Governorate, killing 16 soldiers and injuring 18 others. The report also documented the group’s use of explosive devices, snipers, and armed drones, as well as dozens of attacks in 2025. It further noted that AQAP continued to recruit members and raise funds through digital platforms.

“Cooperation with the Houthis provides AQAP with vital resources, enabling the group to sustain its operations and expand its capabilities.”

In this context, Houthi cooperation with AQAP, particularly in training, arms supplies, intelligence, and logistical support, provides an additional resource stream that could help the group sustain and expand its capabilities.

Additionally, the 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen raised concerns, citing confidential sources, about the possibility of AQAP regaining strength with Houthi support. These concerns merit serious international attention, given AQAP’s track record of plotting terrorist attacks beyond Yemen’s borders.

Third: Expanding Cooperation Between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab Military and Logistical Ties Across the Gulf of Aden

Cooperation between the Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab represents a critical escalation, forging a trans-regional alliance across the Gulf of Aden that expands collaboration in arms transfers, tactical training, and smuggling operations into the Horn of Africa.

In its report in 2024, the UN Panel of Experts noted a rise in contacts between the two groups and cited information indicating that the Houthis had sought to use the Somali coast to expand their maritime activities. Moreover, the Panel identified similar weapons held by both groups, bearing serial numbers that pointed to the same production batches. It considered this evidence of arms transfers between the two groups or their use of common supply sources.

In its 2025 report, the Panel provided additional details on the expanding cooperation between the two groups in arms smuggling, military and technical training, and logistical support. It warned that closer ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab increasingly threatened regional peace, security, and stability. The Panel placed this cooperation within the broader context of the Houthis’ efforts to extend their influence beyond Yemen.

In his analysis of Houthi–al-Shabaab dynamics, Michael Horton contends that the Houthis’ expanding alignment with AQAP facilitated direct channels to al-Shabaab and to associated maritime smuggling operations across the Horn of Africa. Horton notes that AQAP maintains entrenched ties with both al-Shabaab and transnational brokers operating between Yemen and Somalia. Furthermore, AQAP provides key operational services to regional trafficking networks, including cargo protection, transit escorting, logistics facilitation, intelligence gathering, and tribal mediation. This indicates that AQAP serves a dual purpose: rather than functioning solely as a recipient of Houthi support, it actively facilitates access to expansive regional networks (Horton, 2024, pp. 16–17).

Houthi–Al-Shabaab Agreements on Arms Transfers and Military Training

In a report published in May 2025, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies cited United Nations information concerning meetings held in 2024 between Houthi representatives and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. The discussions addressed cooperation on arms transfers and military training in exchange for an expansion of piracy and arms-smuggling activities.

According to the cited information, al-Shabaab requested advanced weapons and military training from the Houthis in exchange for intensifying piracy and attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. The report also discussed information indicating that weapons, ammunition, and explosives were transferred from Yemen to areas where al-Shabaab was active during 2024, and that the group acquired technical expertise and military equipment (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025).

Information cited by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies indicates that cooperation extended beyond agreements and training to include the use of transferred weapons in combat operations. Al-Shabaab received weapons shipments from Yemen between June and September 2024 and used some of these weapons in attacks against African Union forces in September and November of that year. Moreover, the Center reported that more than a dozen al-Shabaab members traveled to Yemen to receive training from AQAP, including training in drone technology (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025).

The report highlights a critical shift in al-Shabaab’s aerial capabilities. While the group previously used drones exclusively for reconnaissance, intelligence, and propaganda, its tactics evolved dramatically in 2025. During a major counter-offensive that year, al-Shabaab deployed weaponized drones to recapture territory previously liberated by Somali government forces. This escalation illustrates the severe impact of cross-regional technology transfers and tactical training, which have fundamentally upgraded the group’s combat capabilities (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025).

Transfer of Military and Technical Expertise

Cooperation in drone technology, explosive devices, and weapons maintenance is a prominent aspect of this relationship. The 2025 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen cited information indicating that al-Shabaab members had received training in drone technology and in the manufacture of advanced explosive devices.

A study by Peter Salisbury, Nada al-Dosari, and Jay Bahadur, published in August 2026 under the title “From Spoke to Hub: The Houthis in Africa”, examined the role of intermediaries in facilitating the movement of personnel and expertise between Yemen and Somalia. The study reported that Houthi military engineers traveled to the Jilib area of Somalia in 2024 to provide training in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, drone modification, and weapons maintenance.

Furthermore, the 2025 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen stated that arrangements had been made to facilitate the travel of approximately 400 Somalis to Houthi-controlled areas to receive military and ideological training, based on testimonies and evidence examined by the Panel during its investigations.

A study by the Century Foundation cited estimates from Yemeni and Somali security officials and other sources indicating that between 120 and several hundred al-Shabaab members had received training in Yemen. It also examined Ahmed Ilmi Samatar’s role in facilitating the movement of individuals between the two countries for military training (Salisbury, al-Dosari, and Bahadur, 2026).

Fourth: Houthi Contacts with the Islamic State in Somalia

Alongside their ties with AQAP and al-Shabaab, reports indicate the Houthis have established contact with the Islamic State in Somalia, centered in the mountainous Puntland region, as well as with transnational arms-smuggling networks linking Yemen and Somalia. In its 2025 report, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen cited senior Somali intelligence sources confirming detected communications between the Houthis, ISS, and al-Shabaab. Furthermore, Somali authorities intercepted explosive and drone shipments arriving from Yemen and arrested operatives tied to active maritime trafficking rings.

A March 2025 study by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, authored by researchers Ibrahim Jalal and Adnan al-Jabrani, traces the evolution of Houthi–Islamic State in Somalia ties back to at least 2021. While initially limited to small arms transfers, the relationship broadened significantly between November 2023 and May 2024, when Houthi representatives deployed to northeastern Somalia. There, they coordinated maritime intelligence gathering to identify vessel locations in the Gulf of Aden in exchange for short-range attack drones and technical training. These findings show an alliance that has expanded from basic weapons trafficking into shared maritime targeting, technical exchange, and advanced military support (Jalal and al-Jabrani, 2025).

Sanctions announced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2022, further expose the Yemeni arms-smuggling networks supplying the Islamic State in Somalia. The Treasury designated key operatives, including Abdulrahman Mohammed Omar, one of Puntland’s premier arms traffickers, who had been supplying both ISS and al-Shabaab since at least 2017.

Treasury findings indicate that Omar facilitated a 2020 weapons shipment to ISS originating with an Islamic State operative in Yemen. In 2021, he brokered another major transfer from the Yemeni port city of Ash Shihr, containing assault rifles, machine guns, and improvised explosive device components. Additionally, Omar funneled approximately $300,000 to an AQAP facilitator, underscoring cross-group financial links in the region (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2022).

The U.S. sanctions also targeted Issa Mahmoud Yusuf, who operated a network of smuggling vessels that transported weapons and equipment from Yemen to the Islamic State in Somalia in response to the group’s requests. The U.S. Department of the Treasury reported that one of Yusuf’s vessels was part of a network that used fishing operations as a cover for arms smuggling and money laundering.

The network comprised vessels and fishing agents linked to the Houthis. These findings indicate an overlap among arms-smuggling networks serving different terrorist organizations, as well as connections between certain individuals involved in these networks and individuals affiliated with the Houthis (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2022).

On August 26, 2024, Puntland security forces intercepted a trafficking cell in Galkayo, arresting seven individuals and seizing five first-personview (FPV) drones alongside explosives. In Annex 22 of its 2024 report (S/2024/748), the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia detailed that these drones featured real-time video feeds, with local intelligence tracing their origin to Yemen.

This seizure coincided with a marked upgrade in the Islamic State in Somalia’s aerial tactics. A February 2025 report by the UN Sanctions Monitoring Team noted the group had progressed from reconnaissance to dropping explosive payloads and experimenting with suicide drones. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) documented this tactical shift in January 2025, recording two weaponized drone strikes against Puntland forces on January 20 and 23 that killed two soldiers and wounded several others, marking the group’s first operational use of drones in direct armed combat (ACLED, 2025)

In an analysis published by the Institute for Security Studies Africa on June 10, 2025, researcher Karen Allen examined emerging risks arising from the expansion of Houthi ties with Somali terrorist organizations and the transfer of drone technology and military expertise to these groups. Allen argued that these developments could alter the nature of security threats in the Horn of Africa, particularly given armed groups’ ability to exploit existing smuggling networks and to access military equipment and technical expertise (Allen, 2025).

These developments add another dimension to concerns about the Houthis’ ties to terrorist organizations. They point to contacts with Islamic State in Somalia and arms-smuggling networks linking Yemen and Somalia, at a time when the group’s ability to conduct drone attacks is also advancing. From a counterterrorism perspective, the concern is that these networks could provide Islamic State in Somalia with access to weapons and military expertise, thereby increasing security challenges in the Horn of Africa.

Fifth: Transnational Networks: Arms, Migrant Smuggling, and Financing Across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

Arms smuggling is one of the main areas of cooperation between the Houthis on the one hand and armed groups and terrorist organizations operating in Yemen and the Horn of Africa on the other.

The 2025 report of the UN Panel of Experts examined arms-smuggling networks operating between Yemen and Somalia, demonstrating the Houthis’ role in supplying weapons through networks linked to Somalia’s al-Shabaab and AQAP. The report also referred to investigations involving approximately 70 Somali nationals linked to al-Shabaab who were suspected of involvement in arms smuggling between Yemen and Somalia.

The report identified cells in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate linked to Somalia’s al-Shabaab that were responsible for purchasing weapons from parties linked to the Houthis and transporting them to Somalia. It also noted that Somali territory was being used as a transit route for shipments destined for areas under Houthi control.

A Century Foundation study details these illicit networks, highlighting the crucial role of intermediaries in moving arms and equipment along the African coast to Yemen, and the Houthis’ growing management of these corridors.

Furthermore, Michael Horton’s research demonstrates how shared financial incentives extend to Horn of Africa migrant-smuggling rings. Horton notes that al-Shabaab has profited from human trafficking for years, with smuggling networks generating tens of millions of dollars transporting migrants into Yemen. In turn, AQAP levies taxes on smugglers moving these migrants from southern Yemen toward the Saudi and Omani borders. Ultimately, all three groups capitalize on migrantsmuggling operations to secure vital funding and cement shared economic interests (Horton, 2024).

A May 2025 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies details multiple arms interdictions between Yemen and Somalia from 2023 through 2025. Among the most prominent was the February 2024 arrest of six smugglers operating between Al Mahrah and Berbera, who were linked to operatives in Houthi-controlled territory. In June 2024, Puntland authorities seized suicide drones south of Bosaso and arrested seven suspected al-Shabaab members, with local officials identifying the Houthis as the source of the drones. Furthermore, the report documents weapons, ammunition, and explosives delivered from Yemen to al-Shabaab via the ports of Marka and Barawe between July and September 2024, alongside intercepted shipments containing advanced missile components and drone technology. These cases provide concrete evidence of active maritime trafficking networks moving high-tier military hardware between the two countries (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025).

These networks’ geographic reach provides multiple supply routes, facilitating the movement of equipment, personnel, and technical expertise while generating considerable revenue for illicit actors. From a counterterrorism perspective, their impact extends well past individual weapons shipments: they enable terrorist organizations to sustain resource pipelines and adapt to security restrictions and sanctions. Furthermore, the convergence of trafficking networks and armed groups obscures the origins of weapons and their transfer routes, significantly complicating counterterrorism enforcement and the implementation of international sanctions regimes.

Sixth: Russian and Chinese Portrayals of Houthi Cooperation with Terrorist Organizations

Coverage of Houthi ties to terrorist organizations is not confined to UN reports and Western analyses; Russian and Chinese research institutions and media outlets have also examined these relationships. Their reporting corroborated patterns of cooperation documented by the UN and offered additional insight into training facilities, inter-group communication, technology transfers, and cross-border smuggling networks.

On February 26, 2025, the official website of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS) published an analysis by the Russian Institute for Middle East Studies examining evolving Houthi–AQAP relations. The study detailed non-aggression pacts, prisoner swaps, sustained communication channels, and expanded cooperation with Somalia’s al-Shabaab through intelligence sharing and technical exchange. Furthermore, it revealed the existence of Houthi-run training camps in Al Jawf and Saada for extremist operatives, many of whom were subsequently deployed to Al Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwa.

Significantly, the analysis identified Saif al-Adel, the Iran-based de facto leader of Al-Qaeda, as a central coordinator in facilitating these cross-group alliances (Russian Institute for Middle East Studies, 2025).

On May 27, 2026, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that a high-level delegation from Somalia’s al-Shabaab visited Yemen to meet with leaders of AQAP and the Houthis. Citing Yemeni security sources, the report stated that the Somali delegation first met with AQAP leadership in Shabwa Governorate to explore joint operational capabilities, before holding separate consultations with Houthi representatives in Al Bayda Governorate.

Discussions with the Houthis focused on expanding cooperation in arms and narcotics smuggling and cross-border human mobility between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as part of a strategic push to deepen logistical, financial, and military alignment across the region.

On September 1, 2026, the Russian news agency “Interfax” published a report on expanding ties between the Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. It stated that a four-member Houthi delegation had visited the Somali town of Jilib in June 2026 to discuss military cooperation, training, and arms supplies.

The report provided information on al-Shabaab members travelling to Yemen for training, as well as visits by Houthi trainers to Somalia to instruct the group’s members in the use of drones. These data provide further details on direct contacts and the movement of fighters and trainers.

On May 29, 2026, the Russian newspaper Izvestia published a report titled “Give or Take: The Houthis and Somali Militants Are Rewriting the Rules of the Game in the Bab al-Mandab Strait”. The report examined the potential scope of cooperation between the Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab, noting that it could extend beyond the exchange of weapons and intelligence to include supply chains, financing, and joint operations.

The report highlighted the potential role of smuggling networks and al-Shabaab’s maritime activities in the Gulf of Aden in facilitating the movement of weapons and supplies across the region. It cautioned that an expansion of this cooperation could heighten threats to international shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and enable these actors to exert pressure on vessel traffic from either side of the strait.

Chinese media have also covered these ties. On September 20, 2026, the newspaper “The Paper” published an article exploring how the war in Yemen could affect security in the Horn of Africa. The article was part of the newspaper’s coverage of an international conference hosted by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

Drawing on earlier reports, the newspaper reported that the Houthis sell weapons, equipment, and drone technology to Somalia’s al-Shabaab and, in return for financial support and maritime smuggling services, provide the group with military training. The article linked these activities to growing security risks in the Horn of Africa, particularly in areas around the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Coverage of these ties in Russian and Chinese sources points to growing attention beyond Western sources to the risks of Houthi cooperation with terrorist organizations. Some publications also offer further details on training locations, contacts between the groups, and the movement of personnel and equipment across the Gulf of Aden, stressing the importance of examining these relationships as part of international counterterrorism efforts.

Seventh: Pragmatic Cooperation Beyond Ideological Differences

The most significant aspect of these relationships is that ideological differences among armed groups have not prevented them from forming pragmatic arrangements based on shared interests. The Houthis adhere to the Zaydi school of Islam, whereas Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia’s al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State are rooted in Salafi-jihadist movements.

Relations between the Houthis and AQAP have historically been marked by ideological hostility and armed confrontation. Nevertheless, UN reports indicate that shared military, security, and logistical interests have created opportunities for cooperation, including ceasefire arrangements, prisoner exchanges, intelligence sharing, arms transfers, and training.

This pattern helps explain the behavior of armed groups in conflict zones. Such groups can set aside their ideological differences when they share direct interests, particularly in protracted conflicts where state institutions are weak and smuggling networks are extensive.

These relationships indicate that terrorist organizations may cooperate with actors whose ideologies or political objectives differ from their own when such cooperation provides access to additional resources, expertise, or military capabilities.

Eighth: Implications for International Counterterrorism Efforts

As noted in UN reports, cooperation between the Houthis and terrorist organizations poses a range of challenges for international counterterrorism efforts, the most significant of which include:

1. Strengthening the Operational Capabilities of Terrorist Organizations

Security and military cooperation with the Houthis enables AQAP and Somalia’s al-Shabaab to improve their operational planning and execution, restructure their activities, and counter security and military pressure.

2. Developing Military and Technical Capabilities

The exchange of expertise and training with the Houthis, particularly in drone technology, helps terrorist organizations develop their military and technical capabilities.

3. Expanding Supply and Financing Networks

Cooperation with the Houthis enables terrorist organizations to exploit networks involved in smuggling weapons, equipment, and financial resources, while overcoming restrictions on their supply channels.

4. Increasing Maritime Security Threats

Houthi cooperation with Somalia’s al-Shabaab raises concerns about the use of smuggling networks through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the exchange of intelligence on vessel movements, and threats to maritime navigation.

5. Rising Risks of Cross-Border Terrorism

Strengthening the capabilities of AQAP and Somalia’s al-Shabaab through cooperation with the Houthis could increase their ability to carry out terrorist operations beyond their main areas of activity, threatening regional and international security.

This implication places the Houthis’ cooperation with terrorist organizations in a broader context: it directly undermines two decades of international counterterrorism gains in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Ninth: What Should Be a Higher International Priority?

Information in UN reports points to the importance of treating the Houthis’ ties to terrorist organizations as a distinct security issue that warrants the attention of relevant international institutions, regardless of differing positions on the conflict in Yemen.

In this context, international cooperation should be strengthened across the following key operational pillars:

1. Expanding Intelligence-Sharing and Collaborative Threat Assessments

Expand intelligence sharing on the Houthis’ ties to AQAP, Somalia’s alShabaab, and the Islamic State in Somalia, including information on the individuals and networks involved in military and security cooperation, expertise sharing, and training. Jointly assess how these relationships are evolving and what they mean for terrorist organizations’ capabilities and the threats they pose to regional and international security.

2. Tracking Arms Transfers and Combating Smuggling Networks

Strengthen regional and international cooperation to track weapons and military equipment moving between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, including drones and dual-use components, and to identify the smuggling networks and intermediaries facilitating transfers between the Houthis and terrorist organizations. This should also include building the capacity of the countries concerned to conduct coastal surveillance, carry out financial investigations, and pursue cross-border networks.

3. Enhancing Coordination Among International Sanctions Mechanisms

Strengthen coordination and information-sharing between the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the UN Security Council’s sanctions-monitoring mechanisms for Yemen, Somalia, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS. This would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Houthis’ ties to terrorist organizations, help identify shared networks and their sources of funding and arms, and make international sanctions more effective.

Conclusion

UN reports and the studies reviewed in this paper demonstrate that Houthi ties with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab have evolved far beyond informal contacts. Today, this alliance encompasses active military and security cooperation, intelligence-sharing, tactical training, and coordinated arms smuggling.

These findings expose a dimension of the Houthi movement that has received insufficient international scrutiny. The group is no longer merely an actor in a domestic civil war or a regional movement targeting commercial shipping; it has established a trans-regional force-multiplier with severe consequences for global security and counterterrorism efforts across Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

Assessing the Houthi threat requires looking beyond the group’s role in Yemen’s conflict and its regional confrontations. It also means examining its ties to terrorist organizations and the weapons, expertise, and supply networks those relationships provide. International counterterrorism institutions should take these ties seriously. Focusing only on current military and political developments risks overlooking a threat that could have implications far beyond Yemen and its immediate neighborhood.

Prof. Dr. Saleh M. Alkhathlan Senior Adviser Gulf Research Center